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A NEW CORRIDOR FOR THE MAZE: TRIBAL




Criminal jurisdiction in "Indian country"' is divided among federal,
tribal, and state governments by an amalgam of statutes, court deci-
sions, treaties, and administrative actions. Major crimes involving
Indians are subject to federal jurisdiction.2 Lesser crimes involving
Indians and non-Indians are subject to federal jurisdiction.' Crimes
© 1992 William V. Vetter
* Assistant Professor, Wayne State University. LL.M., George Washington Uni-
versity; J.D., University of Oregon. The author acknowledges the valuable contribution
of Nancy Farhat, without whose enthusiasm and assistance this article would have been
neither started nor completed.
1. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988) defines "Indian country" as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the juris-
diction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of
any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof,
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
2. The Major Crimes Act provides:
Offenses committed within Indian country
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another
Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A [18
U.S.C. §§ 2241-2245 (1988)], incest, assault with intent to commit murder,
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury,
arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within
the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all
other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not
defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive juris-
diction of the United States shall be defined and punished in accordance
with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in
force at the time of such offense.
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
3. The Indian Country Crimes Act provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place
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involving only non-Indians are subject to state jurisdiction. 4 In 1953,
Congress adopted Public Law 280, which transferred to specified states
all federal criminal jurisdiction over reservations within those states
(with some exceptions) and enabled other states to assume the same
jurisdiction.5 Public Law 280 was amended in 1968 to require tribal
consent to state assumption of Public Law 280 jurisdiction.6 Crimes
are subject to tribal jurisdiction if they involve only tribal members.
7
In a 1976 article, Professor Robert N. Clinton dubbed criminal law
in Indian country a "jurisdictional maze." 8 The legal and ideological
foundations of that maze were begun in Europe long before the United
States began its political existence - even before Europeans "discov-
ered" the American continents. 9 Perhaps unfortunately, it is not the
two-dimensional, Euclidian maze of King Minos; it is a three- or four-
dimensional construct, often built with a hidden agenda and frequented
by ghosts of ideologies past and present. When the first U.S. Congress
enacted Indian-related legislation, it built on existing foundations. The
ensuing 200 years has increased the complexity pnd confusion of
Indian-related legislation. In 1990, another corridor of the maze was
vithin the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing
any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law
of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes
respectively.
Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
4. See Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 242-43 (1896); United States v.
McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 623 (1881).
5. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)). Some states,
such as Washington and Montana, have assumed jurisdiction over part of the reservations
in the state, and, in the case of Washington, assumed only partial jurisdiction over
some reservations.
6. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. 73, 77-81 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
1301-1341 (1988)). Public Law 90-284, except for title I, is commonly referred to as the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).
7. See the exception to 18 U.S.C. § 1152, quoted supra note 3. However, admin-
istratively created Courts of Indian Offenses (also known as CFR courts) exercise
misdemeamor jurisdiction over all intra-Indian crimes within some reservations, regardless
of tribal membership. See discussion infra notes 481-88.
8. Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through
a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARiz. L. REv. 503, 503 (1976).
9. See generally JAmEs MULDOON, POPES, LAwYERs AND INFIDELS (1977); ROERT
A. WIU.IAMS, JR., TaE AmERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEOAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES
OF CONQrEST (1990); FREDERICK TURNER, BEYOND GEOGRAPHY: THE WESTERN SPIRIT
AGAINsT ian WILDERNESs (1980).
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illuminated. The United States Supreme Court ruled in Duro v. Reina0
that Indian tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over crimes committed
by Indians not members of the local tribe." The Court held that
nonmember Indians and non-Indians have identical standing insofar
as Indian tribal court criminal jurisdiction is concerned.' 2 A few months
later, in the frenetic dying moments of the 1990 Congress, a measure
slipped through purporting to reverse the Supreme Court's decision
and eliminate the newly discovered corridor.
3
While constructing Duro's new corridor in the maze, the Supreme
Court encountered problems similar to those confronted by anyone
modernizing any historic edifice. The old walls and foundations pre-
sented more obstacles than support; corners and infrastructures were
not in convenient places; the old blueprints did not include relevant
information; compromises had to be made. This newly lit corridor of
the maze begins between the fixed walls of Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe 4 and United States v. Wheeler 5 and on the bedrock of
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,16 viz., the dependent nature of tribal
sovereignty precludes independent exercise of external relations. But a
short way down this new corridor, the way appeared blocked by a
wall of decisions laid on foundations fixed by the likes of Montana
v. United States 7 and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 8 viz. non-
members (external) are subject to tribal civil jurisdiction. Examining
that wall revealed what looked like an opening; nonmembers supply
the basis for tribal civil jurisdiction by voluntarily entering into some
relationship with the tribe or its members. Working toward that open-
ing, the new corridor was blocked by an opposing wall; not all tribal
jurisdiction resulted from nonmembers' voluntary acts. Just a year
before, the Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation 9 patchwork ("protection of tribal values and customs") was
10. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
11. Id. at 679.
12. Id. at 695. The Duro decision has been hailed as a "devastating blow to Indian
tribes" in an article by the Director and an attorney for the Indian Law Support Center.
Steve Moore & Jerilyn DeCoteau, 1990 Decisions of the United States Supreme Court:
Erosion of Native Tribal and Religious Rights, 24 CLEAnIGHousE REv. 991, 991 (1991).
13. Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-
511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1990).
14. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
15. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
16. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
17. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
18. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Merrion was followed, legally and chronologically, by
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 209 (1989).
19. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). Brendale's consent to tribal authority was, like Duro's,
nonexistent, but both acted within reservation boundaries; their actions threatening tribal
values. Brendale had not sought or forged connection with the Yakima Nation, but the
Court held him subject to some degree of tribal civil regulation. Only experience will
tell if Brendale increased or decreased the acknowledged scope of tribal jurisdiction.
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papered to the partial wall of tribal jurisdiction. In addition, cases
such as Merrion hold that the power to tax nonmembers' on-reservation
activities is a matter of inherent sovereignty, not consent.20
Thus, the "external relations" foundation acquired a swiss-cheese
appearance. Support was sought in a new direction, i.e, the Consti-
tution protects United States citizens from unwarranted intrusions on
personal liberty. The new direction was itself confounded. All Indians,
not just nonmembers, are United States citizens. The key to this
obstacle was posited to be in the hands of Congress. But Congress'
key -was not used for the Wheeler-approved tribal jurisdiction over
members. The Court turned to another key already at hand, one akin
to the Montana key of consent, forged from the very source of the
Constitution, i.e., the power of participation by the governed.
Through the governed's consent door, the Duro majority arrived at
its destination, an area of uncertain size and character at a yet unfixed
location in the maze. From this vantage, the majority reached back
to block some false corridors started by the lower courts and to adorn
the walls with proposed but rejected plans. The Duro dissent ap-
proached the destination unwillingly and nailed alternate proposals to
the door; some were countered by the majority's elaborations but
others remain as challenges for further exploration.
Short months after the Court's decision, Congress attempted to
obliterate the Duro corridor. Starting from the same place and based
upon the same historic plans, the legislation's sponsors and supporters
avowed a diametrically opposed conclusion, primarily by alleging that
Duro read the plans wrong.2' It was rumored that the enactment stands
on venerable foundations, but nothing concrete was revealed.
At least one aspect of the illumination of these allegorical corridors
appears inadequate - the search for a historic foundation. To say
that federal Indian law is history-dependent is to understate the ob-
vious. Every inquiry concerning jurisdiction and Indians must start
from politico-ideological constructs begun before the United States
came into being and (passing through numerous and contradictory
modifications and embellishments of court decisions, legislation, and
politics) proceed to the present time. Concerning the Duro question,
neither the parties, the courts, nor congresspersons seem to have given
more than selective, perfunctory consideration to historic facts or
documents. The practice was, instead, to make broad conclusory state-
ments with only vague references to ostensible supporting information.
Part I1I.B of this article presents a more detailed look at historical
sources.
20. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 147.
21. See infra part IV.
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Duro, on its face and especially in conjunction with Oliphant,
presents a significant problem. How can day-to-day, routine reservation
law enforcement be handled? The argument that the Duro result left
a jurisdictional void is, perhaps, theoretically incorrect, but it is not
practically incorrect. The advocates of Congress' "solution" apparently
think the problem is solved. However Duro itself makes that belief
highly questionable. Possibilities for resolving that problem are dis-
cussed in the final portion of this article.
L The Corridor's Beginning
A. The Setting
1. The Facts1 - Duro v. Reina
On June 15, 1984, Albert Duro (a Cahuilla Indian from California)
participated in a confrontation between two carloads of youths, within
the Pima-Maricopa Indian Reservation, which is just east of Scottsdale,
Arizona. Duro allegedly discharged two shots from a lever-action rifle.
One of those shots allegedly struck and killed Philip Brown, a four-
teen-year-old member of the Gila River Indian Community who was
about two blocks away and not involved in the confrontation. About
June 19th, Duro was arrested by federal agents in California. On the
prosecutor's motion, a first-degree murder indictment was dismissed
without prejudice. Two days after that, Duro was turned over to the
Salt River Department of Public Safety (tribal police) and charged
with unlawfully discharging a firearm, a misdemeanor.
Albert Duro, born in California in 1958, is a U.S. citizen and an
enrolled member of the Torrez-Martinez Band of Mission Indians, a
federally recognized Indian tribe.z During most of his twenty-six years
preceding the incident, Duro lived in California not on an Indian
reservation.Y He met Debbie Lackey, a member of the Salt River
22. The facts before the federal courts were limited to Duro's membership in a
tribe other than the Pima-Maricopa Indian Community and that he was charged in the
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Court with the criminal discharge of a firearm on
the community's reservallon. The other facts mentioned in the following discussion are
disclosed in the various court opinions, briefs filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, and
a telephone interview with John Trebon, Esq., Attorney for Albert Duro. See also
Hearing [Apr. 11, 19911 on H.R. 972 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) (written
testimony of Prof. N.J. Newton).
23. Brown resided on the Salt-River Indian Reservation, even though he was not
a member of that community.
24. The Torrez-Martinez Band of Mission Indians is small; it has never had a tribal
court and exercises no criminal jurisdiction over its members.
25. California, a "Public Law 280" state (see supra note 5 and accompanying text)
has criminal jurisdiction over in-state reservations.
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Pima-Maricopa Indian Community who was raised in California, and
the Iwo lived together intermittently during 1980-83, primarily in Cal-
ifornia. In March 1984, Duro moved onto the Salt River Reservation
to live with Lackey and her family. While living on the reservation,
Duro was employed by the PiCopa Construction Company, which is
owned by the Community. PiCopa does not limit employment to
Indians or Community members. Shortly after the shooting incident,
Duro left the Pima-Maricopa Reservation.
Duro moved to dismiss the tribal court charges on the ground that
he was not a member of the Community and therefore not subject to
its criminal jurisdiction. That motion was denied. 26 No tribal appeal
was available. 27 Duro petitioned the U.S. district court for a writ of
habeas corpus. That petition was granted.u
On appeal, a divided Ninth Circuit panel vacated the district court
decision. 29 Almost a year after its initial decision, the same panel issued
amended opinions, reaching the same result for essentially the same
reasons.30 Later, a majority of the Ninth Circuit judges did not vote
to grant Duro's request for rehearing en banc, over a strenuous three-
judge dissent."' When he petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for cer-
tiorari, Duro was in the anomalous position of having lost before the
Ninth Circuit despite the fact that four of the six circuit judges who
expressed their opinion disagreed with that result. In Greywater v.
Joshua, -2 a case similar to Duro, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit did not experience a divergence of opinion - the court unan-
imously reached the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit's dissenters.
2. The Facts - Greywater v. Joshua
Mary Jo Greywater, Anthony Charboneau, Jr., and Raymond Buck-
les, members of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians who
resided on that tribe's reservation, were arrested by Sioux Tribal Police
26. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Duro, Cause No. CR-84-0256
(Salt-River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Ct. Oct. 19, 1984), reprinted in Exhibit
K, Petition for Writ of Cert., in Joint Appendix, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)
(No. 88-6546).
27. SALT RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA INDIAN CommuNrTY LAW AND ORDER CODE § 4-
32 (n.d.) [hereinafter SALT RER CODE), reprinted in Exhibits L, M, Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus, in Joint Appendix, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (No. 88-
6546). S, e infra part III.A.
28. The parties' Stipulation of Fact and the District Court's Memorandum and
Order in Duro v. Reina, Cause No. CIV 84-2107 PHX WPC (D. Ariz. 1985), are
reproduced in the Joint Appendix, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (No. 88-6546).
29. Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987).
30. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988) (amended decision).
31. Duro v. Reina, 860 F.2d 1463, 1463 (9th Cir. 1988) (order denying rehearing
en banc); id. (Kozinski, J., joined by Leavy, J. and Trott, J., dissenting).
32. 46 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988).
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on the Devils Lake Indian Reservation. 33 All three were charged, under
the Devils Lake Sioux Tribal Code, with possession of alcohol in a
motor vehicle, public intoxication, and disorderly conduct.3 The au-
tomobile's driver, a member of the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe, was not
charged. The three Chippewa moved for dismissal contending that, as
nonmembers, they were not subject to the tribe's criminal jurisdiction.
The Sioux Tribal Court denied the motion without a hearing and
without a record .3 The U.S. District Court for North Dakota dismissed
habeas corpus petitions without prejudice, pending exhaustion of tribal
court remedies.3 6 A unanimous Eighth Circuit panel reversed and
directed the district court to issue writs of habeas corpus, declaring





Though other authorities were discussed in the Greywater and Duro
opinions, the primary precedents considered were Oliphant and Wheeler.
Oliphant and Wheeler were both decided during the Supreme Court's
October 1977 Term; they were argued two days apart and the opinions
released sixteen days apart. The Wheeler decision was unanimous, but
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Marshall dissented in Oliphant. Justice
Brennan did not participate in either case.
Oliphant involved tribal prosecutions for misdemeanor offenses al-
legedly committed on the Port Madison Indian Reservation in Wash-
ington State. The Suquamish Indian Tribe is the resident tribe of that
reservation. Mark David Oliphant was charged in the Suquamish
Indian Provisional Court with assaulting a tribal officer and resisting
arrest. Daniel B. Belgarde was arrested after a high-speed chase through
the reservation and charged with recklessly endangering another person
and damaging tribal property. Both were non-Indians who lived on
the Port Madison Indian Reservation."8 Oliphant and Belgarde sepa-
rately petitioned the U.S. district court for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that the tribal court had no criminal jurisdiction over non-
33. The Devils Lake Sioux Indian reservation is about 95 miles southeast of the
Turtle Mountain Chippewa Indian Reservation. Both are in North Dakota.
34. Charboneau was also charged with resisting arrest.
35. The tribal judge allegedly told the three that they would not receive a fair trial
because only Sioux would be on the jury. Greywater, 846 F.2d at 489.
36. Id. at 487.
37. Id. at 488.
38. The Port Madison Indian Reservation is a "checkerboard" of tribal land. The
district court found that approximately 63% of the land within the reservation boundaries
was owned in fee simple by non-Indians. The remaining land was "trust" land (primarily
unoccupied) held by the U.S. for the benefit of the Suquamish Indians. Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 n.1 (1978). Of the approximately 2980
reservation residents, only about 50 were members of the Suquamish Tribe. Id.
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Indians.39 The district court disagreed and denied both petitions. 40 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision concerning Oli-
pharit.
41
In Oliphant, the Supreme Court reviewed the legislative, adminis-
trative, and judicial history of Indian tribal criminal jurisdiction vis-
4-vis non-Indians. The majority concluded that criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians was a matter of external relations and, therefore,
inconsistent with the dependent status of Indian tribes.4 2 The two-
justice dissent was based upon the theory that the retained sovereignty
of Indian tribes was sufficient to allow criminal jurisdiction over all
persons within the reservation, subject only to express, affirmative
withdrawal by statute or treaty. 43 Consistent with the facts, both
Oliphant opinions were couched in "Indian" versus "non-Indian"
terms.
Wheeler involved sequential prosecutions in the Navajo Tribal Court
and the U.S. district court. Wheeler was an enrolled member of the
Navajo Tribe and lived on the Navajo Reservation. In tribal court,
Wheeler was charged with and pled guilty to misdemeanor disorderly
conduct and contributing to the delinquency of a minor (a fifteen-
year-old Navajo girl) within the reservation. 4 More than a year later,
Wheeler was charged in federal court with statutory rape, based on
the sne facts. Wheeler moved to dismiss the federal charges on double
jeopardy grounds. The district court agreed and dismissed the indict-
ment. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Indian tribal
courts and federal courts are not arms of separate sovereigns and,
therefore, federal prosecution was barred by the prior tribal prosecu-
tion. 4 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, hold-
ing that Indian tribes and the United States are separate sovereigns
and therefore the Fifth Amendment does not bar successive tribal and
federal prosecution. 46 Key to that decision was that tribal criminal
jurisdiction over its own members was never expressly surrendered,
39. Id. at 194-95.
40. Id.
41. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976). Belgarde's appeal to the
Ninth Circuit was held in abeyance while the petition for certiorari was heard by the
Supreme Court. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195 n.5.
42. Oliphant, 495 U.S. at 208-11.
43. Id. at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 314-15 & nn.l-3.
45. United States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd., 435 U.S.
313 (1978). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between that
decision and United States v. Walking Crow, 560 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 953 (1978).
46. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 331-32.
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was not inconsistent with the tribe's "dependent" status, and was not
delegated federal power. 47 In contrast to Oliphant, Wheeler was couched
in terms of "tribal member" versus "nonmember." Significantly (at
least for Duro), Wheeler stated, "And, as we have recently held [in
Oliphant] they [Indian tribes] cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts." 4
B. The Lower Court Opinions
1. Pima-Maricopa Community Court
In the Pima-Maricopa Community Court (the tribal court), Albert
Duro contended that he was not within that court's criminal jurisdic-
tion because he was not a member of the Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community.4 9 The Community Code's criminal jurisdiction provision
provides for jurisdiction over offenses committed by "persons other-
wise subject to" the tribal court's jurisdiction. 0 The Code does not
elaborate on "otherwise subject to." The tribal court concluded that
the Supreme Court's statement in Wheeler that Oliphant held that
47. Id. at 328.
48. Id. at 326. In both Duro and Greywater, the United States argued that the
Wheeler decision did not mean what it said. While two judges of the Ninth Circuit
were apparently convinced, the Supreme Court was not.
There was apparently no contention that Wheeler's federal prosecution was barred
by the proviso in 18 U.S.C. § 1152 that Indians punished by the local law of the tribe
are not subject to federal prosecution, perhaps because Wheeler was prosecuted under
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (the Major Crimes Act) rather than § 1152 (the federal enclaves
extension).
49. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Duro, Cause No. CR-84-0256
(Salt-River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Court Oct. 19, 1984), reprinted in Joint
Appendix, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (No. 88-6546).
50. Section 4-1(c) of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Law &
Order Code provides:
(c) Criminal jurisdiction over persons.
(1) The court of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Com-
munity shall have jurisdiction over all offenses enumerated
in the Code of Ordinances when committed by any person
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Salt River Court.
(2) Any person otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
Salt River Court who enters upon the Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community shall be deemed to have con-
sented to the jurisdiction of the community court.
SALT RAVER CODE, supra note 27, § 4-1(c), reprinted in Exhibit J, Petition for Writ of
Cert., in Joint Appendix, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (No. 88-6546). The Salt
River Code takes an encompassing position on territorial jurisdiction, including juris-
diction over "all territory within the reservation boundaries, fee-patented lands, rights-
of-way, roads, water, bridges, and land used for schools, churches, or agency purposes."
SALT RvER CODE, supra note 27, § 4-1(c)(3), reprinted in Joint Appendix, Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (No. 88-6546).
No. 2]
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Indiam tribes had no jurisdiction to try "nonmembers" could not be
understood literally since Oliphant dealt only with "non-Indians."I'l
The tribal court held that Duro was subject to its jurisdiction because
he was not "non-Indian." 52
2. Duro - U.S. District Court
The district court's decision on Duro's petition was based on stip-
ulated facts.53 In its memorandum decision, the district court stated
that the Community Code allows tribal prosecution of all nonmembers
but that the tribe exercises that jurisdiction only over Indian nonmem-
bers. 4 The district court acknowledged the controversy over Oliphant
but held that it was not crucial because the tribal court's exercise of
jurisdiction over Duro violated the equal protection provision of the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 5 The district court held that under
either the "strict scrutiny" or the "rational basis" test, exercising
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians while not exercising it over non-
member non-Indians violated equal protection rules, stating, "Respon-
51, Stipulation of Fact, reprinted in Joint Appendix, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676
(1990) (No. 88-6546).
52. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Duro, No. CR-84-0256 (Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Community Ct. Oct. 19, 1984), reprinted in Exhibit J, Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, in Joint Appendix, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)
(No. 88-6546). There was never a contention that Duro did not exhaust tribal remedies.
The Salt River Code limits the right to appeal to the appellate division to "[a]ny party
aggrieved by the verdict or judgment in a civil action and any defendant found guilty
in a criminal action ... ." SALT RIVER CODE, supra note 27, § 4-32, reprinted in
Petition for Writ of Cert., in Joint Appendix, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (No.
88-6546).
53. See supra note 28.
54. Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1987).
The Salt River Code provides:
Any person not a member of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Community who within the community commits any
act which is a crime under community, federal or state law
may be prosecuted under community law, forcibly ejected
from the community .... and/or may be turned over to
the custody of the United States ... or the State of Arizona
for prosecution under federal or state law.
SALT.RvEa CODE, supra note 27, § 2-5 (emphasis added), reprinted in Exhibit A,
Petition for Writ of Cert., in Joint Appendix, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (No.
88-6546). It is not reasonable to construe § 2-5 as defining the phrase "persons otherwise
subject to" in § 4-1(c). Section 2-5 of the Salt River Code, on initial examination,
appears more restricted than § 4-1(c). The two sections are reconcilable by interpreting
§ 2-5 as providing an additional power (expulsion) exercisable against nonmembers.
That, however, says nothing about prosecutorial jurisdiction. Section 2-5 does not
distinguirh between nonmember Indians and nonmember non-Indians.
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988).
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dents have failed to articulate any valid reason to justify the differential
treatment of nonmembers solely on the basis of race.
'3 6
3. Duro - U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
The appeal to the Ninth Circuit produced five opinions. The final
result was that the district court's decision was reversed, even though
the majority of judges who expressed their opinions would have sus-
tained that decision. The panel to which the cdse was assigned split 2-
1; the panel majority and the dissent each published an original and
an amended opinion.17 The petition for rehearing en banc was denied,
but three judges dissented, agreeing with the panel dissent.1
8
(a) Panel Majority
The panel majority characterized the issue as "one of the uncharted
reaches of tribal jurisdiction," 9 opining that the exercise of tribal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians was "virtually without historical
precedent."' 6 The panel majority lamented that the resolution was
made more difficult "by the indiscriminate use by Congress and the
courts of the terms 'Indian' and 'non-Indian' - 'Indian' frequently
has been used to denote 'tribal member,' while 'non-Indian' has served
as a synonym for 'nonmember.
' ' 61
The panel majority looked first to Oliphant. After noting that
Oliphant dealt only with non-Indians, the panel majority interpreted
subsequent Supreme Court decisions as indicating both that Oliphant
56. Duro v. Reina, Cause No. CIV 84-2107 PHX WPC (D. Ariz. 1985), in Joint
Appendix at 41, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (No. 88-6546).
57. Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987) (Brunetti, J., and Choy, J.,
joined in the majority opinion; Sneed, J., dissented); Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136
(9th Cir. 1988) (amended decision).
58. Duro v. Reina, 860 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1988) (order denying rehearing en
banc).
59. Duro, 821 F.2d at 1359. The panel majority stated the issue as "whether an
Indian may be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the court of a tribe of which
neither he nor his victim was a member." Id.
60. Id. at 1360. The majority went on to state:
This Pack of precedent] is not because such power did not theoretically
reside in the tribes, but rather because circumstances... did not give rise
to its exercise. The circumstances giving rise to the instant case have their
roots in the present displacement of many Indian tribes, the resultant
heterogeneity of present day reservation populations, and the increasing
prevalence and sophistication of tribal courts.
Id. (emphasis added). These statements are directly contrary to the congressional ad-
vocacy employed to obtain passage of the anti-Duro legislation, despite the fact that
those advocates argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision was correct. See infra part IV.
61. Duro, 821 F.2d at 1360.
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did,, ' and did not,63 apply to nonmember Indians. A similar lack of
verbal consistency was found in Ninth Circuit opinions." Because of
that asserted ambiguity, the panel majority concluded that Oliphant
was not mandatory precedent for Duro but that Oliphant's rationale
might be employed. 65
The panel majority stated that the Oliphant conclusion was based
on three factors: (1) a historical federal government presumption that
tribal governments had no jurisdiction over non-Indians; (2) a specific
treaty provision for federal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians; and
(3) the fact that tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was
inconsistent with the tribes' "dependent status.""6
Considering the first factor, the panel majority found historical
ambiguity concerning nonmember Indians. The executive and judicial
branclhes, per the panel majority, apparently presumed Indian tribes
had jurisdiction over all Indians, without regard to membership.67 On
the other hand, the panel majority said, historical executive and con-
gressional pronouncements appear to have used "Indian" to mean
"tribal member," implying that nonmembers and non-Indians had the
same status." The historical record, then, was of little assistance.
The panel majority did not discuss Oliphant's second factor, an
underlying treaty; no party contended that a determinative treaty
existed. On the third Oliphant factor, which it characterized as the
most significant, the panel majority again found ambiguity. It noted
that con one hand, the theory of overriding sovereignty (that the Indian
tribes by treaty subordinated themselves to the United States) suggested
that the subordination applied only to non-Indians. 69 On the other
hand, the panel majority stated, all Indians are now United States
citizens and, therefore, can claim exemption from tribal jurisdiction
on the same grounds as non-Indians. 70 Reserving the last consideration
for its equal protection discussion, the panel majority held that neither
Oliphant's reasoning nor language disposed of the Duro issue.
71
62. Id. (citing Merrion v. .icarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 173 (1982); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)).
63. Id. (citing National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 853-
55 (198.5); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
135, 153 (1980)).
64. See id. at 1361 n.1.
65. Id. at 1361.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Richard B. Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian
Tribes, 54 WASH. L. Ra. 479 & n.5 (1979)).
68. Id. (citing Karl J. Erhart, Comment, Jurisdiction Over Nonmember Indians on
Reservations, 1980 ARiz. ST. L.J. 727, 74648).
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In its amended opinion,72 the majority expanded on its Oliphant
discussion, with greater attention paid to later cases that mentioned
Oliphant. The first addition to the majority's opinion expressed its
reasons for not following the statements (that Oliphant applies to
nonmembers) in Merrion and Wheeler. The panel majority found three
reasons why Merrion did not control Duro:
(1) the characterization of Oliphant as applying to non-
members was in Justice Stevens' Merrion dissent, not in the
majority opinion.
(2) the Merrion issue was the tribe's power to tax non-
Indians, not nonmembers.
(3) the majority and dissenting opinions in Merrion used
the terms "non-Indian" and "nonmember" interchangea-
bly, without apparent reason.73
The panel majority dismissed Wheeler by characterizing its discussion
of Oliphant as dictum.74 In its amended opinion, the panel majority
acknowledged that Wheeler consistently used the term "nonmember"
but noted that membership was not an issue because the defendant
was a member of the prosecuting tribe. The Wheeler decision's use of
the term "nonmember" when referring to Oliphant was characterized
as "indiscriminate.")
75
In its original decision, the panel majority also addressed the equal
protection claim. 76 The panel majority disagreed with the district court's
"conclusion" that the tribal court's decision concerning nonmember
Indians was based upon race. The panel majority found that deter-
mining who is an "Indian" for federal criminal jurisdiction purposes
is based upon the defendant's degree of Indian blood and tribal or
federal recognition of status." "For the purpose of federal jurisdiction,
72. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988).
73. Id. at 1140. The panel's amended opinion states: "This change in terms has
no relevance to the [Merrion] decision. It is clear that the Court is discussing the tribe's
authority to tax 'non-Indian' miners not 'nonmembers."' Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The panel majority also made some minor changes to the text and added
a long footnote where its initial opinion had merely mentioned that a commentator had
concluded that non-Indians and nonmembers had the same status under Oliphant. The
panel majority examined the 1980 comment published in the Arizona State Law Journal
rather minutely in its discussion of congressional intent. The panel's comments, after
making the comment sound inconsistent, conclude: "The problem is that it is indeed
too difficult to get a finger on the pulse of Congress' intent in this area." Id. at 1141
n.4 (construing Erhart, supra note 68).
76. In a footnote, the panel majority engaged in a somewhat unfocused discussion
comparing the Fifth Amendment's equal protection prbvision and that of the ICRA (25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988)). Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358, 1362 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987).
That note concludes that a determination that the tribal court's action is valid under
the Fifth Amendment necessarily means that the action is valid under the ICRA.
77. Duro, 821 F.2d at 1363 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153; United States v.
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Indian status is 'based on a totality of circumstances, including ge-
nealogy, group identification, and lifestyle, in which no one factor is
dispositive."' 78 The panel majority justified tribal jurisdiction on sim-
ilar grounds, i.e., not solely on Duro's race, but that combined with
his enrollment in a recognized tribe and his association with the Pima-
Maricopa Community through his member-girlfriend and his employ-
ment by a tribally owned construction company.7 9 In its amended
opinion, the panel majority concluded that "extending tribal court
criminal jurisdiction to nonmember Indians who have significant con-
tacts with a reservation does not amount to a racial classification. "10
The panel majority's "nonracial" classification was tested under the
"rational basis" equal protection analysis. The necessary rational basis
was found in the community's need for adequate law enforcement and
the desire to treat all resident Indians, member or nonmember, equally."'
As an additional basis for its initial decision, the panel majority
opined that the district court's decision created a "jurisdictional void." 82
To reach that conclusion, the panel majority characterized the decision
as being that nonmember Indians must be treated as non-Indians for
all tribal, state, and federal jurisdictional purposes. That treatment,
the panel majority argued, would preclude both tribal and federal
criminal jurisdiction if the crime were "victimless," or both perpetrator
and victim were nonmembers." The found "void" is based upon the
asserted fact that states do not (at least in Duro's case), or cannot,
exercise jurisdiction.84 Therefore, the panel majority's initial opinion
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 859 (1979)). The
same theory was used to support the definition of "Indian" used in the post-Duro
legislation. See infra part IV.
The discussion acknowledged that, at least in theory, federal Indian legislation is
based upon the political, rather than racial, character of Indian tribes. Duro, 821 F.2d
at 1362-63. The Supreme Court's exposition of the political nature of Indian tribes is
found, at least in significant part, in United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977),
and Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
78. Duro, 821 F.2d at 1363 (quoting Clinton, supra note 8, at 518).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1364.
81. Id. at 1363. This portion of the panel majority's opinion was not changed in
the amended opinion.
82. Id. at 1364. This argument was.strenuously made by the United States at all
levels in Duro, before the Eighth Circuit, in Greywater, and to Congress. The argument
succeeded only with two Ninth Circuit judges and some members of Congress.
83. Id. at 1364 & n.5.
84. Id. (citing State v. Allen, 607 P.2d 426, 429 (1980)). The majority also noted
that extending state jurisdiction to nonmember reservation resident Indians would have
its own disadvantages. Id. (citing Robert N. Clinton, State Power over Indian Reser-
vations: A Critical Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D. L. REV. 434, 445-46
(1981)).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/2
No. 21 TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 363
concluded that finding in Duro's favor would create a void where no
government could exercise criminal jurisdiction.85 The panel majority
did not acknowledge that its "significant contacts" limitation resulted
in a similar void - possibly smaller but also more vague.
In its amended opinion, the panel majority added the assertion that
the "federal criminal statutory scheme and its treatment of crimes
committed by Indians" was "more dispositive" than Oliphant.6 That
"statutory scheme" is keyed to the term "Indian."7 Based primarily
on Ninth Circuit precedent, the panel majority concluded that "In-
dian," as used in those sections, has never been interpreted to be
limited to "an Indian member of the local tribe." 8 The panel major-
ity's amended opinion stated:
The structure of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, as
far as it is relevant here, is easily discerned. Tribal courts
generally handle petty crimes by Indians against Indians and
victimless crimes by Indians. However, certain "major"
crimes by Indians are dealt with in federal court pursuant
to the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. That statute
punishes "Indians" who commit crimes in Indian country.
That usually means that the crime is committed on some
tribe's reservation "and the fair inference is that the of-
fending Indian shall belong to that or some other tribe...
[the statute's] effect is confined to the acts of an Indian of
some tribe, of a criminal character, committed within the
limits of the reservation." United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 383, 6 S. Ct. 1109, 1113, 30 L. Ed. 228 (1886)
(emphasis added). That statute has never been restricted in
its application to Indians who are members of the "host"
tribe. 9
This added discussion concluded:
The cases discussing the federal criminal statutory scheme
clearly indicate that if Congress had intended to divest tribal
courts of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians they
[sic] would have done so. Absent such divestment it is
reasonable to conclude that tribal courts retain jurisdiction
over crimes committed by Indians against other Indians
without regard to tribal membership. 9°
85. Id.
86. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 114243 (9th Cir. 1988) (amended decision)
(footnote omitted).
87. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153 (1988).
88. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1143.
89. Id.
90. Id. The panel did not cite any cases that expressly state this holding and in
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The fact that this argument is subject to criticism is proven in the
dissenting opinions and the Supreme Court's decision.
(2) Panel Dissent
In the initial dissent, Judge Sneed argued that Wheeler made explicit
that Oliphant applied equally to non-Indians and nonmember Indians. 91
The amended dissenting opinion focuses on WheelerY Judge Sneed
argued that Wheeler's use of "Indian," "non-Indian," and "nonmem-
ber" was precise and purposeful. The question in Wheeler was the
nature of an Indian tribes' "retained sovereignty," similar to the issue
in Oliphant. Wheeler delineated that jurisdiction in terms of "non-
members," clearly consistent with Oliphant and inconsistent with the
panel majority's position.9 3
Judge Sneed's original opinion posited that the "unique sovereignty"
of Indian tribes does not justify differing treatment for Indian and
non-Indian nonmembers. As a racial distinction, that differential treat-
ment would have to survive strict scrutiny; Judge Sneed argued that
it does not because the arguments supporting tribal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians applies with at least equal force to non-Indians.
4
The revised dissent took the position that a potential discrimination
(equal protection) claim is not so much a separate basis for decision
as a means to "inform" interpretation." Judge Sneed suggested that
under the panel majority's approach, "nonmember Indian" is the only
none of the cases it discussed was the "non-Indian"/"nonmember Indian" question an
issue.
The panel majority also noted that the Department of the Interior's regulations
establishing Courts of Indian Offenses, see 25 C.F.R. § 11.2 (1990), bases those courts'
jurisdiction on a defendant's Indian descent and membership in any recognized Indian
tribe, without distinguishing nonmember Indians. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1142 n.6.
91. Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1988) (Sneed, J., dissenting).
Judge Sneed also pointed out that two commentators (both of whom had been favorably
cited by the majority), had concluded that Oliphant suggests equal treatment for non-
Indians and nonmember Indians. Id. (citing Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own
Count,-y: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government,
33 STAx. L. R v. 979, 1022 n.251 (1981) (cited by the majority at Duro, 821 F.2d at
1363); Erhart, supra note 68, at 737-49 (cited by the majority at Duro, 821 F.2d at
1361-62)).
92. At the beginning of the amended dissent, Judge Sneed concedes that Oliphant
need not control the decision in Duro. The basic stated reason for that concession is
that Oliphant was based, in significant part, on the conclusion that Indian tribes had
not historically exercised jurisdiction over non-Indians. Judge Sneed states that a similar
statement cannot be made concerning the exercise of tribal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indian,. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1146 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Duro, 821 F.2d at 1365.
95. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1151-52.
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category potentially subject to a biased tribunal and it is proper judicial
behavior to employ an interpretation that avoids that potential dis-
crimination.96
The revised dissent also added a "federal statutory scheme" discus-
sion, primarily to refute the panel majority's addition. That additional
discussion concludes that neither federal statutes nor cases require that
nonmember Indians be subject to tribal court jurisdiction.97 The amended
dissent proposed that a proper interpretation of federal jurisdictional
statutes would result in nonmember Indians being subject to federal
jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction as feared by the panel majority.98
(c) Dissent from Order Denying Rehearing En Banc
After the amended panel opinions were issued, a majority of the
Ninth Circuit judges did not vote to grant the request for en banc
review, over a three-judge dissent.99 The dissent did not mince words:
In attempting to navigate what it calls "the uncharted reaches
of tribal jurisdiction," ... a panel of our court has cast
96. Id. at 1151. The member Indian is tried in his or her tribe's court; the non-
Indian is tried in his or her state (or federal) court; the nonmember Indian is subject
to trial by a tribal tribunal possibly prejudiced by his or her membership in another
tribe. In the "federal statutory scheme" discussion, Judge Sneed states:
To disregard membership in construing the broad reach of 18 U.S.C. §
1152 protects Indians from possible discrimination by state courts; to
disregard it construing the exception to its broad reach serves only to
enhance the possibility of discrimination by the tribal court against a
nonmember Indian. Only an incurable romantic would argue that only
discrimination by state courts can exist.
Id. at 1150.
97. Id. at 1148-51.
98. Id. at 1150-51. Both "statutory scheme" discussions appear aimed at a presumed
"void" left if nonmember Indians are not subject to tribal jurisdiction. The panel
majority argues that if tribal courts do not have jurisdiction, then state courts and law
enforcement will necessarily become more involved in reservation affairs or those crimes
will go unpunished. .d. at 1145-46. Judge Sneed's dissent argues that no "void" would
exist because a "non-Indian" crime committed in "Indian country" is subject to federal
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Id. at 1150-51. This argument may, however, run
afoul of United States v. McBratney, which held that a crime by a non-Indian against
a non-Indian is subject to state law, even if it occurred on a reservation. United States
v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 623 (1881). If a nonmember perpetrator acted against a
nonmember victim, equal non-Indian/nonmember treatment would result in state juris-
diction under McBratney. Judge Sneed's argument requires that a nonmember Indian
be treated as an Indian for general 18 U.S.C. § 1152 purposes but as a non-Indian
under the Indian-against-Indian exception to that section. That distinction may be
supportable based on the "special relationship" between Indians generally and the
federal government and the limited "inherent" powers of Indian tribes. It does, however,
seem to strain the bounds of statutory construction.
99. Duro v. Reina, 860 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski, J., joined by Leavy,
J. and Trott, J., dissenting).
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off the map and the compass. The panel's holding - that
a tribal court may exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians
who are not members of the tribe - overlooks clear Su-
preme Court pronouncements to the contrary, is at odds
with current equal protection analysis, creates an irrecon-
cilable conflict with the Eighth Circuit and potentially sub-
jects criminal defendants to biased tribunals1 0°
The Kozinski dissent argued that the panel majority's "perplexity"
was of its own making, pointing out that the Eighth Circuit, in
Greywater, found no similar confusion.' 0' While Oliphant may have
left open the issue of tribal court criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians, subsequent decisions have not. Wheeler, Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, °2 and Montana
v. United States'03 are identified as controlling cases. In each, according
to the Kozinski dissent, the primary issue was the nature and extent
of inherent tribal sovereignty, and in each, that sovereignty was ex-
pressly found to relate only to tribal members. °4 Nonmember Indians
were identified with non-Indians.
Significantly, the [Supreme] Court viewed its conclusion [in
Montana] as flowing from the rationale of Oliphant:
"Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority
in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support
the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of non-
members of the tribe."'10
The panel majority's opinion on the equal protection issue came
under similarly strong criticism. The Kozinski dissent acknowledged
that Congress may avoid the equal protection restrictions when legis-
lating matters concerning Indians. That ability is, however, based upon
Congress' exclusive power to deal with Indian problems.e 6 Congress'
1(0. Id. at 1463. The dissent later states: "[The panel's] one-Indianis-just-like-
another-Indian approach is seriously misguided." Id. at 1464.
101. rd.
102. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
103. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
104. Duro, 860 F.2d at 1464-66.
105. Id. at 1466 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)
(emphasis added)).
106. Id. at 1467 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). Congress,
per Kozinski, has a unique position:
When Congress acts, it must reconcile two somewhat inconsistent con-
stitutional provisions: the fifth amendment's implicit guarantee of equal
protection and article I, section 8's grant of power to legislate with respect
to Indians. The more specific constitutional authorization as to Indians
must temper the application of equal protection principles, lest the whole
body of federal Indian law be wiped off the books.
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position is unique; states cannot enact special legislation concerning
Indians.'07 "Indian tribes may no more discriminate on the basis of
race than may a state."' 08
The panel majority's justification of a tribe's use of "Indian" as a
jurisdictional category (because race is only one factor in determining
"Indian-ness") was also rejected by the Kozinski dissent.? 9 In the
context of other races, it has been established that so long as race is
a factor, the classification is subject to "strict scrutiny," even though
other factors may be involved.110 To survive strict scrutiny, there must
be a compelling state or tribal interest and the Kozinski dissent found
no tribal interest sufficiently compelling to force nonmember Indians,
but not non-Indians, to submit to a tribe's criminal jurisdiction.,
After all of the Ninth Circuit's opinions are tabulated, six judges
expressed their opinions - four voted against tribal jurisdiction while
two voted for jurisdiction; because of panel assignments, the two-
judge vote won.
6. Greywater v. Joshua - U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit
In Greywater, the Eighth Circuit unanimously held that an Indian
tribe does not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians."
2
The Eighth Circuit's decision was issued between the initial and amended
Ninth Circuit opinions in Duro."3 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged
and rejected the Ninth Circuit's decision.
107. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Reservation,
439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979).
108. Duro, 860 F.2d at 1468 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977)).
111. Id. The Kozinski dissent also criticizes the panel majority's failure to address
the potential problem of biased tribunals. Id. at 1468-69. This criticism is in substantially
the same terms as Judge Sneed's dissent and includes a long quotation from testimony
before the Civil Rights Commission concerning tribal judicial prejudice in the Hopi-
Navajo relationship. Id. at 1469 (quoting U.S. COVMe'N ON Cvn RIoHTS, EFORCEMEwr
OF THE INDIAN Cxvm RiGHTs ACT: HEARING BEFORE TH UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
Cvm RiGrTs 219-20 (1987) (testimony of Lee Brook Phillips, attorney)).
112. Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 490 (8th Cir. 1988). The facts are discussed
supra part I.A.
113. The Eighth Circuit had to deal with an exhaustion-of-remedies issue not present
in Duro. In Greywater, the district court had dismissed the petitions for habeas corpus
pending exhaustion of tribal court remedies. In Duro, the petitioner had no right to
appeal within the tribal court; in Greywater, the petitioners apparently had a right to,
but did not, appeal within the tribal court system. The Eighth Circuit held that Oliphant
"is direct authority that exhaustion of tribal remedies is not required." Greywater, 846
F.2d at 488. The Eighth Circuit also noted that National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v.
Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 191 (1985), was not applicable because that was a civil case and,
even if it were applicable, the record indicated that further proceedings in tribal court
would be futile, an express exception to the National Farmers general rule. Greywater,
846 F.2d at 488-89.
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The Eighth Circuit framed the issue in retained inherent tribal
sov.ereignty terms, similar to Oliphant."4 Supported by a lengthy dis-
cussion of Wheeler, the Eighth Circuit concluded: "Although we
believe the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe retains inherent power to protect
tribal self-government and control internal relations, these powers of
self-governance clearly focus inward and govern the internal rules and
social relations by which tribal members live.""' The Eighth Circuit
noted that relevant 1825 treaties allocated to the United States juris-
diction over crimes committed by an Indian of one tribe against an
Indian of another." 6 This allocation, said the circuit court, exemplifies
the historic lack of tribal authority to punish nonmember Indians and
was necessary to satisfy one of the purposes of the treaties, i.e., to
maintain peace among the various tribes."
7
The "jurisdictional void" argument that impressed the Duro panel
majority was also made in Greywater. The Eighth Circuit was not
impressed and disposed of the argument in a footnote stating in effect
that the argument had little relevance to the principles of retained
tribad sovereignty that governed the decision."' In Greywater, the
"jurisdictional void" argument was rather feeble since the state pros-
ecuted the petitioners based on the same events." 9
The Eighth Circuit also considered the fact that the nonmember
Indians were not able to participate in tribal government. However,
rather than considering this in equal protection terms, the Eighth
Circuit related it to the inherent nature of tribal government. An
Indiam tribe's power to govern internal affairs, the circuit court said,
is consistent with the fundamental principle of United States govern-
ment that each sovereign governs only with the consent of the gov-
erned. 20 On the Devils Lake Reservation, neither non-Indians nor
114. Greywater, 846 F.2d at 489. As in Duro, the United States (supporting the
Devils Lake Sioux Tribe) argued that Wheeler does not mean what it says. See id. at
488.
115. Id. at 490-91 (footnote omitted). The Eighth Circuit also found support for its
position in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980).
116. Greywater, 846 F.2d at 493 (citing Treaty with the Sioune and Ogallala Tribes,
July 5, 1825, 7 Stat. 252; Treaty with the Sioux et al., Aug. 19, 1825, 7 Stat. 272).
117. Id. How the treaty provisions may indicate a lack of tribal power to deal with
nonmember crimes is unclear. The implication that allocation of jurisdiction over
intertribal crimes to the United States was an integral part of the treaty is, however,
undoubtedly accurate. It was in the interest of the United States to preserve peace
between all groups on the frontier. Similarly, it was in the interest of an Indian tribe
that was agreeing to change its way of life and become settled to request, and expect,
protection from tribes which had not made similar agreements.
118. Id. at 490 n.3.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 493 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979)).
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nonmember Indians (resident or not) can vote in tribal elections, hold
tribal office, sit on tribal juries, become members of the tribe, or
share directly in tribal disbursements. Thus, the Eighth Circuit held,
there is no significant difference between the position of non-Indians
and nonmember Indians. 2 1 In addition, both groups face the potential
discrimination the court found significant in Oliphant: "ITihey would
be judged by a court system that precludes their participation, accord-
ing. to the law of a societal state that has been made for others and
not for them."'2
II. Constructing the Corridor: Duro v. Reina in the Supreme Court
A. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 23 to resolve the
conflict between Duro and Greywater, stating the issue as "whether
an Indian tribe may assert criminal jurisdiction over a defendant who
is an Indian but not a tribal member." 124 The Court's conclusion was:
We hold that the retained sovereignty of the tribe as a
political and social organization to govern its own affairs
does not include the authority to impose criminal sanctions
against a citizen outside its own membership.
... For purposes of criminal jurisdiction, petitioner's
[Duro's] relations with this Tribe [the Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community] are the same as the non-Indian's [sic] in Oli-
phant. We hold that the Tribe's powers over him are subject
to the same limitations.lu
1. Remaining Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Does Not Include
Power over External Relations
The Court's decision was based upon limitations inherent in the
"dependent nature" of Indian tribal sovereignty. The Court stated
that Duro falls between Wheeler (retained jurisdiction and tribal mem-
121. Id.
122. Id. This conclusion resulted, in part, from the Eighth Circuit's decision, based
upon the record before it, that significant "racial, cultural, and legal differences" exist
between the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe and the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa
Indians. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit panel majority's opinions effectively treats all
"Indians" as a single polity which, while consistent with historical non-Indian ideology,
is not consistent with either historical or current facts.
123. 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
124. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990) (Brennan, J. joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
125. Id. at 679, 688.
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bers) and Oliphant (retained jurisdiction and non-Indians) because
Albert Duro is an Indian but not a member of the prosecuting tribe.
Tribal sovereignty, as described in Wheeler, is of a "unique and limited
character,"'12 that is needed to control internal relations and to preserve
unique customs and social orders. The primary aspect of full sover-
eigrtty which Indian tribes lack is the power to determine independently
external relations. 127 As determined by the Court, prosecution of "out-
siders" is a part of "external relations" and, therefore, can be exercised
by ]indian tribes only through congressional delegation.28
The propriety of a nonmember's subjection to tribal court must,
said the Court, be considered in light of his or her status as a United
States citizen, not in terms of categorization as an "Indian" for federal
jurisdiction purposes. 129 Indians, like all other citizens, have constitu-
tional protection against unwarranted intrusions into personal liberty.
While that does not prevent Congress from imposing burdens on
Indians as members of a political class, it does preclude Indian tribes
from imposing burdens on citizens who have not consented to tribal
membership.3 0 The Court focused on this "consent" factor as the
source of Indian tribal authority. Because tribal authority is based
upon consent, membership is the touchstone of tribal criminal juris-
diction i l The fact that Duro is an Indian and he had some contact
with the tribe was rejected as a basis for jurisdiction. According to
126. Id. at 685 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)).
127. Id.
123. Id. at 686.
129. Id. at 692. Before 1924, some Indians had become U.S. citizens pursuant to
the Allotment Acts or other particular circumstances. In 1924, all Indians became
citizens, regardless of tribal status. See Act of June 24, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253
(originally codified at 8 U.S.C. § 3).
131). Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. The Court noted that a jurisdictional distinction has
been made between members and nonmembers in other areas of Indian law, including
state taxation (citing Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (resident
nonmember Indians not exempt from state taxation)); McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (state taxation of tribal members would interfere
with internal self-governance and self-determination)); and civil regulation (citing Mon-
tana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (tribe has no power to regulate activities of
nonmembers on fee lands within reservation boundaries)). But the Court also acknowl-
edged that it previously held that Indian tribes have some authority to deal with
nonmembers "outside the criminal context," typically involving situations arising from
property ownership within the reservation or a "consensual relationship with the tribe
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements."
Id. at 687 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)); see also
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989) (inconclusively discussing tribal power to zone fee land to protect tribal integrity
and self-determination).
131. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. The Court expressly declined comment on the effect
of a foxrmal acquiescence to tribal jurisdiction (e.g., in exchange for the tribe's agreement
not to exercise exclusionary powers). Id. at 697.
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the Court, the argument that those facts support jurisdiction treats
Indian tribes as "mere fungible groups of homogenous persons among
whom any Indian would feel at home"'' 2 and is merely a slight revision
of the rejected contention that any person coming on a reservation
impliedly consents to tribal jurisdiction. Significantly, the Court held
that with respect to consent to, and participation in, tribal government,
nonmember Indians are indistinguishable from non-Indians."'
2. Other Arguments Rejected
(a) Historical Argument
The tribe and supporting amici argued that the historical record
supports tribal jurisdiction. These arguments relied primarily on sources
used in Oliphant. The trend in the legislation Oliphant noted was
toward increasingly broader federal jurisdiction. The United States and
other amici argued that the scope of tribal sovereignty must be deter-
mined through a process of elimination and the tribes lost only juris-
diction that was expressly allocated to non-Indian governments. The
argument was that, through treaties and statutes, the United States
first took jurisdiction over selected crimes by or against citizens within
Indian country. Later, United States jurisdiction was extended to all
intra-non-Indian crimes, then to major intra-Indian crimes. The ar-
gument continued that since, for all Indian-related jurisdictional ques-
tions, Congress consistently distinguished only between non-Indians
and Indians, Congress consciously intended that tribes exercise juris-
diction over all Indians. 14 The Court disposed of that argument some-
what summarily: "Congressional and administrative provisions such as
those cited above[ 3 ] reflect the Government's treatment of Indians as
a single large class with respect to federal jurisdiction and programs.
Those references are not dispositive of a question of tribal power to
treat Indians by the same broad classification."' 3 6 The Court pointed
out that it reached an analogous conclusion in Colville.137 In addition,
132. Id. at 695.
133. Id. at 696.
134. The arguments based on the use of the term "Indian" in federal statutes and
programs recall the Ninth Circuit panel majority's discussion of the federal statutory
scheme in its amended opinion. See discussion supra notes 86-90.
135. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (1988); Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 733
(predecessor to various 18 U.S.C. sections); 25 C.F.R. § 11.2(a) (1989) (current De-
partment of the Interior regulation concerning Courts of Indian Offenses (CFR courts),
first established by regulation in 1882 and not significantly changed thereafter).
136. Duro, 495 U.S. at 689.
137. Id. (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980)) (discussing "Indian" as used in the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988)).
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the Court stated that the record from times before creation of modern
tribal courts is of little value, but the relatively brief history of those
couits is somewhat more informative.18 Modern tribal courts, the
Court stated, were established under the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 (IRA), which required Department of the Interior approval of
tribal codes.'39 The Court cited five opinions of the Department's
Solicitor that touch upon tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, 40
two of which are characterized as equivocal. The other three (including
the most recent two) state that the only way tribal courts could obtain
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians was by congressional delegation,




The Court did not accept the "jurisdictional void" argument as a
sufficient basis for "extending" tribal jurisdiction to nonmember In-
dians. 42 The Court noted that a similar, and probably more significant,
argument to that effect was rejected in Oliphant.4 1 The Court also
noted that the Ninth Circuit panel majority's "significant contacts"
test does not solve the perceived problem because it would not permit
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians who are present on, but have no
significant contact with, a reservation.'" While the Court mentioned
a number of suggestions that had previously been made to alleviate
the perceived problem, it ultimately concludes that if a void does exist,
filling this void is a matter for Congress, not the Court.
45
133. The Court noted that "scholars" who found those sources illuminating have
reached differing conclusions, citing two student-written law review articles: Erhart,
supra note 68, at 740 (treaties suggest no jurisdiction); Patricia Owen, Note, Who Is
an Indian?: Duro v. Reina's Examination of Tribal Sovereignty and Criminal Jurisdiction
over Nonmember Indians, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 161, 170-71 (treaties suggest jurisdiction).
Duro, 495 U.S. at 690.
139. Duro, 495 U.S. at 690-91 (citing Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576,
48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988)).
140. Id. at 691-92. The cited documents are found in I U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR,
OPINIONS OF THE SoLIcrroR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR RELATINO TO INDIAN
AFF irs, 1917-1974 (1979), at 445 [hereinafter Op. Souc. DEP'T INTERIOR] (opinion
dated Oct. 25, 1934) (citing in turn 55 Interior Dec. 14 (Oct. 25, 1934)); OP. SOLIC.
DEP'T INTERIOR, supra, at 699 (opinion dated Nov. 17, 1936); id. at 736 (opinion dated
Mar. 17, 1937); id. at 849 (opinion dated Aug. 26, 1938); id. at 872 (opinion dated
Feb. 17, 1939).
141. Duro, 495 U.S. at 691-92.
142. Id. at 696.
143. Id. The Court notes that on many reservations, including the Salt River Pima-
Maricc.pa Reservation, the number of resident non-Indians is significantly greater than
the number of nonmember Indians. Id.
144. Id. at 696 n.3.
145. As to the suggestion in Judge Sneed's dissent that 18 U.S.C. § 1152 could be
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The Court did note that even if the tribes cannot impose criminal
penalties, they have power to deal with nonmembers. The tribes,
explained the Court, can exclude undesirable persons from tribal lands.
In addition, the Court said:
Tribal law enforcement authorities have the power to re-
strain those who disturb public order on the reservation,
and if necessary, to eject them. Where jurisdiction to try
and punish an offender rests outside the tribe, tribal officers
may exercise their power to detain the offender and trans-
port him to the proper authorities.'4
To the contention that states may not have the power to prosecute
on-reservation crimes, the Court responded that Congress, through
Public Law 280, provided a method for establishing state jurisdiction. 47
The argument that states are unwilling to exercise jurisdiction over
reservation-based crime is rebutted, at least in part, by the fact that
the Greywater defendants were prosecuted in state court.14'
B. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent disagreed with the majority's reading of Oliphant.149
While the majority emphasized implicit divestiture, the dissent empha-
construed to fill the void, the Court stated: "That statute is not before us and we
express no views on the question." Duro, 495 U.S. at 697. The Court also expressly
declined to address the ability of neighboring tribes to enter into some type of reciprocal
agreement concerning jurisdiction. Id.
The jurisdictional void argument was presented to Congress with much greater success.
See infra part IV.
146. Duro, 495 U.S. at 696 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 434 (1989); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832)).
This is consistent with the provisions of § 2-5 of the Salt River Code. See supra note
54. Not expressed in that statement is, however, the limitation that a tribe's power to
exclude does not apply to nontrust lands within the reservation. See Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
147. Duro, 495 U.S. at 697. Public Law 280 (Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67
Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360)) allows states, with the consent of the involved tribe, to assume complete or
partial civil or criminal jurisdiction in any part of Indian country within the state's
boundaries and includes the power, if necessary, to repeal any Indian country-jurisdiction
disclaimers in the state constitution. The existence of Public Law 280 may effectively
rebut the dissent's argument that Duro creates a jurisdictional void while Oliphant
merely created a potential discretionary void. Under Public Law 280, states and tribes
acting jointly have the power to provide for state jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.
The failure to exercise that power is only politically different from a prosecutor's failure
to exercise jurisdiction per Oliphant.
148. See supra note 32.
149. Duro, 495 U.S. at 700-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
374 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
sized Oliphant's historical analysis, i.e., that Congress historically
provided for non-Indian jurisdiction over only non-Indian criminals,
withdrawing only that same jurisdiction from Indian tribes.5 0 There-
fore, the dissent argued, Oliphant's reasoning and the congressional
acts there considered require an opposite conclusion in Duro. Juris-
diclional acts distinguished between Indians and other persons by
excepting crimes by one Indian against another.'5 ' The dissent argued
that because federal legislation dealt with Indians as an undifferentiated
class, the presumption was, and the logical conclusion must be, that
tribes retain jurisdiction over all Indians, regardless of membership.
Thus, the dissent concluded, that statutory history compels the con-
clusion that tribes continuously retained jurisdiction over offenses
involving only Indians.5 2 To support that conclusion, the dissent turned
to the "jurisdictional void" "created" by the majority. The dissent
argued that any "practical" jurisdictional void after Oliphant results
from a "discretionary decision" to not exercise federal criminal juris-
diction over non-Indian wrongdoers.'53 That, said the dissent, is sig-
nificantly different from the "legal" jurisdictional void that results
from the majority opinion, under which no sovereign has jurisdic-
tion.'1 The existence of a void is not, according to the dissent, an
independent reason for finding tribal court jurisdiction but, instead,
supports the argument that Congress did not assume that tribal criminal
authority was limited to tribal members.'55
The dissent also took issue with the majority's arguments based
upon Indian citizenship.156 The dissent recast the majority opinion into
the assertion that no matter what the historical record, tribal courts
lost criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians when those people
became United States citizens. 57 The dissent contended that citizenship
is irrelevant because, tribal criminal jurisdiction (per Oliphant) depends
150. Id. at 701-02.
151. Id. at 702. The primary statute so providing was originally enacted in 1817.
Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1988). However, the first act mentioned by the dissent (Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 33,
1 Stat. 137) does not make that same distinction. See discussion infra notes 181-91.
152. Duro, 495 U.S. at 703. The implicit assumption is that divestment of any
portion of pre-Columbian tribal sovereignty can occur only through express federal
action.
15:3. Id. at 706.
154. Id.
15:5. Id. at 703. That assertion does not appear to be consistent with the structure
of the Ninth Circuit panel majority's opinion or the content of that opinion's discussion
of the "jurisdictional void" issue. In both substance and form, the panel majority
indicated that it was an independent reason for finding tribal court jurisdiction.
156. Id. at 706.
157. Id.
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upon congressional intent."8 That argument doubles back to the pre-
ceding historical discussion that concludes Congress never affirmatively
withdrew tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.'5 9 The dissent took the
position that the majority's citizenship analysis is also inconsistent with
allowing tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers in civil actions. 60
Perhaps more significantly, the dissent pointed out that participation
in government is not a prerequisite to a sovereign's exercise of criminal
jurisdiction; if it were, neither states nor the federal government could
try nonresidents or aliens. 161
The dissent minimized the majority's concern about possible tribal
court prejudice against nonmember Indians. That possibility, the dis-
sent explained, is substantially alleviated by the fact that tribal courts
and their processes are subject to the ICRA, including its federal
habeas corpus remedy.
62
As a final note, the dissent described the federal Indian policy since
1934 as promoting the independence and self-government of Indian
tribes and the dissent charged the majority's decision as being incon-
sistent with that policy.
63
III. A Corridor Construction Review
A. In General
More was at stake in Duro than a single misdemeanor charge. The
fundamental aspects of tribal sovereignty, while not necessarily in-
volved, were a potential basis for decision. The Court might have
decided the case on statutory equal protection grounds. That was the
district court's conclusion and would have resolved the presented
problem. 64 However, the Court addressed the nature of tribal author-
ity.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 707.
160. Id. (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
161. Id. The dissent also argued that the "consent" theory is inconsistent with an
underlying premise of Indian law, i.e., that Congress could grant tribal courts criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, obviating the need for any consent. Id. at 707-08. That
argument overlooks the fact that the non-Indians are U.S. citizens and thereby, presum-
ably, "consent" to the laws constitutionally adopted by Congress.
162. Duro, 495 U.S. at 708-09 (citing Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1325 (1988); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)).
163. Id. at 709. That statement overlooks the 20- to 25-year period (1940s through
early 1960s) during which the primary thrust of congressional policy was to "terminate"
any and all federal-tribal relationships and fully integrate Indian individuals into the
general American population.
164. Id. at 682. The district court held that the community's exercise of jurisdiction
over Albert Duro violated the ICRA (25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988)). The dissent labeled
the ICRA argument as "begging the question" because the ICRA precludes tribes from
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The parties and the Court treated Duro as a particularized appli-
cation of the analyses expressed in Oliphant and Wheeler. Whether
the result was clarification or confusion remains to be seen. Those
decisions establish that Indian tribal sovereignty retains all of its pre-
Columbian plentitude unless: (a) surrendered by treaty; (b) restricted
by Congress; or (c) exercised inconsistently with tribal status. While
these are listed as independent factors, they become intertwined in
application. In Duro, tribal authorities did not claim jurisdiction under
tre ty or affirmative legislation; Albert Duro did not contend that any
statute or treaty expressly precluded jurisdiction. Therefore, of the
three potential sovereignty limitations, only the inherent tribal sover-
eignty one remained.
Although the "dependent" nature of the tribes' status was imposed
by European "international law" (i.e., political and military power),
United States-Indian treaties normally included language indicating that
the signatory tribe acknowledged dependence on the United States.165
discriminating between persons who are within tribal jurisdiction while the question in
Duro is who is within tribal jurisdiction. If that criticism is accepted, it does not
completely resolve the equal protection issue. The jurisdiction of tribes and their courts
has been held to be a matter of federal law. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v.
Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). While it is not unconstitutional for Congress to
discriminate between Indians and non-Indians, see, e.g., Moe v. Salish & Kootenai
Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S.
382 (1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), that does not necessarily approve
a federal-law distinction between Albert Duro and non-Indian nonmembers absent
specific congressional action. By sustaining tribal court jurisdiction over Albert Duro,
might: the Court itself have been violating equal protection limitations? Further, the
Court has held that states are precluded from providing different treatment for Indians
by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment is in the same words as
the ICRA; both preclude each affected government from denying "to any person within
its jurisdiction" equal protection of the laws. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988) with
U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. If the ICRA does not preclude tribes from distinguishing
between nonmember Indians and other nonmembers, insofar as criminal jurisdiction is
concerned, should the Fourteenth Amendment not bar a similar state distinction? There,
too, the issue is who is within the state's jurisdiction.
165. A number of the earlier treaties are more logically read as indicating that the
tribes agreed to trade exclusively with U.S. traders. It is unlikely that the tribes
understood the "dependence" language to make them legally, politically, or militarily
subseivient to the United States. During the American Revolution, it is extremely unlikely
that the Indians were under that impression. If the Indians had understood or were told
that by signing treaties they would become the rebels' subjects, they probably would
have refused to sign and immediately joined the British cause. Revolutionary officials
sough:, by gifts and persuasion, to dissuade the tribes from supporting the British. A
major effort was made to convince the tribes that the British lied when they told the
Indians that the colonists intended, if successful, to take over Indian lands. Though the
Indians were repeatedly assured of the colonials' honorable intentions, the British
assertion contained more than a modicum of truth. See GREaoORy ScHAAr, VAMPUM
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That language has been construed as the tribes' acknowledgement that
they were subordinate to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States.166 Thus, limited tribal sovereignty could be attributed either to
the status unilaterally imposed or to treaties. While the Duro decision
mentions these various sources of limitation on tribal sovereignty, the
decision's precise basis remains somewhat obscure.
In Wheeler, the problem of inherent sovereignty was not very dif-
ficult; the defendant was a member of the prosecuting tribe. Congres-
sional and executive reports demonstrated a consistent understanding
that Indian tribes had power over tribal members and were responsible
for their members' actions. Since that authority was not delegated
federal authority, it had to be inherent. In Oliphant, the situation was
not so obvious. There the Court discussed legislative and administrative
history related to tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians and concluded
that both the executive branch and Congress shared the "presumption"
that "tribal courts do not have the power to try non-Indians .... ",67
However, the Court went on to state:
[E]ven ignoring treaty provisions and congressional policy,
Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
absent affirmative delegation of such power by Con-
gress .... Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both
those powers of autonomous states that are expressly ter-
minated by Congress and those powers "inconsistent with
their status."'16
The Court's discussion of congressional and executive actions in Oli-
phant was summarized by the statement that the presumption that
Indian tribes did not have jurisdiction is entitled to weight. 169 That is,
the actions of Congress and the executive branch merely confirm the
legal conclusion that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians is inconsistent with the inherent nature of tribal sovereignty.
That understanding of Oliphant is supported by language in Wheeler
to the effect that the tribes' inability to control external relations is a
function of their status.1 70 However, Wheeler also contains this state-
BELTS & PEAcE TPES: GEORGE MORGAN, NATIvE AMERICANS AND REVOLUTIONARY
DIPLOMACY (1990). It was not until after the War of 1812 that the Indians east of the
Mississippi could be considered actually dependent upon the United States; more than
half a century would pass before the tribes west of the Mississippi were reduced to the
same circumstances.
166. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 326 (1978); Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
167. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 197-206 (1978).
168. Id. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)).
169. Id. at 206.
170. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
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ment: "But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign
powers.' 7' That statement creates confusion because it can be read
to mean that congressional action is necessary to place even the slightest
limitation on plenary tribal sovereignty, which is substantially the
position taken by the Duro dissent. However, it is equally likely that
the quoted sentence may be read as referring to Congress' power to
further restrict the tribes' "existing [limited] sovereign powers," which
appears to be the Court's understanding in Duro.
Duro attempted to demonstrate that the following propositions are
not irreconcilable:
(1) Indian tribes are sovereign entities with the power to govern.
(2) The United States Constitution requires zealous protection of the
individual rights it guarantees.
(3) Tribal governments are not required to provide full constitutional
protection of individual rights.
A very real problem is how tribal criminal jurisdiction can be
recognized over any person, given the second and third propositions.
The majority (without so stating) mixes the legal rule that an individual
can waive his or her rights with the political theory that a government's
authority comes from the consent of the people it governs. Tribal
governments, the argument posits, derive their power from tribal
members and, therefore, members implicitly consent to that govern-
ment's jurisdiction, a fully reciprocal relationship. Even if the problem
of waiver by implication is passed over, Duro's solution appears
inconsistent with decisions allowing tribal civil jurisdiction over non-
members; tribal governments derive both civil and criminal powers
from the same source. 72
The Duro majority's primary holding appears to be based on the
rule that inherent tribal sovereignty does not include power over
external relations. The Court characterizes nonmember relationships as
external relations. However, prior decisions have held that tribal gov-
ernments have jurisdiction over nonmembers in a number of situa-
tions. 17A leading factor in those cases has been the nonmember's
consensual interaction with the tribe, a tribal entity, or tribal mem-
bers. 174 In that sense, Duro's membership/cdnsent theory is consistent
171. Id. at 323.
172. It is also inconsistent with any geographic component in tribal jurisdiction,
unless geography is considered as only establishing the boundaries within which tribes'
limited jurisdiction over nonmembers can operate.
173. See infra part III.D.
174. See infra part III.D. Albert Duro's relationship with at least one tribal member
and a tribal entity is probably sufficient to allow the tribe to exercise civil jurisdiction
over him in some situations. For example, there should be little doubt that the tribe
could impose a tax on Duro's income from PiCopa Construction or the tribal court
could exercise jurisdiction over an action by his girlfriend's parents for room and board.
See generally Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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with prior cases concerning civil jurisdiction. However, in some situa-
tions, tribal civil jurisdiction has been recognized even though no
consensual relationship existed.17 To resolve this apparent inconsis-
tency, Duro distinguished between the degree of government intrusion
resulting from exercising civil jurisdiction and that resulting from
exercising criminal jurisdiction and stated that the latter is a more
serious intrusion than the former.176 The power to participate in tribal
government, said the majority, balances the lesser tribal protection of
individual rights.
It is difficult to determine Duro's precise chain of logic. The opinion
intermixes explanation with refutation and is not particularly convinc-
ing; a number of questions remain. The principal problem is, perhaps,
that the majority opinion does not directly address the question of
how the parameters of the "inherent" limitations on tribal sovereignty
are determined. The Duro dissent and prior cases such as Oliphant
and Wheeler suggest that the only limitations on tribal plenary sov-
ereignty are those Congress imposes, expressly or by necessary impli-
cation. By silence, the majority rejected that test but provided no
substitute.
Even though the Duro dissent stated a basis for determining the
"inherent" limits of tribal jurisdiction, its arguments are not compel-
ling. If the nineteenth-century legislation cited by the dissent had been
adopted within the past ten to fifteen years, the conclusions drawn
might have been more convincing. But the dissent's major premise
depends upon the historical nature of the legislation. When placed in
historical context, the cited congressional and executive actions provide
little support for, and in some instances contradict, the conclusions
drawn by the dissent.
It is fairly obvious that the majority's discussion of congressional
and executive actions is merely a refutation of the respondents' con-
tentions, not a separate (or even interrelated) basis for decision. Despite
its acknowledged power to do so, Congress has not made any general
declaration of the attributes of inherent tribal sovereignty. 77 Even
175. See infra part III.D.
176. Duro, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). This particular proposition is generally sup-
ported by the Constitution's (and the Court's) emphasis of personal rights relating to
criminal prosecution. It is not supported, however, by the proposition that a govern-
ment's power comes from those entitled to participate in that government. In Duro, it
is the power to act at all that is in question, not the intrusiveness of the act.
177. There are two acts that might be considered general declarations of tribal
government status. In 1871, Congress decreed that no Indian tribe could thereafter be
"acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the
United States may contract by treaty." Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
That declaration, however, was not really the result of any protracted discussion of
tribal government theory; it was more a result of internal congressional politics. In
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though Duro relegated them to secondary importance, congressional
and executive records remain a significant repository of objective
information concerning the status of Indian tribes. The Court has
frequently acknowledged the political nature of the relationship and
the 'Court's secondary position in political matters. 178
The various acts, proposals, and actions mentioned in the Duro
dissent (and in Oliphant and Wheeler), particularly when taken in
historical context, do not support the dissent's conclusion or the Duro
respondents' contentions. When it comes to tribal authority over non-
member Indians, express congressional and administrative guidance is
essentially nonexistent.
B. Congressional and Administrative Perspectives on Indian
Country Criminal Jurisdiction
Even before the Colonies won the Revolutionary War, rebel officials
were concerned with controlling events that might alarm or alienate
Indians on or beyond the Western frontier. Unauthorized homesteading
and the accompanying violence pushed the Indians toward becoming
British partisans. If the Indians were to actively support the British,
the possibility of a successful rebellion would be substantially reduced.
Even though there were numerous people who desired peace and
friendship with the Indians for their own sake, the primary concern
addition, as a practical matter, the act was innocuous. The Western Indian tribes
continued to act upon their own initiative. The clashes between the plains tribes and
the U.S. Cavalry continued; the battles on Rosebud Creek and at the Little Bighorn
loomed in the future. Even Congress continued to use the same language for interpolity
negotiations. See, e.g., Deficiency Appropriation Act of May 1, 1876, ch. 88, 19 Stat.
41, 45 (authorizing payment for commissioners to "treat with" the Sioux Indians). The
Court has treated tribal-U.S. "agreements" as having the same status and effect as
treaties. See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); United States v. Winans,
198 U.S. 371 (1905).
The 1934 IRA might also be seen as a general declaration. However, one of its more
obscure and important provisions decreed that Indian tribes organized under the IRA
could exercise specified powers in addition to those "vested" by "existing law." Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 984, 986 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
476(e) (1988)). The Act did not make any statement concerning what those existing
powers were. The staff of the Department of the Interior (who advocated more tribal
power and autonomy than Congress was then willing to concede) undertook to identify
those "vested" powers as broadly as possible. See Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior
Dec. 14, reprinted in Op. Souc. DEP'T INTRIUOR, supra note 140, at 445 (decision of
Oct. -25, 1934). There listed is the power to "administer justice with respect to ...
offense; of or among themembers of the tribe .... ." 15 Interior Dec. at 17, reprinted
in Op. Souc. DP'T IrMoR, supra note 140, at 446. See discussion infra notes 320-
28.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39-45 (1913); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903); Blue Jacket v. Commissioner (The Kansas
Indians),, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755-57 (1867); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 407 (1865).
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of the Continental Congress was not losing to the British - both the
British and the inchoate United States treated the Indians more as
pawns than as nations with their own interests. 179 The successful con-
clusion of the Revolutionary War did not resolve the problems the
government faced concerning Indians. A major problem, if not the
primary one, was the continuing encroachment of white settlers on
unceded Indian lands. The United States hoped that peace and goodwill
could be maintained by regulating the persons allowed into Indian
territory and punishing non-Indians who committed crimes against
Indians. 1'0 To those ends, Congress adopted a series of "Trade and
Intercourse Acts" starting in 1790.11 Despite the hopes of officials,
unrest continued all along the western front. Indian wars in the
Northwest (Ohio, Indiana, etc.) became increasingly severe until Gen-
eral Anthony Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers in 1794.'8
A major component of the Trade and Intercourse Acts was the
attempt to regulate trade with the Indians, both to prevent less scru-
pulous United States citizens from dealing with the Indians and (in-
effectually) to preclude trading by persons from other countries,
particularly Britain and Spain. The acts included a trader-licensing
scheme similar to that used by the British officials before the Revo-
lution,"" and prohibited unlicensed persons' entry into Indian areas,
providing for their removal by the military. In addition, the acts made
179. See generally SCHAAF, supra note 165; cf. 1 FRANCIS P. PRucHA, Tan GREAT
FATHER 37-44 (1984) [hereinafter GREAT FATHER].
180. See, e.g., President George Washington, Message to Congress (Oct. 25, 1791),
in HOUSE JOURNAL, 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 445.
181. See, e.g., Trade and Intercourse Acts, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790); ch. 13, 2
Stat. 139 (1802); ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
182. The British, who maintained military and commercial establishments in the
territory awarded to the United States in the treaty following the Revolution, continued
to encourage the Indian tribes to resist encroachment. See generally JAMEs L. Wmorr,
BRITAIN AND THE AAERICAN FRONTIER, 1783-1815 (1975). However, at a crucial moment,
the British refused to open the gates of Ft. Miami to protect Indians retreating before
General Wayne. The British did not relinquish all of their posts in what was acknowl-
edged U.S. territory until after the War of 1812. See generally CoLIN G. CALLOWAY,
CROvN AND CALumTm: BRmSa-INAN RELATIONS, 1783-1815 (1987); Henry Horseman,
The British Indian Department and the Resistance to General Anthony Wayne, 1793-
1795, 49 Miss. VA=LEY Hisr. REv. 269 (1962); Lewis Cass, Remarks on the Policy and
Practice of the United States and Great Britain in Their Treatment of the Indians, 24
NORTH AMERICAN REV. (Apr. 1827). On the military situation of the area, see generally
FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE SWORD OF THE REPUBLIC: THE UNITED STATES ARMY ON THE
FRONTIER, 1783-1846 (1969).
183. See, e.g., Proclamation of 1763 (Oct. 7, 1763), in 3 WiLcom E. VAsnBuRN,
THE AimRCAN INIANS AND 'm UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 2135 (1973).
The Continental Congress had adopted a similar licensing system. See Ordinance for
the Regulation of Indian Affairs, 31 J. oF CoNTN ENTAL CONGRESS 490-93 (1786),
excerpted in DoCuMENTs OF UNITED STATES ImlAN POLICY 8-9 (Francis P. Prucha ed.,
2d ed. 1990).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
382 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
it a federal or state crime to commit crimes against Indians. The last
provision, just as the others, was aimed at diminishing the possibility
of Indian wars, not particularly at protecting the Indians.
The 1790 Act granted states or organized territories jurisdiction over
"any citizen or inhabitant of the United States" who commits a crime
against "the person or property of any peaceable and friendly Indian
or Indians" within any town, settlement, or territory belonging to any
Indian or Indian tribe.'8 The Act did not preclude state or federal
jurisdiction over Indians who were citizens or inhabitants of the United
States. 5 The Act (as all similar acts before 1802) was "temporary."
When renewed by Congress in 1793, the provisions intended to control
non-Indian criminal activity were substantially enlarged. 8 6 However,
most of the added language was aimed at the same problems, namely,
unau:horized appropriation of Indian land and criminal attacks against
Indians. Despite the law, unrest continued. The 1796 Trade and In-
tercourse Act provided for federal or state jurisdiction over "any
citizen or other person" committing an enumerated crime (including
murder) against an Indian or Indians. s7 Section 14 of the Act made
it a f&deral crime for any Indian to come out of Indian country and
commit a crime against the person or property of a "citizen or
inhabitant" of the United States.'83 State and federal courts were given
jurisdiction over Indians who violated that provision. 89 Those provi-
sions were renewed in the 1799 Act'90 and the 1802 Act.' 9' Even though
they were the major component of federal Indian policy, none of the
Trade and Intercourse Acts adopted after 1790 were mentioned in the
Duro dissent.
The Duro dissent concluded that the 1790 Act, and, by implication,
the other pre-1817 acts, "implicitly" (but purposefully) exempted all
Indian-against-Indian crimes.'9 Neither the acts' language nor the
184. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 33, § 5, 1 Stat. 137, 138. Apparently, it was not
considered a crime to commit otherwise criminal acts against Indians who were not
"peaceable and friendly."
185. Some might argue that "citizen or inhabitant" was intended to exclude Indians.
However, the final portion of that section provides for non-Indian criminal jurisdiction
over Indians who come out of Indian country and perpetrate a crime "against a citizen
or white inhabitant thereof." Id. (emphasis added). Apparently, it was not considered
criminal for an Indian to take similar action against a nonwhite inhabitant. In 1793,
the language concerning Indian crimes outside Indian country was amended, deleting
"or white inhabitant," thus proscribing Indian crimes against all citizens.
186. Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 4, 1 Stat. 329.
187. Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, §§ 4, 6, 15, 17, 1 Stat. 469, 470-71, 473.
188. Id. § 14, 1 Stat. at 469, 472-73.
189. Id. §§ 16, 17, 1 Stat. at 474-75.
190. Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743.
191. Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139.
192. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 702-03 (1990).
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surrounding circumstances strongly support that conclusion. The acts
do not expressly preclude prosecution of an Indian for a crime against
another Indian. Grammatically, the only way to construe those enact-
ments as "implicitly" exempting Indian-against-Indian crimes is to
conclude that Congress did not intend the terms "citizen," "inhabi-
tant," or "other person" to include Indians.
The surrounding circumstances show that any attempt to unilaterally
regulate intra-Indian matters would have been futile; its only effect
would have been to antagonize the western tribes and provide substance
to British propaganda. A major object of the Trade and Intercourse
Acts was to lessen the possibility of Indian wars. 193 Hoping to retain
the goodwill of the then unconquered tribes, the acts demarked "Indian
country"'' 94 and provided for punishment of non-Indians who com-
mitted crimes there. Realistically, the acts were more a political gesture
than anything else; the meager power of the infant Union was not
sufficient to impose its laws on anyone on or beyond the frontier. The
United States was intent on its political survival, which was far from
certain. The Trade and Intercourse Acts, at least through the War of
1812, had that as their primary, almost exclusive, objective. In some
respects those acts were wishful thinking. One must ignore contem-
porary reality to infer from these enactments that Congress had any
sovereignty-related intent concerning intertribal crime in Indian coun-
try.
Even though Britain had conceded the area by treaty, it exercised
significant influence over trans-Appalachian Indians until after the
War of 1812. British traders were not controlled despite the Trade and
Intercourse Acts, and federal officials conceded that control was not
possible and probably not desirable, even after the war. Not only did
the United States not have the coercive power to control the British
traders, it did not have the trade goods needed to supply the Indians.
It was the considered opinion of federal officials that the continuation
of British trade in United States territory was necessary for peace with
the Indians. 195 The repeated prohibition of non-United States traders
was not enforced.
193. See GREAT FATHER, supra note 179, at 89-114 (chapter 3).
194. The 1796 Act was the first United States law to specifically describe a boundary
between Indian and non-Indian country. The earlier acts merely identified Indian country
as towns, villages, or territories of the Indians. In effect, the 1796 Act renewed a
practice established in King George's Proclamation of 1763 which precluded non-Indian
settlement beyond the watersheds of the rivers that flow into the Atlantic, despite the
fact that non-Indian settlement already existed in the proscribed area.
195. See, e.g., Report of Secretary of War (Mar. 14, 1816), in 2 AM. STATE PAPERS
- INDiA AFfims No. 142, at 26 (1834). The Secretary of War reported to the Senate:
The great distance of some of the tribes in the Northwest Territory, and
in the northern regions of Louisiana, from the settled parts of the United
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To infer solely from the enacted words (without any reference to
context) that Congress had any "presumption" or intent concerning
the Indians' internal affairs is unwarranted. United States Indian policy
of the time was driven by foreign policy, primarily concerned with
European powers, and the desire to avoid Indian wars through any
means. To maintain and enhance its image in "civilized" Christian
Europe, the United States attempted to project an "enlightened" policy
toward the "less fortunate" Native Americans.196 At the same time,
however, federal authorities were committed to paying the Revolution-
ary War veterans with land in "Indian Country" that the possessing
tribes had no interest in relinquishing. The Indians with whom federal
officials were dealing in that era were not uninformed or politically
unaware.'9 Any federal enactment that even impliedly claimed juris-
diction over intertribal or intratribal affairs would have eventually
become known to the Indians. Indian reaction would have been det-
rimental to the United States, particularly before 1815, on both the
North American and European scenes.
The Duro dissent stated that the 1817 Federal Enclave Extension
Act' " amended the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act and "withdrew"
state criminal jurisdiction.'9 The 1817 Act does not expressly amend
any Trade and Intercourse Act. Had Congress intended specific amend-
ment to the Trade and Intercourse Acts, it would have mentioned
them, as it had in the preceding session.2w The 1817 Act's language
States, will probably make it necessary to permit the British merchants
from Canada to participate in the commerce of those tribes, until more
accurate information is obtained as to their [the tribes'] situation and
numbers, their wants, and their capacity to pay for articles of the first
necessity. As this knowledge is gradually acquired, and the mode of
conducting the trade better understood, the exclusion of foreigners from
all participation in it may be safely effected.
Id. at 2:7; see also Report of Ninian Edwards (Superintendent and Treaty Commissioner,
Illinois Terr.) (Nov. 1815), in 2 Aid. STATE PAPERS - INDiAN AFFAIRS No. 142, at 63
(1834) ,(exhibit R).
196. See Cass, supra note 182. Lewis Cass' lengthy article in the April 1827 North
American Review was written and published solely to refute an article which had been
publish-d in the English Quarterly Review and circulated throughout Europe. The English
article made derogatory statements about the treatment of Indians by both individual
Americans and governmental officials. From some accounts, it might be inferred that
federal Indian policy was driven more by world public opinion than by internal politics
or concern for Native Americans.
197. See Schaaf, supra note 165.
198. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383.
199. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 702 (1990).
200. See Act of Apr. 29, 1816, ch. 165, 3 Stat. 332 (titled "An act supplementary
to the act passed the thirtieth of March, one thousand eight hundred and two, to
regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve peace on the
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does, however, appear to be the first to obviously prohibit crimes by
Indians in Indian country. 2 1 Section 1 of the 1817 Act proscribes all
crimes in Indian country, by whomever, against whomever. However,
section 2 (vesting jurisdiction in the territorial and federal courts)
contains the proviso: "[N]othing in this act shall be so construed as
to affect any treaty now in force between the United States and any
Indian nation, or to extend to any offence committed by one Indian
against another, within any Indian boundary."
The political and military positions of the Indian tribes were signif-
icantly altered by the War of 1812. The death of Tecumseh and the
defeat of the allied tribes in the Old Northwest, together with Andrew
Jackson's victories in the South, effectively ended European and Indian
power east of the Mississippi.2°3 That fact, along with the United
States' inflated confidence, eliminated the perceived need for caution
in claiming jurisdiction over Indian country. Though little congres-
sional history is available, the most likely purpose of the 1817 Federal
Enclaves Extension Act was to make general provisions for uniform
federal criminal law throughout United States territory where no state
or territorial government had been established, which included a very
frontiers"). The Act again prohibited Indian trade by any persons not United States
citizens and provided for forfeiture of violators' trade goods and the use of military
forces to apprehend them. Jurisdiction was granted exclusively to federal courts. See
also Act of May 6, 1822, ch. 58, 3 Stat. 682 (continuing the practice of expressly
mentioning the Trade and Intercourse Act when the intention was to amend that act).
The 1817 Act does mention the 1802 Trade and Intercourse Act, not to amend that
act but to incorporate the enforcement powers of its sections 14 and 15 into the 1817
Act. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, § 3, 3 Stat. 383.
201. The fact that the 1817 Congress felt it necessary to include the Indian-against-
Indian exemption lends some support to the Duro dissent's contention that prior acts
did not proscribe those crimes. The 1817 enactment does not, however, support any
implied exemption in the prior acts. It does support an inference that pre-1817 Congresses
intended to proscribe only interracial crimes; they were not concerned with what Indians
did to each other.
202. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, § 2, 3 Stat. 383. Other contemporaneous legislation
also provided special benefits to Indians as a racial group. For example, an 1822 statute
provides:
[I]n all trials about the right of property, in which Indians shall be party
on one side and white persons on the other, the burthen of proof shall
rest upon the white person, in every case in which the Indian shall make
out a presumption of title in himself from the fact of previous possession
and ownership.
Act of May 6, 1822, ch. 58, § 4, 3 Stat. 682, 683. That provision was reenacted in the
1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, which consolidated prior Indian-related legislation. Act
of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 22, 4 Stat. 729, 733. See discussion infra part III.C.
203. See DONALD R. HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812: A FORGOTTEN CONFLICT 303-09
(1989); HENRY BEERS, THE WVEsTER MarrARY FRONTIER 1815-1846 passim (1935).
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large geographic area.204 The Trade and Intercourse Acts had more
limited purposes and were not intended to provide general govern-
mental control over the area beyond established states and territories. 2s
In fact, the 1817 Act was quite pretentious. The United States had
the military and political power to enforce its laws in only a small
portion of the unorganized territory.
Despite probable inability on the domestic scene, in the international
arena, the United States unequivocally took the position that the
relationship between the United States and the Indians within its
claimed boundaries was a purely domestic matter. In the negotiations
leading to the Treaty of Ghent, ending the War of 1812, one significant
subject was Indian tribes and a British-proposed buffer zone between
Canada and the United States (entirely within United States territory).
In one exchange, the American negotiators informed the British:
The United States claim, of right, with respect to all
European nations, and particularly with respect to Great
Britain, the entire sovereignty over the whole territory, and
all the persons embraced within the boundaries of their
dominions; Great Britain has no right to take cognizance
of the relations subsisting between the several communities
or persons living therein; they form, as to her, only parts
of the dominions of the United States, and it is altogether
immaterial whether, or how far, under their political insti-
tutions and policy, these communities or persons are inde-
pendent States, allies, or subjects. With respect to her, and
all other foreign nations, they are parts of a whole, of
which the United States are the sole and absolute sover-
eigns.20
204. The 1817 Act may have grown out of a short comment in President Madison's
annual message to CongreAs on December 3, 1816:
Occurrences having taken place which show that the statutory provisions
for the dispensation of criminal justice are deficient, in relation to both
places and to persons, under the exclusive cognizance of the national
authority, an amendment to the law, embracing such cases, will merit the
earliest attention of the Legislature.
President James Madison's Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1816), in 30 ANNALS
OF CONG. 11, 14 (1816), in I RICHARDSON'S COMPILATIONS OF PRESIDENTS MESSAGES,
reprinted in H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 37, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 573 (1895) (U.S. Ser. Set
vol. 3265, vol. 1). The available legislative journal indicates there were some unidentified
amendment(s) but that the final proposal passed, essentially without debate. See 30
ANNALS OF CONG. 33, 82, 85, 92, 103, 143, 1025, 1040, 1044 (1817).
205. The extension of the federal enclaves law may have also been intended to
provide greater coercive authority to frontier officials trying to deal with British traders
and their unsettling effect on U.S.-Indian relations.
206. Note from the American to the British Ministers (Sept. 26, 1814), reprinted In
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, 3 Foreign Affairs, No. 269, at 695, 720 (1832).
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The position taken vis-d-vis Britain was that the Indians within United
States boundaries were entirely subject to United States sovereignty
but that the United States' "benign and enlightened" policy was to
allow Indians to continue their internal practices until such time as
they were "civilized. '"2 That policy, said the negotiators, had pro-
duced a longer period of peace than at any previous time since British
colonization began and, more emphatically, that the United States
policy concerning Indians was strictly an internal affair.M
The next frequently mentioned legislation was enacted in 1834. By
then, United States-Indian relations had expanded into a much larger
geographic area and encompassed many more tribes. Just one aspect
of federal policy, "removal" of Indians to locations west of the
Mississippi, required initiating formal relations with the tribes in the
target area. In 1834, a legislative package was proposed by the House
Committee on Indian Affairs, with the goal of modernizing Indian-
related legislation and combining it into a comprehensive, consistent
whole. The package contained three interdependent measures: one to
rationalize the administration of Indian affairs, one to consolidate and
update prior Trade and Intercourse Acts and their amendments, and
one to establish a territorial government for a "Western Territory"
composed of the removed tribes. 209
The proposed 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, inter alia, incorpo-
rated the substance of and repealed the 1802 Act and the 1817 Federal
Enclave Extension Act. Sections 2 through 15 made various provisions
concerning trade and travel in Indian country, primarily prohibitions
subjecting the violator to civil forfeiture of goods, money, or both.
Section 16 proscribed crimes "by a white person ... within the Indian
country" against an Indian. 210 Section 17 provided a method for
obtaining compensation from any Indian of a friendly tribe who
destroyed or damaged property "of any person lawfully within" Indian
207. Id.
208. Id.; see PAUL JOHNSON, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN - WORLD SocIETY 1815-
1830, at 37-38 (1991); cf. CouN G. CALLOWAY, CRowN AND CALUMET - BRrSH-INI
RELATONS, 1783-1815, at 240-57 (1987).
209. H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. (1834). Though introduced a month
earlier, the committee proposals were not considered until a few days before adjourn-
ment. The proposals concerning the Department of Indian Affairs and Trade and
Intercourse passed essentially as proposed. The proposed act "to provide for the
establishment of the Western Territory, and for the security and protection of emigrant
and other Indian tribes therein" was the subject of strenuous objection and set over to
the next session, when it was permanently tabled. The proposal may have been developed,
in part, from a proposal submitted by the Secretary of War in 1826. See Secretary of
War Barbour, Preservation and Civilization of the Indians, H.R. Doc. 102, 19th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1826) (U.S. Ser. Set vol. 135).
210. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 16, 4 Stat. 729, 731.
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country or of any "citizen or inhabitant" outside of Indian country.
211
Seclion 19 provided for the arrest of an Indian accused of a crime
outside a reservation who later fled to a reservation.212 Sections 20
and 21 prohibited the transfer of "spirituous liquor or wine" to an
Indian in Indian country and the operation of a still in Indian coun-
try.," Section 25 incorporated the 1817 Federal Enclave Extension Act
into congressional Indian policy:
[S]o much of the laws of the United States as provides for
the punishment of crimes committed within any place within
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall
be in force in the Indian country: Provided, The same shall
not extend to crimes committed by one Indian against the
person or property of another Indian.
2 14
The reason for including section 25 was stated in the accompanying
report:
In consequence of the change in our Indian relations, the
laws relating to crimes committed in the Indian country,
and to the tribunals before whom offenders are to be tried,
require revision. By the act of 3d March, 1817, the criminal
laws of the United States were extended to all persons in
the Indian country, without exception, and by that act, as
well as that of 30th March, 1802, they might be tried
wherever apprehended. It will be seen that we cannot, con-
sistently with the provisions of some [of] our treaties, and
211. Id. § 17, 4 Stat. at 731-32. As originally proposed, the section only proscribed
actions, by Indians outside of Indian country. See H.R. REP. No. 474, supra note 209,
at 31. As adopted, the section also proscribed actions taken by an Indian, in Indian
country, against the property of "any person lawfully within such country .... " Act
of June 30, 1834, § 17, 4 Stat. at 731. However, the operative provisions of that section
provide only for remuneration to "such citizens or inhabitants." Id. This section
effectively makes the perpetrator's tribe responsible for restitution. There is no indication
that any other tribe may have authority over the offender. Section 19 also implies that
only an offender's tribe could be required to surrender the offender. Id. § 19, 4 Stat.
at 732.
212. Act of June 30, 1834, § 19, 4 Stat. at 732.
213. Id. §§ 20, 21, 4 Stat. at 732-33.
214. Id. § 25, 4 Stat. at 733. The 1817 Act was expressly repealed. Id. § 29, 4 Stat.
at 734. It seems that the contemporary administration was not particularly impressed
with the exception. The Commissioner's 1835 report relates that the Choctaws had
recently executed two members of their tribe, pursuant to tribal tradition, for being
witches. The federal agent called the Choctaw chiefs to council and instructed them to
abolish that custom, subject to a federally imposed penalty of death for persons
participating in an execution and "the lash" for anyone preferring witchcraft charges.
The Commissioner praised the agent's actions. Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Elbert Herring (Nov. 24, 1835), in I WasHuRN, supra note 183, at 28, 28-29.
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of the [proposed] territorial act, extend our criminal laws
to offenses committed by or against Indians, of which the
tribes have exclusive jurisdiction; and it is rather of courtesy
than of right that we undertake to punish crimes committed
in that territory by and against our own citizens. And this
provision is retained principally on the ground that it may
be unsafe to trust to Indian law in the early stages of their
Government. It is not perceived that we can with any justice
or propriety extend our laws to offenses committed by
Indians against Indians, at any place within their own
limits.21'
The report misstated the 1817 Act. It did not mention the 1817 proviso
so prominent in Duro and Oliphant; in fact the report asserted there
was no exception in that Act. The "change in our Indian relations"
mentioned as the impetus for revision was twofold: (1) the change
from the previous essentially political relationship based on fear of
Indian wars to a relationship "of the strong to the weak, and [which]
demands at our hands a more liberal policy, as well directed to promote
their welfare as our political interests;"216 and (2) the then almost
completed removal policy. The treaties to which the report refers as
possibly precluding federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian-against-
Indian crimes were those providing for removal; among those specif-
ically mentioned in the report are the Choctaw treaty of September
27, 1830, and the Creek treaty of March 24, 1832.217 Those treaties
obligated the United States to secure to the signatory tribes "the
jurisdiction and Government of all the persons and property that may
be within their limits" in the West.218 The limitation on federal juris-
diction is attributed in the report to treaty limitations, not a general
theory of tribal sovereignty.
The 1834 report's description of the Indian-against-Indian exception
is connected with the Trade and Intercourse Act revisions, but the
reasons for that exception were discussed in connection with the pro-
215. H.R. REP. No. 474, supra note 209, at 13 (second and third emphasis added).
216. Id. at 11.
217. Id. at 16; see Choctaw Treaty of Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, reprinted in
CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDiAN TrEATims 1778-1883, at 310 (reprint 1972) (popularly
known as the "Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek); Creek Treaty of Mar. 24, 1832, 7
Stat. 366, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra, at 341. Before the House, Rep. Horace Everett
(Whig-Vt.), urging passage, remarked: "It [the tribal self-government provision, § 3]
was drawn in conformity with the provisions of various treaties, nor did it go beyond
them." 10 CONG. DEB. 4764 (1834).
218. Id. The quoted language makes it sound as if the tribe was given jurisdiction
over non-Indians. However, in a later clause, the Choctaw treaty expresses "a wish"
that Congress grant the tribe the power to punish any white man who comes into their
territory and violates tribal law. Id.
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posed Western Territory Act, which found prominence in Oliphant
and in the Duro dissent. In Oliphant, the report supporting the Western
Territory Bill was used to illustrate Congress' intention to preclude
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians temporarily within Indian coun-
try.2 9 In the Duro dissent, however, the proposal was cited as sup-
porting the proposition that Congress presumed that Indians would
police intertribal disputes. 2 That assertion is not supported by the
proposed bill or the accompanying report. As quoted in Oliphant, the
repoirt stated:
The want of fixed [tribal] laws, of competent [tribal] tri-
bunals of justice, which must for some time continue in the
Indian country, absolutely requires for the peace of both
sides that this protection [of "officers," "persons" in fed-
eral service, "persons" required by treaty to reside in Indian
country, and "persons merely travelling through the Indian
country"] should be extended. 2 '
The "want of fixed tribunals" does not characterize a tribal govern-
ment capable of acceptably dealing with intertribal crimes. Any inter-
pretation of the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, or of the report
accompanying it, must recognize that the-Act was part of a package;
some portions appear to have a different meaning when read in
isolation.
In the years immediately preceding 1834, the executive branch and
Congress shared the opinion that policing intertribal crime was a
federal responsibility. In an 1829 message to Congress, President An-
drew Jackson proposed an Indian-controlled government in Indian
country. "There they may be secured in Governments of their own
choice, subject to no other control from the United States than such
219. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 201-22 (1978).
220. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 704 n.2 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 202 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 474, supra note 209, at 18).
The "protection extended" was that the identified persons (not identified by race)
remained subject to United States jurisdiction and bound by United States laws. Pro-
tected persons violating tribal law were to be removed from the offended tribe's territory
by the territorial governor. Proposed Western Territory Act, § 8, H.R. REP. No. 474,
supra note 209, at 37.
As justification for the appointed governor's veto power over the general council's
legislation, Representative Everett remarked:
Suppose the council, acting according to Indian notions, should think it
fit to enact retaliation by [as?] law; the consequence would soon be war
among themselves; and so soon as the torch of civil discord was thus
lighted, the United States Government must act; it was bound to act; the
treaty and the law require it. We had, therefore, a direct interest in the
enactments of this new Indian government.
10 CONG. DEB. 4766 (1834).
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as may be necessary to preserve peace on the frontier, and between
the several tribes."m A law adopted shortly after President Jackson's
message authorized treaties with the various tribes for land exchanges
and removal west of the Mississippi, and "Itihat it shall and may be
lawful for the President to cause such tribe or nation to be protected,
at their new residence, against all interruption and disturbance from
any other tribe or nation of Indians, or from any other person or
persons whatever.'"'2
The 1834 Western Territory proposal was politically contempora-
neous with the 1829-1830 executive and congressional acts. The 1834
proposal was developed from a 1829 report by then-Governor Lewis
Cass and General William Clark, prepared at the request of the
Secretary of War. 4 The Cass-Clark report was supplemented and
supported by an 1834 report of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs,
West, which expressly supported the three-bill proposal.?3
The 1829 Clark-Cass report included proposed legislation, section
48 thereof providing that federal Indian agents be responsible for
procuring the arrest of any Indian committing a crime.226 The accom-
panying commentary by two recognized and influential "experts" (one
of whom had become the Secretary of War in the interim) explained
the necessity for that proposal:
The Indians are broken into little independent communities,
jealous, vindictive, and warlike. Occupying the same general
regions, engaged in the same pursuits, and with territorial
claims, ill defined, or not defined at all, it is not surprising
that dissentions should frequently arise, nor that they should
sometimes lead to hostilities.
222. H.R. REP. No. 474, supra note 209, at 15 (quoting President Andrew Jackson's
Message to Congress of Dec. 8, 1829 (emphasis added)).
223. Act of May 30, 1830, ch. 148, § 6, 21st Cong., Ist Sess., 4 Stat. 411, 412
(emphasis added).
224. S. Doc. No. 72, 20th Cong., 2d Sess. (1829) (U.S. Ser. Set vol. 181). A
"western territory" bill was also introduced in 1829. That bill would have established
a territory in Indian country very similar to those established elsewhere, run by the U.S.
government, not the Indians. See H.R. REP. No. 474, supra note 209, at 76-78 (exhibit
S). The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in his 1830 report, recommended the 1829
Cass-Clark report as a basis for updating the 1802 Trade and Intercourse Act. See
Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs Samuel S. Hamilton (Nov. 26, 1830), in 1
WASHBURN, supra note 183, at 16-17.
When the 1834 proposal was introduced, Lewis Cass was Secretary of War and thus
in charge of the Indian Affairs Department. Despite a political change of heart on
Indian removal, Cass gave no indication that he had changed his view of Indian society
or character between 1829 and 1834.
225. See H.R. REP. No. 474, supra note 209, at 78-105 (exhibit T).
226. S. Doc. No. 72, 20th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1829).
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But these difficulties, whether real or imaginary, are not
the most prominent causes of the hostilities in which the
Indian tribes are so often involved. Many of their wars are
as ceaseless as they are causeless, originating they know not
why, and terminating they care not when. They result, in
fact, from the spirit of their institutions. Until a young man
has been engaged with an enemy, and can boast of his
prowess, he is held in no estimation, and is considered little
better than a woman.2 7
The 1834 Western Territory proposal was intended to replace tra-
ditional intertribal war with a deliberative body. Various portions of
the proposal dealt with an all-tribe Council which would pass laws of
general application, including "all necessary regulations respecting the
intercourse among the various tribes, to preserve peace, to put a stop
to hostilities, ... to arrest and punish all Indians who may commit
offenses within the district of one tribe, and who may flee to an-
other . . . "m The proposal specifically dealt with intertribal crimes,
providing for a five-chief court (none from the offender's or victim's
tribe), subject to review by the governor, who was to be appointed by
the President. 9 Nothing in the proposal intimated that the committee
was of the opinion that any tribe had or could exercise criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. The Western Commissioners'
1834 report stated outright what the committee only hinted:
Laws also will be necessary to define the rights and powers
of the different Indian nations, and regulating their inter-
course with each other.
With the exception of two or three tribes . . . the Indian
tribes are without laws, and the chiefs without much au-
thority to exercise any restraint upon their people .... At
present nothing is more common than for hunting parties
to wander from their homes, visit the settlements of other
tiribes, and kill their stock and commit other depreda-
tions .... It is now quite common, too, for a chief or
warrior who has influence enough to raise a war party, to
attack some other tribe for the purpose of plunder, or taking
scalps. This leads to retaliation and revenge, and thus wars
have been carried on between several tribes from time im-
227. Id. at 44-45.
228. H.R. REP. No. 474, supra note 209, at 36 (§ 7 of proposed Western Territory
Act).
229. Id. at 36-37 (§ 9 of proposed Western Territory Act).
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memorial. Humanity as well as due regard for the just
rights of others, requires that these practices should cease.
And it remains for the Government of the United States
alone to determine when they shall end. 30
In a passage that directly expresses the understanding (or assumptions)
of Congress, the committee stated: concerning the proposal's provision
for the non-Indian governor's review of capital cases:
The danger of leaving the punishment of death to the
judgment of tribes who are not accustomed to measure
degrees of guilt, especially against others than members of
the tribe, is too obvious to need comment.... Each tribe
will see that it is an important protection to its own mem-
bers.?
Again, with respect to the proposal allowing the governor to veto any
legislation adopted by the intertribal council, the report stated:
The United States being bound to protect the several
tribes from domestic strife, each tribe from the aggression
of the others, and from all foreign force, are directly con-
cerned that all the regulations made by the council should
aid them [the United States] in the fulfillment of these
obligations, at least that they [the Indians] should not ob-
struct or render them [the obligations] more burdensome.
As the power of the several tribes is unequal, it will be
necessary to protect the weak against the strong, and the
strong against the combinations of the weak. And to secure
these objects, it will be necessary that there should be some
check against improvident or improper acts of the general
council.'
230. Id. at 91. (emphasis added). A detailed report of continuing skirmishes between
the Chippewa and the Sioux was submitted shortly before the 1834 legislation. Henry
R. Schoolcraft - Expedition into the Indian Country, H.R. Doc. 152, 22d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1832) (U.S. Ser. Set vol. 219).
231. H.R. RP. No. 474, supra note 209, at 19 (emphasis added). Supporting the
Western Territory proposal, Rep. Edward Everett (Whig-Mass.) remarked:
If the gentlemen [opposing the bill] would take into consideration the
extensive intercourse of the Indian tribes with whites; that they are new
to legislation; and, above all, that they were a people of deep passion,
and bred from infancy to revenge, they must admit the propriety of putting
some restriction on the power of inflicting death at pleasure upon whom
they would. Otherwise, traders and travellers might be unjustly condemned
and sacrificed before their case could be duly considered.
10 CONG. DEB. 4767 (1834). In other words, Indian tribes were not capable of "duly
considered" judgments in criminal cases.
232. H.R. REP. No. 474, supra note 209, at 34 (emphasis added).
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The proposed legislation as a whole shows a similar understanding.
Section 3 authorized each tribe to establish and maintain its own
government for the management of "their own internal concerns."" 3
In addition, section 7 established a confederacy, governed by a general
council of elected tribal representatives or chiefs.
It shall be their duty to make all necessary regulations
respecting the intercourse among the various tribes, to pre-
serve peace, to put a stop to hostilities, to settle any ques-
tions of dispute respecting boundaries, to arrest and punish
all Indians who may commit offenses within the district of
one tribe, and who may flee to another, and to take such
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the intentions
of this act.2-u
Given the state of affairs reported to Congress and the proposals
made, the most that might be said about Congress' presumptions is
that the 1834 Congress operated on the belief that any method of
settling intertribal disputes and crimes, other than intertribal war,
would have to be provided by Congress. The committee intended to
create a method of handling intertribal crime because no acceptable
method then existed. 235 There was no assumption that any of the tribes
had an acceptably civilized method of exercising jurisdiction over
nonmnember Indians.236 The Western Territory proposal was perma-
nently tabled. 23
233. Id. at 35.
234. Id. at 36 (§ 7 of proposed Western Territory Act).
235. Indicative of the federal executive's understanding of the time is the 1832 report
of Commissioner of Indian Affairs Elbert Herring:
Some of the Indian tribes have proceeded to hostile acts, in the course
of the year past, against each other, and conflicts have ensued, in which
blood has been spilt in defiance of the obligation imposed by the guarantee
of the United States, for the preservation of peace and tranquillity among
them. The instigators of such unwarrantable proceedings, as well as the
chief actors in every instance of ascertained outrage, are justly considered
responsible to the [United States] -Government for the transgression, and
are invariably required to be given up to its authority to answer for their
offences.
ELERr HERRING, ANNuAL Rm'ORT OF a COMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRs FOR TH3E
YEAR 1832, at 163-64 (1832), reprinted in 1 WAsHBURN, supra note 183, at 22, 26.
236. During the House debate, it was asserted, repeatedly by proponents and op-
ponenis, that the tribes were not capable of creating or managing an acceptable type
of government. See 10 CoNG. DEB. 4764-80 (1834). The tribes most mentioned were
those considered the most "civilized" of all Native American groups, some of which
had adopted written constitutions and laws, and otherwise emulated Anglo-American
forms.
237. 10 CONG. DEn. 4780 (1834). The proposal drew vigorous opposition from
Repres,,-ntative (and ex-President) John Quincy Adams (Mass.), who saw the proposal
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The Duro dissent asserted that the 1834 Congress understood that
individual tribes "police[d]" intertribal disputes. 238 Actually, Congress
assumed that unless the federal government intervened, intertribal
crimes would be revenged on the warpath rather than tried at the
courthouse. It is doubtful that the Duro dissent.or the 1834 Congress
would equate "retaliation and revenge" or "ceaseless and causeless
war" with exercising recognized criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians.
Chronologically the next congressional action that received attention
in Oliphant, Wheeler, and Duro is an 1854 act23 that, in part, amended
the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act. To support its position that
Congress intentionally left prosecution of intertribal crime to the tribes,
the Duro dissent stated:
In 1854, Congress again amended the statute [240] to pro-
scribe prosecution in federal court of an Indian who had
already been tried in tribal court.
... Moreover, the provision in the 1854 Act exempting
from federal jurisdiction any Indian who had been previ-
ously punished by a tribal court amounts to an express
acknowledgement by Congress of tribal jurisdiction over
Indians who commit crimes in Indian country.24'
as a precursor to Indian statehood and objected to admitting an Indian state on equal
footing with non-Indian states. Id. at 4770. Rep. William Archer (Whig-Va.) held similar
views but expressed them in very racist terms, raising the "specter" of admitting the
"states" of Cuba and "Hayti," even free blacks from Canada and Liberia, and urging
all "southern men" to oppose the bill. Id. at 4777-78.
238. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 707 (1990).
239. Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, 10 Stat. 269.
240. Duro, 495 U.S. at 702 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The implication in the opinion
is that the 1854 measure amended the 1817 or 1790 enactments. However, the 1854 Act
expressly amended the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, which had consolidated provi-
sions of earlier statutes, including earlier Trade and Intercourse Acts and the 1817
Federal Enclaves Extension Act.
241. Id. at 703. The opinion's citation to "10 Stat. 270, ch. 30" is inaccurate. The
proper citation is: Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, § 3, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., 10 Stat.
269, 270.
Between 1834 and 1854, at least one situation in Indian country prompted a call for
elimination of the Indian-against-Indian exception. Apparently in 1845-46, members of
the dominant political group in the Cherokee Nation abused their governmental authority
for their own aggrandizement and committed crimes including murder and robbery
against members of the other tribal groups. See S. RaP. No. 461, 29th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1846) (U.S. Ser. Set vol. 478). The result was a bill to extend federal criminal law to
all persons in Indian country. That bill did not pass, but reports of the atrocities and
injustices by the dominant party of the tribe considered most highly advanced would
not be conducive to the belief that all tribes acceptably exercised jurisdiction over even
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The characterization of the 1854 Act is misleading, particularly as to
its scope, which has a direct impact on the associated congressional
intent. The referenced portion of the 1854 Act was adopted in response
to a. specific contemporary problem and was intended to address only
that problem. The relevant portion of the Act's section 3 stated:
[N]othing contained in the twentieth section of the said act
[of 1834], which provides for the punishment of offenses
therein specified, shall be construed to'extend to any Indian
committing said offenses in the Indian country, or to any
Indian committing any offence in the Indian country who
has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or in any
case where, by treaty stipulations the exclusive jurisdiction
over such offenses may now or hereafter be secured to said
Indian tribes, respectively .... 242
Section 20, the only affected section of the 1834 Act, prohibited the
sale of liquor to Indians and the introduction of liquor into Indian
country (except to supply United States Army personnel).243 The 1817
Indian-against-Indian exception was carried forward in section 25 of
the 1834 Act.244 The 1854 prior-tribal-punishment provision did not
amend or affect that 1817/1834 exception.
The Senate Indian Affairs Committee appended section 3 to an 1854
House bill that amended an 1851 Act dividing Arkansas into two
judicial districts. 245 The amended measure passed the Senate without
their own members. In fact, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs expressed the opinion
that the only powers exercised by Indian tribes concerned internal affairs and were given
("conceded") to them by the federal government.
242. Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, § 3, 10 Stat. 269, 270. The following sections
of the Act provide punishment for both Indians and "white persons" committing the
crimes of arson or assault with intent to kill or maim in Indian country. Id. §§ 4, 5.
As enacted, those sections only proscribe such actions by Indians against "white
persons," not against other Indians. These additional sections do not exempt Indians
who have been punished by local tribal law. If section 3 had the encompassing meaning
attributed by the Duro dissent, sections 4 and 5 would have to be exceptions to section
3. The Congress that adopted the measure must not have had the same understanding
as the Duro dissent suggests because neither section 4 nor 5 is drafted as an exception.
243. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 20, 4 Stat. 729, 732.
244. Id. § 25, 4 Stat. at 733.
245. 23 CONG. GLOBE 581 (1854). The committee amendment added sections 2
through 6 to the House-passed act. The 1851 Act resulted, at least in part, from the
difficulty caused by the fact that the Indian Territory was part of the Arkansas judicial
district and court was held at Little Rock, some 160 miles from the nearest border of
the Indian Territory, thus requiring Indians and others to ride over 300 miles on
horseback to appear as witnesses in a criminal trial of an alleged horse thief. See
REPORT OF Tm JuJnu= Ry CommIrEE, S. REP. No. 372, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. (1846)
(U.S. Ser. Set vol. 476).
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debate. 246 When the bill came back to the House, a motion to send it
to the Judiciary Committee to consider the amendments was resisted
by Rep. Alfred B. Greenwood (D.-Ark.), based upon the urgency of
the measure and the "simple and plain" nature of the amendments. 247
To explain the simplicity of the added section 3, Representative Green-
wood stated:
A case arose where a member of the Creek nation, who
had engaged in selling spirituous liquors in the nation, in
violation of its laws, was arrested by the authorities of his
own country. The grand jury of the western district of
Arkansas thought [it] proper to reindict [sic] him for the
same offense. Thus a conflict of jurisdiction grew up, and
the Senate thought [it] proper to make a provision to the
effect that, when an individual guilty of an offense of that
character, and others similar, had been tried and punished
in the Creek or any other nation, such trial and conviction
should be a bar to subsequent prosecution in the district
court of the United States.24
The genesis of section 3 was a specific incident that almost started an
Indian war, as reported in the November 1853 report of the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs:249
I deem it incumbent upon me to call particular attention
to that portion of the interesting report of Superintendent
Drew referring to the question of the amenability of Indians
to the penalties of the [federal] law prohibiting the intro-
duction or sale of ardent spirits in the Indian country; a
question which has recently caused great excitement among
the Creeks, and may lead to serious difficulty. This, and
the other semi-civilized tribes on that frontier within his
superintendency, have adopted stringent laws upon the sub-
ject, which are regularly and rigidly enforced against their
own people guilty of the offence; while, according to judicial
interpretation in that quarter [the federal court in Arkansas],
they are also amenable under our [federal] law. Thus, an
Indian, though he may have been severely punished by his
246. 23 CONo. GLOBE 580-81 (1854).
247. Id. at 700-01. The urgency was that thirty to forty men who had been in jail
for up to two years could not be sent to the penitentiary due to the new Western
District of Arkansas' lack of legal authority to sentence persons to confinement in the
Eastern District. Id. at 701.
248. Id. (emphasis added).
249. S. ExEc. Doc. No. 1, 33d Cong., Ist Sess. 243-64 (1853).
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tribe for introducing or disposing of liquor, is liable to
arrest and punishment a second time for the same offence;
a result certainly contrary to the spirit of our institutions,
and as repugnant to the Indian as it would be to ourselves.
It is one to which the Creeks appear determined not to
submit. Individuals of their nation, seized by the United
States marshal last summer, were rescued by them; and a
second effort of that officer to arrest these persons has lead
to great excitement. A considerable number have banded
together and armed themselves to resist the attempt at all
hazards;, and in the case of failure, they threaten the lives
of those of their chiefs who have been instrumental and
active in the adoption and enforcement of their own law ....
The enforcement against Indians, by criminal prosecution,
of the law to prohibit the introduction or sale of liquor in
the Indian country, is believed to be contrary, not only to
the intention of the framers of that law [1834 Act, § 20],
but also to the principle, uniformly acted on in respect to
all of the tribes, of as little direct interference as possible
in their internal and domestic affairs. Hence offences, and
other matters of even greater concern, are left to be settled
entirely by themselves.2 0
The Commissioner did not report that any tribe had attempted to
punish members of other tribes or that any crimes other than those
related to liquor prohibitions were at issue. The Duro dissent's refer-
ence to the 1854 Act used the phrase "tried in tribal court, ' 25' which
implies the existence of an Anglo-American-type court, an implication
not supported by the Act or the circumstances. Even less does the
18541 Act, or its cause, support any inference that Indian tribes were
exercising criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers or that Congress
intended to allow them to so do.
2
2
250. Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
251. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 702 (1990).
2f-2. This understanding of the relevant portion of section 3 of the 1854 Act is
stron:gly supported by the preceding portion of that enactment. Section 3 is one long
sentence clearly divided into two parts. The first part expressly states that nothing in
section 25 of the 1834 Act is to be construed to extend to Indian country any laws
adopted for the District of Columbia, a provision continued into the analogous current
statute. That part of the section has a purpose very distinct from the second part. The
first provision of section 3 expressly refers to section 25 while the second provision
expressly refers to section 20. It is not grammatically possible to give the second
provi!;ion's final phrase an independent status broader than the clause of which it is
but a part. The enacting Congress must be deemed aware of the distinction between
the two sections it was amending. The Duro dissent's interpretation of the 1854 Act
effectively treats both parts as referring to section 25 of the 1834 Act, ignoring the
limiting reference to section 20 and the limited reason for the amendment.
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The relevant part of the 1854 Act has a single purpose - to exempt
from prosecution under federal liquor laws any Indian who had been
punished by his or her tribe for violating tribal liquor laws. 2 3 Inter-
preting that provision as a general exemption, as does the Duro dissent,
is not supportable. Interpreting section 3 of the 1854 Act to apply to
non-liquor offenses would result in two general exemptions from fed-
eral prosecution, one from 1817 exempting Indian-against-Indian crimes
(regardless of tribal punishment), and one from 1854 exempting crimes
punished under tribal law (regardless of the victim's identity). Inter-
preting the 1854 provision broadly renders its final phrase (the precise
part referenced by the Duro dissent) surplusage, unless the 1854 pro-
vision is simultaneously interpreted to extend to Indian crimes against
non-Indians. To make a broad interpretation of the 1854 provision
meaningful without including Indian-against-non-Indian crimes would
require interpreting the 1817/1834 exemption as not applying to "vic-
timless" crimes, which is insupportable. Such a broad interpretation
of the 1854 provision is not supported by the Act itself. "54 In addition,
if section 3 is construed as having general application, it is inconsistent
with long-standing and often reenacted provisions for federal punish-
ment of Indians committing crimes against non-Indians; merely by
showing that he had been punished according to tribal law, any Indian
would be exempt from federal prosecution. There is certainly nothing
in the history of the 1854 Act or its surroundings to indicate Congress
intended that result.
If the 1854 Act is interpreted as a general exemption for all Indians
subjected to tribal punishment for intra-Indian crimes, it is pure
surplusage. The preceding clause exempts Indians from liquor sales
crimes; the 1817 Indian-against-Indian exemption covers all general
federal crimes. The only logical interpretation is that Congress meant
what it said, i.e., section 20 of the 1834 Act should not be used to
impose criminal liability on an Indian previously sanctioned by his
253. There is also nothing in the 1854 Act that indicates tribal punishment must
have been through a court. Both contemporary and subsequent materials show that
Congress was aware that tribal social controls did not include Anglo-American-type
punishment for "crimes."
254. Assume that an arsonist's tribal law required the arsonist to replace a burned
home and supply food to the offended family for the following year. If an Indian set
fire to a non-Indian's home within Indian country and had been held responsible by
his tribal elders for the traditional penalty, section 3 of the 1854 Act (as interpreted by
the Duro dissent) precludes federal prosecution. That result/interpretation is rendered
implausible by the fact that section 4 of the Act expressly makes such a crime by an
Indian a federal felony punishable by no less than two years' imprisonment at hard
labor. Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, § 4, 10 Stat. 269, 270. Section 5 of the Act
provides federal penalties for an Indian who assaults a white man with a deadly weapon.
Id. § 5. If section 3 had the meaning ascribed in the Duro dissent, both sections 4 and
5 would have merely proscribed the crime, without regard to race.
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own tribe. That was the precise and only problem Congress intended
to, and did, address.
The subsequent history of the 1854 Act is anomalous. In 1862,
Congress replaced section 20 of the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act.2
5
Rather than stating only the amendments to be made, the 1862 Act
set out the entire section (section 20), as amended. The 1862 Act did
not include the 1854 proviso, which has been held to have had the
effect of repealing the 1854 exception.2 s When the United States
Revised Code was compiled in the early 1870s, the compilers over-
looked the 1862 amendment and included an exemption to the liquor
sale prohibition for sales by Indians, based on the previously repealed
1854 enactment.0 7 To remedy that particular oversight, Congress
amended the Revised Statute in 1877 to eliminate the 1854 Indian
liquor-sale exemptionY8s The end result of that series of amendments
has been a double affirmation of an intention to repeal the Indian
exemption to the liquor sales prohibition. 9
The same compilers that overlooked the rather obvious meaning of
the 1862 amendment incorporated the then-repealed 1854 Act into at
least three different sections. The final part of the second clause of
the 1854 Act, section 3 (providing exemption from liquor crimes for
tribally punished Indians), was erroneously treated as if it applied to
the first clause of that section. As codified, section 2146 of the Revised
Statutes provided that section 2145 (the Federal Enclave Extension)
did not apply to "any Indian committing any offense in Indian county
who has been punished by the local law of the tribe .... ,,260 The
compilers left out the Indian-against-Indian exception, an action that
could be used to infer that the codifiers believed both exceptions
covered all crimes and one was surplusage. Congress dispelled any
such inference; the 1817 exception was restored by an 1875 amendment
to the Revised Statutes.
26
1
255. Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 24, 12 Stat. 338. The same amendment procedure
was used again in 1864, when the provision was amended to add federal circuit courts
as potential trial courts. Act of Mar. 15, 1864, ch. 33, 13 Stat. 29. Neither amendment
included the 1854 language exempting Indians punished by their tribe.
256. United States v. Shaw-Mux, 27 F. Cas. 1049, 1049-50 (D. Or. 1873); see also
United States v. Cowboy, 694 F.2d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 1982).
257. See U.S. REv. STAT. § 2139 (1875 ed.), 18 Stat. 375 (part I).
258. Act of Feb. 27, 1877, ch. 69, 19 Stat. 240, 244 (to correct errors and omissions
in the Revised Statutes).
259. United States v. Cowboy, 694 F.2d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 1982).
260. U.S. REv. STAT. § 2146 (1875 ed.), 18 Stat. 376 (part I). The repealed 1854
Act is specifically identified in the marginal notes as the source for this provision.
261. Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 316, 318 (correcting errors and omissions
in the 1873 Act adopting the Revised Statutes). As amended in 1875, the Revised Statutes
provided: "The preceding section [federal enclave jurisdiction] shall not be construed
to extend to crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another
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There is a dearth of case authority discussing the effect of the 1854
tribal-punishment provision, even though that provision has been car-
ried forward into current statute.262 That section's tribal-punishment
provision was raised as a defense in United States v. Sosseur,263 where
the Indian defendant was charged with a gambling violation. The
Seventh Circuit held the provision inapplicable because the defendant
had not been punished by the tribe and the tribe had no law prohibiting
gambling.2 4 The tribal punishment exception was also discussed in
United States v. LaPlant.261 In that case, the defendants had been
charged with assault in tribal court and then in federal court. Despite
some confusing procedures, the defendants had pled guilty in tribal
court before they were formally charged in federal court. Responding
to the defendants' motion to dismiss, the United States Attorney
conceded that the federal charge constituted double jeopardy. In dic-
tum, the Montana District Court stated that the tribal-punishment
exception "alone would appear sufficient ... to warrant dismissal...
absent any question of double jeopardy. ' 2 66 The existence of the
exception was noted in United States v. Wheeler, but the prosecution
there was under the Major Crimes Act, to which, the Court said, the
1854 exception does not apply.267 In Wheeler, the Court did not say
to what crimes the tribal-punishment exception does apply, but the
implication is that the exception's scope is much less pervasive than
implied by the Duro dissent.
The same Congresses that allegedly acknowledged tribal authority
over nonmembers via the tribal-punishment exception (mid-1850s
through early 1870s) also dealt with individual tribes and nations in
other ways. Within months after introducing and approving the 1854
Act, the Senate approved a number of treaties with Indians in the
Oregon Territory. A treaty signed on the Rogue River in November,
1854, with the Chasta and other tribes provided:
They [the signatory tribes] also pledge themselves to live
peaceably with one another, and with other Indians, to
abstain from war and private acts of revenge, and to submit
Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who has been
punished by the local law of the tribe ... ." Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 (pt. 3)
Stat. 316, 318, codified at U.S. REv. STAT. § 2146, at 374 (2d ed. 1878) (italicized
portion added in 1875).
262. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
263. 181 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1950).
264. Id. at 876.
265. 156 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mont. 1957).
266. Id. at 662.
267. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325 & n.22. (1978). The exception was
also noted and passed over by the Ninth Circuit in the same case. United States v.
Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255 & n.1 (1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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all matters of difference between themselves and Indians of
other tribes and bands to the decision of the United States
or the agent and abide thereby.
268
Treaties with the Umpquas and Calapooias, the Nisquallys, and the
Willamette Indians all had similar provisions.2 69 If the agreement was
violated, the United States was obligated to treat it as a depredation
against a "citizen," i.e., by forcing the return of property taken or
payment via deduction from the perpetrator's annuity.210 That type of
provision was not limited to Pacific Northwest tribes. An 1855 treaty
with the Minnesota Chippewa contained an essentially identical pro-
vision,271 as did an 1857 treaty with the Nebraska Pawnee.272 These
provisions do not support the conclusion that the Senate assumed that
the tribes had previously, peacefully, exercised criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember offenders. The more rational inference, particularly
in light of the continuing intertribal and interracial wars, is that the
Senate was of the opinion that without these provisions, Indians would
settle intertribal matters through personal revenge or war.
Even treaties with the Five Civilized Tribes imposed provisions for
peaceable settlement of intertribal matters. In an 1856 treaty providing
for removal of the Seminole from Florida to the Creek area of Indian
Territory, specific provision was made for jurisdiction of Creek and
268. Treaty with the Chastas & Other Tribes, Nov. 18, 1854, art. 8, 10 Stat. 1122,
1123.
269. Treaty with Umpquas and Calapooias, Nov. 18, 1854, art. 8, 10 Stat. 1125,
1127; Treaty with the Nisquallys, Dec. 26, 1854, art. VIII, 10 Stat. 1132, 1134; Treaty
with the Willamette Indians, Jan. 22, 1855, art. 6, 10 Stat. 1143, 1145.
270. See, e.g., Treaty with Umpquas and Calapooias, Nov. 18, 1854, art. 8, 10 Stat.
1125, 1127. The treaty provided: "And if any of the said Indians commit any depre-
dations on any other Indians, the same rule shall prevail as that prescribed in this article
in case of depredations against citizens." Id.
271. Treaty with the Chippewas, Feb. 22, 1855, art. IX, 10 Stat. 1165, 1169. The
treaty provided:
The said bands of Indians, jointly and severally, obligate and bind them-
selves not to commit any depredations or wrong upon other Indians, or
upon citizens of the United States; to conduct themselves at all times in
a peaceable and orderly manner; to submit all difficulties between them
and other Indians to the President, and to abide by his decision ....
Id.
272. Treaty with the Four Confederate Bands of the Pawnee Indians, Sept. 24, 1857,
art. V, I1 Stat. 729, 731. The treaty provided: "The Pawnees. .. promise to be friendly
with all of the citizens [of the United States], and pledge themselves to commit no
deprolations on the property of such citizens, nor on that of any other person belonging
to any tribe or nation at peace with the United States." Id. If the Pawnee failed to
return any property taken in violation of those pledges, the United States was authorized
to deduct the value from annuities. The Pawnee agreed to submit all intertribal disputes
to the U.S. government or its agent for resolution. Id.
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Seminole courts over civil matters involving members of the other
tribe.2 3 Those provisions would have been unnecessary if tribes had
inherent, recognized jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.
At the other end of the spectrum, treaties signed in 1865 with
Northern plains tribes, not then compliant with federal authority,
contained somewhat similar provisions, taking into consideration the
different standing of the signatory tribes. For example, a series of
treaties with various tribes of the Sioux Nation include the tribes'
agreements to submit to federal officials all controversies with other
tribes that involved the question of peace and war and to abide by
the official's decision.274 In those same treaties, the United States agreed
to protect the settled Indians "against any annoyance or molestation
on the part of whites or Indians, as an inducement to settle in one
location to become farmers . "...-275 Those provisions may not indicate
an absence of tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. However,
the inference is that federal officials (executive branch negotiators and
senators) believed that intertribal matters were not settled by peaceful
means, and federal intervention was necessary. Once the Indians settled
as the federal officials desired, federal power was promised to protect
the settled Indians from those who remained "uncivilized." The sin-
cerity of that promise, at least in hindsight, may have left something
to be desired, but there is no question that the undertaking is not
273. Treaty with Creeks and Seminoles, Aug. 7, 1856, art. XIII, 11 Stat. 699, 703.
The treaty provided:
The officers and people of each of the tribes of Creeks and Seminoles
shall ... have the right of safe conduct and free passage through the
lands and territory of the other. The members of each shall have the right
freely to settle within the country of the other, and shall thereupon be
entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of members thereof,
except that no member of either tribe shall be entitled to participate in
any funds belonging to the other tribe. Members of each tribe shall have
the right to institute and prosecute suits in the courts of the other, under
such regulations as may, from time to time, be prescribed by their respective
legislatures.
Id. Article XIV provided for extradition when a member of one tribe fled to the country
of the other to escape apprehension. Id.
274. See Treaty with the Blackfeet, Oct. 19, 1865, art. III, 14 Stat. 727, 727; Treaty
with the Sans Arcs Indians, Oct. 20, 1865, art. III, 14 Stat. 731, 731; Treaty with the
Yanktonai Indians, Oct. 20, 1865, art. III, 14 Stat. 735, 735; Treaty with the Onkpahpah
Indians, Oct. 20, 1865, art. III, 14 Stat. 739, 739; Treaty with the Upper Yanktonals
Indians, Oct. 28, 1865, art. III, 14 Stat. 743, 743; Treaty with the O'Gallala Indians,
Oct. 28, 1865, art. III, 14 Stat. 747, 747.
275. See Treaty with the Blackfeet, Oct. 19, 1865, art. V, 14 Stat. 727, 727; Treaty
with the Sans Arcs Indians, Oct. 19, 1865, art. V, 14 Stat. 731, 731; Treaty with the
Yanktonai Indians, Oct. 20, 1865, art. V, 14 Stat. 735, 735; Treaty with the Onkpahpah
Indians, Oct. 20, 1865, art. V, 14 Stat. 739, 739; Treaty with the Upper Yanktonais
Indians, Oct. 28, 1865, art. V, 14 Stat. 743, 743; Treaty with the O'Gallala Indians,
Oct. 28, 1865, art. V, 14 Stat. 747, 747.
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based on tacit recognition of established tribal criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians.
Following the Civil War (in which some tribes, or parts of tribes,
fought for the Confederacy), new treaties were negotiated with the
Five Civilized Tribes. In these treaties, the tribes agreed to remain at
peace with all other tribes, and the United States guaranteed protection
against any hostilities of other tribes . 76 More significantly for current
purposes, the tribes agreed to the establishment of a general council
in Indian Territory, 277 quite similar to the government that was pro-
posed in the rejected 1834 Western Territory bill. The treaties provided:
Said general council shall have the power to legislate upon
all rightful subjects and matters pertaining to the intercourse
and relations of the Indian tribes and nations resident in
said territory; the arrest and extradition of criminals and
offenders escaping from one tribe to another; the admin-
istration of justice between members of the several tribes
of said territory, and persons other than Indians and mem-
bers of said tribes or nations .... All laws enacted by said
council shall take effect at such time as may therein be
provided, unless suspended by the direction of the Secretary
of the Interior or the President of the United States.271
The Superintendent of Indian Affairs was to preside over the council.2 79
Taken alone, the general council provisions are possibly ambiguous
concerning the nature of the individual tribes' jurisdiction over non-
members. However, when the provisions are read as a whole, the
reasonable interpretation is that each tribe's internal laws applied only
to its members and general council laws applied to intertribal crimes
276. See, e.g., Treaty with the Seminole Nation, Mar. 21, 1866, art. I, 14 Stat. 755,
756. Similar treaties were entered into with the other tribes. See, e.g., Treaty with the
Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians, Apr. 28, 1866, 14 Stat. 769; Treaty with the Creek
Nation, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 785; Treaty with thi Cherokee Nation, July 19, 1866,
14 Star. 799. One purpose of these treaties was to require the tribes to free their slaves
and grant the former slaves full citizenship in their respective tribes. See, e.g., Treaty
with the Seminole Nation, art. II, 14 Stat. at 756. Some of the slaves' descendants feel
that they have not been granted the rights required by the treaties. See Nero v. Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma, 892 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1989).
277. See, e.g., Treaty with the Seminole Nation, Mar. 21, 1866, art. VII, 14 Stat.
755, 75i8. Similar treaties were entered into with the other tribes. See, e.g., Treaty with
the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians, Apr. 28, 1866, 14 Stat. 769; Treaty with the Creek
Nation, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 785; Treaty with the Cherokee Nation, July 19, 1866,
14 Stat. 799.
278. See, e.g., Treaty with the Seminole Nation, art. VII, para. 3, 14 Stat. at 759.
The council could not legislate "upon matters pertaining to the organization, laws, or
customs of the several tribes, except as herein provided for." Id.
279. Id. para. 4.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/2
No. 2] TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 405
and concerns. Again, these treaty provisions would have been unnec-
essary if the tribes had recognized, accepted jurisdiction over nonmem-
ber Indians.
In May, 1890, Congress adopted the Oklahoma Territory Enabling
Act and delineated federal jurisdiction in the remaining Indian Terri-
tory.20 Limiting the jurisdiction of the United States District Court
for the Indian Territory, Congress preserved tribal jurisdiction: "Pro-
vided, however, That the judicial tribunals of the Indian nations shall
retain exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising in
the country in which members of the nation by nativity or by adoption
shall be the only parties .... "n' Further, Congress provided:
The Constitution of the United States and all general laws
of the United States which prohibit crimes and misdemean-
ors in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States ... shall have the same force and
effect in the Indian Territory as elsewhere in the United
States; but nothing in this act shall be so construed as to
deprive any of the courts of the civilized nations of exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases arising wherein members of said
nations, whether by treaty, blood, or adoption, are the sole
parties, nor so as to interfere with the right and power of
said civilized nations to-punish said members for violation
of the statutes and laws enacted by their national coun-
cils .... 282
The 1890 Congress apparently had no doubt that the tribes' criminal
jurisdiction was limited to members; this act specifically dealt with the
tribes considered the most advanced.
The next piece of congressional history discussed in Oliphant, Wheeler,
and the Duro dissent is the 1885 Major Crimes Act213 (which subjects
to federal prosecution specified Indian-against-Indian crimes, without
regard to tribal membership or prior tribal sanction). The Duro dissent
gives no indication of how the 1885 Act implies any congressional
assumption or intent concerning intertribal crimes. The notorious Ex
280. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81 (subtitled "An Act to provide a
temporary government for the Territory of Oklahoma, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the
United States Court in Indian Territory, and for other purposes").
281. Id. § 30, 26 Stat. at 94 (emphasis added).
282. Id. § 31, 26 Stat. at 96 (emphasis added). This provision could easily be
understood as an embodiment of the existing general law concerning criminal jurisdiction
in Indian country. It is not unreasonable to construe this provision as stating Congress'
understanding, as of 1890, of the extent of inherent tribal jurisdiction.
283. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385.
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parte Crow Dog2" decision that most directly prompted the enactment
involved an intratribal crime. The 1885 Act's history does, however,
indicate congressional beliefs about tribal law. Subjecting an Indian
who killed another Indian to tribal-law punishment was deemed in-
adequate by Congress and apparently a large number of other non-
Indians. Based upon congressional 25 and administrative286 pronounce-
ments, Indian tribal-, family-, or clan-level retribution was unaccept-
ably barbarous while federal government-level retribution was not. 287
The House debate concerning the Major Crimes Act included dis-
cussion of why the provision was included in an appropriations bill
rather than presented as a separate act. Rep. James Budd (D.-Cal.)
stated that a similar appropriations-bill amendment was rejected in
1884. because it included misdemeanors, and it was understood that a
felonies-only measure in the 1885 appropriations bill would be accept-
able.u s Representative Budd's 1884 proposal read:
Any act which when done by a citizen of the United States
would be a crime shall be, and is hereby, declared equally
a crime when done by any Indian upon or belonging to any
Indian reservation; and such Indian committing such crime
shall be subject to the same jurisdiction and amenable to
the same process that any citizen would be in like case. 289
284. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
285. See 16 CoNo. REc. 934 (Jan. 22, 1885) (remarks of Rep. Cutcheon, sponsor
of the amendment that became the Major Crimes Act).
Under our present law there is no penalty that can be inflicted except
according to the custom of the tribe, which is simply that of the "blood-
avenger" - that is, the next of kin to the person murdered - shall pursue
the one who has been guilty of the crime and commit a new murder upon
him.
•.. If, however, an Indian commits a crime against an Indian on an
Indian reservation there is now no law to punish the offense except, as I
have said, the law of the tribe, which is just no law at all.
Id.
286. See 1884 REPORT OF CoMssxoNER oF INDIAN AFFAIRS, HousE ExEc. Doc. No.
1, 481h Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 [hereinafter 1884 RE'ORT] (U.S. Ser. Set vol. 2287); 1883
REPO:.tT oF ComssIONER OF INDuN ArsAis, HousE ExEc. Doc. No. 1, 48th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 7-10 [hereinafter 1883 REPORT] (U.S. Ser. Set vol. 2287).
287. If the objective of punishment is to cause the perpetrator suffering, one might
question which is most effective. There is a dearth of objective evidence of suffering
after execution.
288. 16 CONG. REc. 935 (1885) (remarks of Rep. Budd).
289. 15 CoNo. REc. 2577 (1884). The same result could have been accomplished by
repealing the exceptions to existing statutes. The proposal also provided: "[Nlo De-
partment or officer of the United States of America shall have or exercise power or
authority to shield or protect such Indian criminal from just punishment, nor shall any
money herein or hereby appropriated be used for that purpose or to that end." Id.
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Upon the recommendation of the Senate Appropriations Committee
(chaired by Sen. Henry L. Dawes (R.-Mass.)), Representative Budd's
amendment was stricken, without comment or debate. 290 In reply to
the request for an explanation of why the 1884 proposal was rejected,
Rep. E. John Ellis (D.-La.) stated:
The conference committee concurred in the general direction
of the amendment .... It was their thought, as well as the
thought of all good men, that the courts should be extended
to the Indian not only for his punishment when he shall
commit a crime, but for his protection ....
The Indian is not up to the standard of Anglo-American
civilization. There are many little offenses which in civili-
zation amount to crimes that are committed by Indians by
long habit and by toleration among themselves. It was
deemed that if this provision should pass as it is the Indian
would very often be arrested for petty offenses, taken very
far away from his reservation, and subjected to great hard-
ships; and it would be seized upon by unscrupulous officers
as a means of accumulating fees against the Government.
It was agreed when the next bill shall be reported some
effort shall be made in the direction of the amend-
ment .... 291
The 1885 measure apparently made "adequate provision" by limiting
the number of Indian-against-Indian crimes that were made subject to
federal jurisdiction.
Rep. Byron M. Cutcheon (R.-Mich.) in charge of the 1885 measure,
agreed to strike "aggravated assault and battery" from the crimes
included because "[w]e already have among the Indians the court of
Indian offenses for the punishment of trivial violations of the law.
That court can take care of assault and battery." 292 Thus, between the
290. Id. at 4112. When the matter returned to the House, the conference committee
report recommended concurrence with the Senate's action. Id. at 5800, 5802 (statement
accompanying conference committee report). Discussing the recommendation, Represen-
tative Budd stated his reason for the 1884 proposal: "I offered it because on the Pacific
coast and in the Territories when an Indian commits a crime he is corralled on his
reservation and the courts can not punish him. Recently Judge Wingard sent some of
these Indians back to the tribes for punishment." Id. (remarks of Rep. Budd). The
provision concerning federal officers' exercising authority to "shield" Indians from
punishment may have been a response to Judge Wingard's action.
291. Id. at 5802-03 (remarks of Rep. Ellis).
292. Id. at 934 (remarks of Rep. Cutcheon). A portion of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs' report to the same effect (minor crimes handled by the Court of Indian
Offenses) was read by Representative Cutcheon. Id. at 935. Apparently, Representative
Cutcheon assumed that the Courts of Indian Offenses (CFR courts) enforced something
other than "the law of the tribe."
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1884 and 1885 sessions, legislators provided at least three reasons for
the exclusion of misdemeanors from the Major Crimes Act: (1) the
hardship that would be occasioned for petty offenses that were not
thought of as offenses within Indian tribes; (2) the increased oppor-
tunity for fraud against the federal government; and (3) the Department
of the Interior's Court of Indian Offenses handled "trivial violations."
An Indian tribe's ability to punish anyone - member, nonmember,
or ron-Indian - was never given as a reason for not enacting more
inclusive legislation. If any underlying assumption can be implied from
the 1884-1885 record, it is that Indian tribes did not exercise jurisdiction
over any criminal acts, regardless of the perpetrator's identity.
C. Executive Department Legal Opinions Relating to Indian
Country Criminal Jurisdiction
Oliphant cited Opinions of the Attorney General to show that the
executive branch shared the presumption that tribes did not have
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 293 The Opinions of the Attorney General
and the Opinions of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior
should not be considered in isolation from other events. Legal opinions
are, obviously, only a small portion of the available record concerning
executive branch positions on Indian affairs. Reports to Congress and
treaties negotiated by executive branch officials reflect more fully that
branch's perceptions and politico-legal position concerning Indian tribes
and their perceived attributes. Those items are discussed in the pre-
ceding section in connection with related legislative action. The legal
opinions are discussed separately here only because the Court opinions
present them separately.
Following Oliphant's lead, the Duro dissent cited an 1883 Opinion
of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior which had been
adopted as the United States Attorney General's Opinion.2 4 The Opin-
ion was in response to an inquiry from the Secretary of the Interior
concerning the murder of an Arapaho Indian by a Creek Indian on
the Potawatomie reservation. 295 The Secretary's inquiry specifically
alluded to the Dakota territorial court decision in the Crow Dog case, 2
293. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 199 (1978) (citing 7 Op.
Att'y Gen. 174 (1855); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 693 (1834)). Later, the Court also cited a 1970
Opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior that reached a similar
conclusion and noted that the opinion had been withdrawn without explanation or
replacement. Id. at 201 & n.l 1 (citing Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes over Non-
Indians, 77 Interior Dec. 113 (1970)).
294. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 704 n.2 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
295. Crimes Committed by Indians, 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 566 (1883). Tribal names
are spelled differently in the opinion, consistent with the contemporary usage, i.e.,
"Arrapahoe" and "Pottawatomie.
296. United States v. Crow Dog, 14 N.W. 437 (Dakota 1882).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/2
No. 2] TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 409
which was subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court. 297 The Sec-
retary had proposed that the treaty term "bad men" included an
Indian perpetrator, despite the statutory Indian-against-Indian exemp-
tion, an argument apparently accepted by the territorial courts in Crow
Dog.29 The Attorney General disagreed and opined that United States
courts did not have jurisdiction over the alleged murderer, despite the
"outrageous character of the homicide." '29
Of particular note is that the Potawatomie Tribe, within whose
district the crime was committed, had no law that covered this crime,
which was committed by an Indian not a member of the reservation
tribe against another Indian, also not a member of the reservation
tribe.3° This was the same situation as in Duro. Contrary to the
implication in the Duro dissent, the Attorney General was not acting
under the presumption that any tribe would or could govern intertribal
crimes.101 In the end, the Attorney General hinted rather broadly that,
regardless of law to the contrary, the Secretary might undertake pros-
ecution based upon the Dakota court's decision in Crow Dog, to
mollify the community because of "the great outrage committed by
297. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). The Supreme Court's decision was
issued six months after the Attorney General's Opinion and reached the same conclusion
on much the same grounds.
298. See United States v. Crow Dog, 3 Dakota 106, 112 (1882) (published in abridged
form at 14 N.W. 437). The Dakota court held that the Sioux treaties were specific and,
therefore, controlled over the more general Indian-against-Indian exception to federal
criminal jurisdiction. Id. Those treaties, the court held, obligated the United States to
protect the signatory tribes against all "bad men" regardless of race. Id. at 113. Kan-
Gi-Shun-Ga ("Crow Dog" in English) was a murderer and, therefore, a "bad man."
The fact that the victim, Spotted Tail, was an important Sioux chief and had signed
the relevant treaties was mentioned but not expressly given significance.
299. Crimes Committed by Indians, 17 Op. Att'y Gen. at 566.
300. Id. at 570; see also 1883 REPoRT, supra note 286, at 9. The Commissioner's
report also notes that neither the Cheyennes and Arapahos nor the Shawnees and
"Pottawatomies" were members of the "compact" entered into among other tribes in
Indian Territory in 1870.
301. Even the portion of the Attorney General's Opinion quoted in the dissent's
footnote is not as positive as is implied. The attorney general was merely concluding
that since the Potawatomie could not prosecute, the alleged murderer would have to be
released unless one of the other tribes (Creek or Arapaho) could prove that he had
violated one of their laws and that the tribe "having jurisdiction ... according to
general principles, and by forms substantially conformable to natural justice." Crimes
Committed by Indians, 17 Op. Att'y Gen. at 570. Information which was no doubt
available to the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior indicated that the Creek
Nation did not, under its laws, have jurisdiction to prosecute because the crime was
not committed within tribal territory. See 1883 REPORT, supra note 286, at 8-10.
Additional information likely available to the Solicitor indicated that the Arapahos'
attempt to take the perpetrator by force had beefi opposed by federal officials. If the
Arapaho exercised recognized jurisdiction over intertribal crime, federal opposition to
Arapaho efforts to capture the criminal and mete out justice would have been illegal.
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the prisoner; one so well calculated to rouse and to render discontented
the communities concerned therein." 3°2 The Attorney General was
apparently certain that the perpetrator would go free (or be summarily
executed by the Arapaho) if the federal government did not prosecute.
A second interesting factor is that the 1883 Attorney General's
Opinion is directly contrary to an opinion apparently issued just two
years earlier in the Crow Dog matter. In his argument before the
Dakota territorial court, the United States Attorney relied, in part, on
a letter of August 22, 1881, from the Secretary of the Interior advising
him that the "bad men" clause of the Sioux treaties established federal
jurisdiction over the murderer of Spotted Tail. 3°0 According to the
United States Attorney, the Secretary's opinion was supported by the
United States Attorney General in a letter dated August 24, 1881.
304
The 1883 Attorney General's Opinion does not mention the 1881
opinion, and the change in position is unexplained. One change that
may have had some influence on the decision was that in 1882, the
Department of the Interior had begun establishing Courts of Indian
Offenses,3S but there is no particular reason to conclude that the
Solicitor General had that in mind in 1883.
The Duro dissent mentioned the 1883 Attorney General's Opinion
in a footnote concerning congressional intent: "Given the proximity
of this incident to the Crow Dog incident, it is implausible to conclude
that Congress did hot consider the situation of intertribal crimes when
passing the Major Crimes Act. '" 306 Congress' attention was called to
the situation discussed in the Attorney General's Opinion perhaps more
frequently than was the Crow Dog opinion. The 1883 and 1884 reports
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs describe the incident in detail,
including the Attorney General's Opinion and the situation's ultimate
outcome.2° The dissent's assertion may be true, even though the House
302. Crimes Committed by Indians, 17 Op. Att'y Gen. at 570.
303. United States v. Crow Dog, 3 Dakota 106, 109 (1882) (editor's summary of
argument for the United States).
304. Id.
305. See 1883 REPORT, supra note 286, at 10-11. Courts had been established, at
least, at the Devils Lake Agency (now in North Dakota) and the Standing Rock Agency
(now South Dakota) in 1882-83. See 1884 REPORT, supra note 286, at 7.
306. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 704 n.2 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
307. 1883 REPORT, supra note 286, at 8-10. Johnson Foster, a Creek Indian, shot
and killed Robert Poisal, an Arapaho of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation, within
the Potawatomie Reservation. The areas reserved to those tribes were all in the Indian
Territory (now Oklahoma), but not adjacent to each other. See FRANCIS P. PRUCIIA,
AnTAS OF AmEuCAN INDIAN AFFAIRs map 60 (1990). Foster was caught by the Seminole
Light Horse, taken to the Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency, and then turned over to
military authorities at Fort Reno to protect him from threatened Arapaho "summary
vengeance." As detailed by the Commissioner:
[T]he courts of the Creek Nation, to which nation the prisoner belonged,
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discussion only mentions the Crow Dog matter. °0 However, the state-
ment is essentially a non sequitur because the Major Crimes Act
imposed federal jurisdiction without regard to the perpetrator's or
victim's tribal affiliation.
As detailed in the preceding section, eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century federal officials most frequently characterized intertribal rela-
tions as war or bloody interpersonal revenge. It is possible to conclude
that Indian tribes used that means to exercise jurisdiction over inter-
tribal crimes. It is, however, doubtful that contemporary federal of-
ficials so viewed it, and there is nothing to the contrary in the 1883
Attorney General's Opinion. While in the Commissioner's 1884 report
there is a hint of satisfaction with the result of intertribal revenge,
federal officials took a great deal of effort and risk to prevent that
type of action. None of that, including the death of a United States
marshal, would have been necessary, or even appropriate, if the tribe's
exercise of intertribal authority were acceptable to federal officials.
Duro takes the position that the executive branch's legal opinion on
intertribal jurisdiction record is clearer for the period after the estab-
lishment of tribal courts under the IRA.3°9 That record, according to
the majority, is somewhat ambiguous but tends to support the conclu-
sion that the executive branch operated on the presumption that tribal
courts had jurisdiction over only tribal members.310 In a broader
were without jurisdiction, the murder having been committed outside the
limits of their country; that the Absentee Shawnees and Pottawatomies,
within whose boundaries the crime was committed, had no laws applicable
to the case and that neither the Cheyennes and Arrapahoes nor the
Absentee Shawnees and Pottawatomies were parties to the reciprocity
compact ....
1883 REPORT, supra note 286, at 9. The department accepted the offer in the 1883
Attorney General's Opinion and requested that Foster be indicted for murder. In the
meantime, Foster was removed from Fort Reno and taken to Fort Smith for trial on
other federal charges. The U.S. Marshal was accompanied by a "strong force" of
troops, who were required to fend off a group of Arapaho who tried to take Foster.
Before the group reached Fort Smith, Foster "brutally murder[ed]" a deputy marshal
(a white man) and escaped. At the time of the 1883 report, Foster was still at large,
and the problem of federal jurisdiction had been removed by the second murder.
The final detail was added in the 1884 report: "[T]he Indians saved the Government
all further trouble in the [Foster] matter by finally shooting the murderer down like a
wild beast. . . ." 1884 REPORT, supra note 286, at 11.
308. See 16 CoNG. REc. 934-36 (1885). After a conference committee on the Ap-
propriations Act, to which the Major Crimes Act had been attached, the Senate approved
the result, including the Major Crimes Act portion, without addressing that portion.
The only discussion concerned the most appropriate way of handling the opening of
Indian Territory to non-Indian homesteaders. 16 CoNG. REc. 2466-68 (1885).
309. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 690-91 (1990).
310. Id.
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context, the administrative record is less ambiguous than the Duro
majority indicates.
In the late 1870s, the Department of the Interior began appointing
"Indian police" at various reservations. 311 Individuals were selected
from the tribe to serve under the agent, not under tribal officials. The
Indian police apprehended alleged transgressors and took them to the
Indian agent for judgment. This method of law enforcement was tacitly
approved by Congress' salary appropriations for these Indian police.31"
In 1882, the department, by regulation, created the Courts of Indian
Offenses, which, after appropriations were finally made to pay judges,
were established on most reservations. Congress was aware of, and
did not object to, the preparation and dissemination of the regula-
tion. 313
In his 1885 report, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs sought
appropriations to pay $20 per month to judges so that they would not
have to also work as Indian policemen (who were being paid) and to
induce "the best and most intelligent of the Indians to serve. '314 The
Commissioner was direct in his assessment of the purpose of and need
for the Courts of Indian Offenses:
The policy of the Government for many years past has been
to destroy the tribal relations as fast as possible, and to use
every endeavor to bring the Indians under the influence of
law. To do this the agents have been accustomed to punish
for minor offenses, by imprisonment in the guard-house
and by withholding rations; but by the present system [Court
of Indian Offenses] the Indians themselves, through their
judges, decide who are guilty of offenses under the rules,
and pass judgment in accordance with the provisions thereof.
Neither the section in the last Indian appropriations bill
above quoted [the Major Crimes Act] nor any other enact-
ment of Congress reaches any of the crimes or offenses
provided for in the Department rules, and without such a
311. See generally WIIAm T. HAGAN, INDIAN POUCE AND JuDoES (1966); cf. Law
and Order - Dual Sovereignty - Powers of Indian Tribes and U.S., Op. SoLic. DEP'T
INTERIOR, supra note 140, at 891 (opinion dated Apr. 27, 1939).
312. See, e.g., Appropriation Act of May 27, 1878, ch. 142, 20 Stat. 63, 86.
313. See 1883 REPORT, supra note 286, at 10-11. The report states "[o]n the 10th
of April last you gave your official approval to certain rules governing the 'court of
Indian offenses,' prepared in this office in accordance with instructions contained in
your letter of December 2 last." Id. Even though the "you" mentioned in the letter
was apparently the Secretary of the Interior, the information was available to Congress
and no objection was made.
314. 1885 REPORT OF THE CoMassIONE oF INDIAN Asrwrms, H.R. Exac. Doc. No.
1, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1885) (U.S. Ser. Set vol. 2379).
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court many Indian reservations would be without law and
order, and the laws of civilized life would be utterly disre-
garded.31
The precise legal basis for the Courts of Indian Offenses has never
been clearly established. In the 1888 case United States v. Clapox,16
the United States District Court for Oregon stated:
These "courts of Indian offenses" are not the constitutional
courts provided for in section 1, art. 3, Const., which
congress only has the power to "ordain and establish," but
mere educational and disciplinary instrumentalities, by which
the government of the United States is endeavoring to im-
prove and elevate the conditions of these dependent tribes




Even though the initial regulations did not expressly limit jurisdiction
to members of the local tribe,318 federal administrative opinion (at least
in the 1930s) was that jurisdiction was limited to members.
319
A 1939 Solicitor's Opinion 32° (quoted essentially verbatim in the
original Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law321 but not men-
tioned in either Duro opinion) emphasizes the essentially personal
nature, as opposed to territorial nature, of Indian tribal authority.
That opinion repeatedly characterizes tribal authority as a matter
between a tribe and its members. A 1935 Solicitor's Opinion made a
similar statement:
Courts of Indian Offenses are manifestations of the inherent
power of the tribes to govern their own members. It has
been the persistent program of Congress to leave crimes
315. Id. at 21.
316. 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888).
317. Id. at 577. The district court went on to state that "the reservation itself is in
the nature of a school, and the Indians are gathered there, under the charge of an
agent, for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and aspirations which distinguish
the civilized from the uncivilized man." Id.
318. The 1904 regulations limited jurisdiction to Indians "belonging to the reser-
vation." U.S. OFFIcE OF INDAN AFAiRs, REGULATIONS OF THE INDIAN OFFICE §§ 584-
591 (1904 ed.), quoted in Op. Souc. DEP'T INTERIOR, supra note 140, at 893 (opinion
dated Apr. 27, 1939). Similar regulations were apparently adopted in 1884 and 1894.
See Secretary's Power to Regulate Conduct of Indians, Op. Souic. DEP'T INTERIOR,
supra note 140, at 531, 533 (opinion dated Feb. 28, 1935). Generally, there were no
tribal membership rolls prior to the allotment acts (late 1890s through 1920s). Further
research may show that "belonging to the reservation" had essentially the same meaning
in 1884-1904 as "member of the reservation tribe" has presently.
319. See Solicitor's Opinions cited infra notes 320-25.
320. Law and Order - Dual Sovereignty - Powers of Indian Tribes and U.S., Op.
SoLic. DEP'T INTERIOR, supra note 140, at 891 (opinion dated Apr. 27, 1939).
321. FELX S. CoimN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERA INDIAN LAW 359-62 (1941 ed.).
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involving only Indians within the control of the tribes ...
and the authority of tribes to arrest, try and punish their
own members has been beyond cavil.3"
The same conclusion was reached in "Powers of Indian Tribes,
' '3
23
the Department of the Interior Opinion that laid the foundation for
much of the Department's Indian program during the Reorganization
Era and has been influential in the development of Indian law since
its issuance. The Duro majority characterizes that opinion as "equiv-
ocal. ' ' 32 Perhaps the textual discussion seems equivocal but the spe-
cific, repeated, express conclusions are not:
Under section 16 of the Wheeler-Howard Act (48 Stat.
984, 987) the "powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal
council by existing law" are those powers of local self-
government which have never been terminated by law or
waived by treaty. Among these powers are the following:
8. To administer justice with respect to all disputes and
offenses of or among the members of the tribe, other
than the ten major crimes reserved to the Federal courts."
These opinions, made at a crucial point in the development of
modern Indian law, are essentially unequivocal. Perhaps the "equiv-
ocation" noted in the Duro decision is merely imprecise or indiscrim-
inate word usage by different members of the executive branch.
26
D. The Problem of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers
Dur'o states, as a basic rule, that an Indian tribe has authority only
over its members. That is a practical, workable means of ascertaining
whom. a tribe can govern. However, that rule is not consistent with
several prior decisions. If applied across the board, the membership-
322. Secretary's Power to Regulate Conduct of Indians, Op. SoLic. DEP'T INTERIOR,
supra note 140, at 531, 536 (opinion dated Feb. 28, 1935) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted); see also Rosebud Sioux Tax Ordinance, Op. Souc. DnP'T INTERIOR, supra
note 140, at 873, 875 (opinion dated Feb. 17, 1939) ("A practical means of enforcement
(of the tribal tax ordinance] is particularly necessary since nonmembers are not subject
as involuntary defendants to the jurisdiction of the tribal court." (emphasis added)).
323. 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934), reprinted in Op. Souc. DaP'T INTERIOR, supra note
140, at 445 (opinion dated Oct. 25, 1934).
324. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 1988), cited in Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676, 682 (1990).
325. 55 Interior Dec. at 16-17, 65-66, reprinted in Op. Souc. DP,'T INTERIOR, supra
note 140, at 446 (emphasis added).
326. The unequivocal Solicitor's Opinions were rendered by Solicitor Margold. The
possibly ambiguous Solicitor's Opinions were rendered by Acting Solicitor Kirgis. So-
licitor Margold was and is more well known for having expertise in federal Indian law.
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only test effectively eliminates territory as a component of tribal
authority. Prior cases acknowledge tribal civil jurisdiction over non-
members. That presents a problem. If dealing with nonmembers is
extrajurisdictional, how is civil jurisdiction over nonmembers possible?
Duro attaches the members-only theory to consent, albeit consent
implied from tribal membership. If tribal authority is established by
consent, then persons other than members can give the requisite con-
sent. The possibility of nonmember consent to tribal jurisdiction raises
a question concerning the type and nature of the consent necessary.
One possibility, requiring express consent, would be inconsistent
with implied consent through membership. Another possibility, consent
implied from mere presence within a reservation has been rejected. 27
From Duro and other decisions it can be inferred that a nonmember's
voluntary contact with the tribe or tribal members is sufficient to
establish tribal jurisdiction to some degree, i.e., gives some measure
of implied consent.
The consent theory breaks down entirely if there is no consensual
relationship of any sort. The Supreme Court has approved tribal civil
jurisdiction in some situations that provide no basis for implied con-
sent. Citing Brendale, Duro notes that tribes have nonconsensual civil
authority when it is "vital to the maintenance of tribal integrity and
self-determination." 312 The "vital tribal interest" jurisdiction is pre-
sented as inherent in tribal sovereignty, not a power delegated by
Congress.
Tribal authority, therefore, goes beyond consent in some instances.
If the basic test is "vital tribal interests," precluding jurisdiction over
nonmember criminals would seem to be an imposed restriction on
tribal authority - one imposed by constitutional limitations on the
federal government rather than by the inherent nature of tribal sov-
ereignty. A basic test of "voluntary consent" more rationally explains
Duro's limitation in criminal matters, but then "vital tribal interests"
is an addition, and, in effect, a federal delegation, because it extends
jurisdiction beyond the consent limitation. Duro provides little guid-
ance in choosing which test is to be applied or has priority.
1. The Foundations of the Tribal Civil Jurisdiction Corridor
To reconcile the apparent conflict with civil-jurisdiction decisions,
Duro gathers the decisions acknowledging tribal "external" civil juris-
diction into three categories:
327. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
328. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of Yakima Indian Reservation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)).
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(1) judicial resolution of disputes involving nonmembers; 29
(2) "areas such as zoning where the exercise of tribal authority is
vital to the maintenance of tribal integrity and self-determination"; 30
and
(3) "situations arising from property ownership within the reserva-
tion or 'consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. "' 3
The first category implies no limitation on tribal court jurisdiction
over disputes involving nonmembers. However, the authorities cited
merely recognize that the tribal court has the power to issue judgments
even though non-Indians are parties. In practice, that category is a
particular application of the consent theory. In Williams v. Lee, 32 the
relevant tribal court (under the Navajo Tribal Code of the time) had
authority over non-Indians only when they consented to that jurisdic-
tion. 3 Department of the Interior rules for CFR courts, the Depart-
ment's Model Tribal Code, and many tribal statutes have similar
limitations.334
329. Id. at 687 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1978);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); Fux S. ConaN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIA LAW 253 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982)).
33X. Id. at 688 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)).
.331. Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
332. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
333. In January, 1959, a few months before the Williams v. Lee decision, the Navajo
Tribal Council adopted Resolution CJA-1-59, which adopted, as tribal law, the De-
partment of the Interior regulations for CFR courts, 25 C.F.R. pt. 11, including §
11.22, which provided in part: "The Court of Indian Offenses shall have jurisdiction
of all suits wherein the defendant is a member of the tribe or tribes within their
jurisdiction, and of all other suits between members and nonmembers which are brought
before the courts by stipulation of both parties." 25 C.F.R. § 22, quoted in NAvAJo
Tria. CODE tit. 7, § 253 note (1977). As of 1978, title 7, § 253(3) of the Navajo Tribal
Code provided for tribal court jurisdiction over "[a]ll civil actions in which the defendant
is an Indian and is found within its territorial jurisdiction." NAVAJO TRM. CODE tit. 7,
§ 253(3) (1978). The Tribal Code was subsequently amended to provide civil jurisdiction
over "[a]ll civil actions in which the defendant is a resident of Navajo Indian Country,
or has caused an action to occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation."
NAVAiO TRiE. CODE tit. 7, § 253(2) (Supp. 1987). The tribe has had limited success in
enforcing the final clause of § 253. See UNC Resources v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358
(D.N.M. 1981) (concerning one off-reservation radioactive accident with on-reservation
consequences found too remote to support tribal court jurisdiction); UNC Resources v.
Benally, 518 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Ariz. 1981) (same); see also Swift Transp. Inc. v. John,
546 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Ariz. 1982) (holding that U.S. Highway 89 right-of-way is not
within tribal court jurisdiction despite assertion of jurisdiction in NAVAJO TRm. CODE
tit. 7, § 254 (1978 & Supp. 1987)), vacated as moot, 574 F. Supp. 710 (D. Ariz. 1983).
334. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.1 (1990) (originally adopted in 1935); Three Affiliated Tribes
v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986) (the Three Tribes? tribal code was amended after
that litigation began to eliminate the non-Indian consent requirement). Nonconsensual
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The third Duro category has two distinguishable subparts: consensual
relationships and property ownership. The consensual subpart is con-
sistent with a relatively long line of civil cases, primarily tax cases.3 5
The property ownership subpart, however, is accurate (and distinguish-
able from the zoning category) with respect to property on Indian
land within the reservation. On non-Indian land within a reservation,
tribal regulatory jurisdiction is governed by the "vital interests" lan-
guage of the second category.
36
The second category, "vital tribal interests," covers many situations
that also involve tribal law enforcement interests. It is potentially of
the greatest interest, particularly to tribal governments wishing to
regulate all activities within the reservation. Civil regulation is a po-
tential alternative to criminal regulation. The decisions supporting
tribal jurisdiction over "vital tribal interests" are also the most difficult
to reconcile with Duro's limitation in tribal criminal jurisdiction.
The seminal decision for nonconsensual civil regulation is Montana
v. United States,337 which held that the Crow Tribe could not regulate
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers may not provide a meaningful remedy because of
the difficulty in obtaining state court enforcement of a tribal court judgment. See
generally Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986); William V. Vetter,
Of Tribal Courts and "Territories". Is Full Faith and Credit Required?, 23 CAL. W.
L. Ray. 219 (1987).
335. Merrion upheld the tribe's power to tax natural resource extraction activities
on leased tribal lands. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982). In
Colville, the tribes' power to impose taxes on cigarette sales was essentially unquestioned
and the sales inqolved transactions with the tribe or a tribal member. Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 144-45 (1980). Colville
stated that nonmembers and non-Indians held essentially identical relationships to the
tribe for tax purposes. In each situation, the nonmember had voluntarily taken some
action that placed her or him within the scope of tribal authority. Id. at 152-53.
336. See, e.g., Brendae v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). If nothing else,
the tribe can assert the rights of a landowner on tribal land. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 146
n.12.
Real property ownership within reservation boundaries is divided into two broad
categories: (1) "fee" or "nontrust" land that has passed into non-Indian ownership as
a result of the allotment acts or other legislation aimed at terminating Indian tribes as
entities; and (2) "trust" or "Indian" lands owned by Indians, the tribe, or the United
States in trust for Indian individuals or tribes. Regulation of activities on Indian lands
is within tribal jurisdiction. Ownership or use of trust lands also generally entails some
type of consensual relationship with Indian owners, a separate basis for jurisdiction.
Use of nontrust lands, however, is subject to the "vital tribal interests" test. Therefore,
the "ownership of property" part of the third category should be limited to Indian
lands. The Court's recent decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992), may indicate a categorization
for state tax property purposes based upon allotment and issuance of a fee patent,
regardless of current ownership.
337. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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hunting and fishing on nontrust land merely because the land is within
reservation boundaries.
3"8
A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee [usually
non-Indian] lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.1 9
Since Montana, there have been a number of decisions that consid-
ered the scope of tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction. The most recent
Supreme Court decision involving that issue is Brendale which was
cited by the Duro majority as authority for the second factor - "vital
to the maintenance of tribal integrity and self-determination. 3 40 Bren-
dale is not comfortable authority for any proposition . 4' That case
engendered three opinions, none with a majority, disagreeing on the
test for determining the extent of tribal zoning authority over nontrust
land. 42 The Brendale language cited in Duro is from Justice White's
338. Id. at 566.
339. Id. (citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976)) (dealing with
state infringement on tribal self-government when all parties to litigation are tribal
members); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (holding state trial court jurisdiction
over action against tribal member for debt incurred on reservation would interfere with
tribal self-government); Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118,
128-29 (1905) (holding indirect effect of state tax on non-Indian property does not
interfere with vital tribal interests even though it has the effect of lessening funds
potentially available for charitable assistance to tribe); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264,
273 (1897) (holding indirect effect of state tax on lessee's property does not interfere
with vital tribal interest even though it may lessen amount tribe might receive from
leasehold).
340. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of Yakima Indian Reservation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)).
341. Brendale involved a conflict between county and tribal zoning on two distinct
parcels of fee land within the Yakima Reservation. One tract (Brendale's) was within
the "closed" area of the reservation, an area used almost exclusively for natural resource
utilization, with a very small portion of nontrust land. The other tract (Whiteside's)
was near the edge of the reservation in an area with few resources (it overlooked the
county airport) and a much lower portion of trust land. The tribe was found to have
jurisdiction as to Brendale's parcel but not as to Whiteside's. That result was reached
on the Brendale parcel by combining the opinion written by Justice White (joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy) with the opinion written by
Justice Stevens (joined by Justice O'Connor). The result on the Whiteside parcel was
reached by combining the Stevens/O'Connor opinion with the one written by Justice
Blackmun (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall), a 4-2-3 split.
342. Justice Blackmun's three-justice opinion is that the tribe has inherent authority
to zone all land within its reservation, including non-Indian fee lands; only where the
tribe has not exercised that power does the county have jurisdiction to zone and even
that power does not reach lands held by or for Indians. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 448-68
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four-justice opinion, which expressed tribal zoning jurisdiction most
narrowly: A tribe has authority to preclude a particular use on non-
Indian fee land only if that use adversely affected protected tribal
interests. 43 In addition, "[tihat impact must be demonstrably serious
and must imperil the political integrity, economic security or the health
and welfare of the tribe."
3"4
While the Brendale split may inhibit reliance, previous decisions have
enforced nonconsensual tribal civil regulation of nonmembers on fee
lands. In Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation v. Namen, 45 the tribe successfully defended its regulation
of riparian rights appurtenant to non-fee lands abutting Flathead Lake,
within the reservation. The Ninth Circuit found that the tribe's lake-
bed ownership generated considerable tribal funds; improper riparian
development could adversely impact the lake and harm tribal economic
and self-determination interests.346 In Cardin v. De La Cruz,347 the
Quinault tribe successfully enforced its building, safety, and health
regulations against a non-Indian grocery store owner even though the
store was on nontrust land. In addition to the existence of a consensual
relationship, the Ninth Circuit found that the alleged violations threat-
ened the health and safety of tribal members.3"
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The White opinion and the Stevens opinion agree that a
tribe's power to zone non-Indian fee lands is limited but disagree on how that limitation
should be phrased and its effect on the Brendale parcels. The Stevens two-justice opinion
draws a line using a corollary to the tribe's power to exclude: to the extent the tribe
has managed to retain the "essential Indian character" of an area, zoning power is
retained even though non-Indian fee lands may be included. Id. at 433-38. The "essential
Indian character" of tribal lands is, apparently, measured by the extent to which the
tribe's power to exclude has not been taken away by federal statute or "surrendered"
by the tribe. Just how the line is to be drawn remains quite unclear. White's four-
justice opinion is perhaps even less quantifiable than in the Stevens opinion and would
have remanded the case for specific findings of fact concerning the precise impact of
proposed development. Id. at 432-33.
343. Id at 430-31.
344. Id. at 431.
345. 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982). The area in which
the Namen's property was located was primarily non-fee land. Namen's was developed
as a marina to take advantage of the large lake's recreational values. Without the lake's
impact, Namen would probably not qualify for tribal regulation under two of the three
Brendale opinions.
346. Id. at 964. But compare Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200
U.S. 118 (1905), and Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1897), both cited in Montana, for
the scope of direct impacts on tribal interests. Both held that state taxation of non-
Indian, on-reservation activities only indirectly impacted the tribe, despite contentions
that the taxation would lower the funds available for tribal purposes. See also Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
347. 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982).
348. Id. at 366.
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Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Tribe49 is closely related to tribal law
enforcement. There, the Ninth Circuit sustained the tribe's enactment
and enforcement of a civil ordinance controlling self-help repossessions
on the reservation. 30 The ordinance prohibited repossessions without
permission of the debtor or the tribal court. Nonmember persons
violating the ordinance were subject to exclusion from the reservation
and liable for damages. 35' The Ninth Circuit found that the ordinance
related to safety and peace on the reservation and was therefore
enforceable against nonmembers, particularly because of the possibility
of violence arising from a nonconsensual repossession. 52 While the
decision does not indicate a need for a prior consensual relation before
the regulation is enforceable, the Navajo statute was limited to repos-
session of a Navajo's property on land within the tribe's jurisdiction. 53
In contrast, in Swift Transportation v. John354 the United States
District Court for Arizona enjoined tribal members and officials from
continuing a tort case in Navajo Tribal Court. A Swift employee was
driving on United States Highway 89 within the boundaries of the
Navajo Reservation when an accident occurred. The injured parties
(John and others), members of the Navajo Tribe, brought suit for
damages in Navajo Tribal Court. The district court held that tribal
court jurisdiction could not be sustained under the "vital tribal inter-
est" theory. 5 The only interests servedin this particular litigation
349. 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984).
350. Id. at 593-94.
351. If the repossessor were a Navajo, violation of the ordinance was a misdemeanor.
The ordinance was apparently drafted with Oliphant in mind.
352:. Babbitt, 710 F.2d at 593. But see UNC Resources v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358
(D.N.M. 1981) (holding invalid a Navajo ordinance granting tribal court jurisdiction
over nonresidents whose action causes damage on the reservation); UNC Resources v.
Benally, 518 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Ariz. 1981) (same). In those cases, the damaging event
(a radioactive "spill") occurred outside the reservation but caused damage to land and
livestock within the reservation. The courts held that there was an insufficient connection
between the reservation and the causative event to allow tribal jurisdiction.
353. Babbitt, 710 F.2d at 590 n.1 (quoting NAVAJO TRia. CODE tit. 7, § 607 (1977)).
The pcwer to exclude was a secondary reason for the ordinance's validity.
354. 546 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Ariz. 1982), vacated as moot, 574 F. Supp. 710 (D.
Ariz. 1983). The district court decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit which, after
determining the appeal was moot, remanded it to the district court which, in turn,
vacated the injunction previously granted. Apparently, the parties settled while the
appeal was pending. There is no indication in the reports that the district court's decision
was found wanting in any particular.
355. Id. at 1193. The district court found that there was no consensual relationship
between Swift and the tribe or tribal members. The court also found that the right-of-
way for U.S. 89 was no longer part of the Navajo Reservation, as a result of the
manner in which that right-of-way was acquired. On the consent issue, the district court
found that merely driving within the reservation was insufficient, even though that
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were those of the injured tribal members which, according to the
district court, do not satisfy the Montana tribal-interests requirement.
36
These pre-Duro cases show that tribes have some type of noncon-
sensual jurisdiction under some circumstances. It may, however, be
limited, a la Brendale, to specific events or conditions that impose a
high degree of risk to the tribe or its membership (as opposed to its
individual members), and may also require a very cumbersome and
would be sufficient for a state's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction.
More in the way of minimum contacts is required for a tribal court to
assert personal jurisdiction over non-Indians than is required for a state
court to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a non-resident. In addition,
the ability of a state to require non-resident motorists to appear in state
court is grounded primarily upon its power to exclude such motorists from
highways within the state. As a result of the establishment of the right-
of-way, there is no corresponding power in the Navajo Tribe to exclude
non-members from U.S. Highway 89. Furthermore, if the Court were to
accept defendants' contention that mere presence within reservation bound-
aries is enough to allow tribal court jurisdiction, there would be no need
to consider Montana's threshold distinction between those reservation lands
owned by Indians and those owned by non-Indians.
Id. (citations omitted). But see Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 900 F.2d 1164
(8th Cir. 1990) (holding highway right-of-way not withdrawn from reservation)
356. Id. The district court stated:
The Court of course understands that an automobile accident can have a
"direct effect ... on the economic security, or the health or welfare" of
the individuals involved. Under this second portion of the [Montana] test,
however, the focus is on the interests of the tribe rather than the interests
of the individual members of the tribe. This distinction is reflected in the
cases cited in Montana, as well as subsequent cases applying this aspect
of the test. Limiting tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians to cases
involving a direct effect on the tribe itself is also consistent with Montana's
"general proposition" that tribal powers do not extend to nonmembers.
Id. (citations omitted). The Swift Transportation decision concerning jurisdiction over
non-Indian defendants is questionable. A number of tribes have enacted legislation that
grants tribal courts nonconsensual jurisdiction over nonresidents. In Three Affiliated
Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986), the Supreme Court noted that the tribal
code had been amended to grant that type of jurisdiction but made no comment on
the propriety of its exercise. Providing a convenient judicial forum for its constituents
would seem no less a fundamental power of government that the right to tax approved
in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). In Merrion, there were also
other factors, such as consensual relations with the tribe and utilization of tribal
resources, that satisfy the Montana requirements.
It could also be argued that the Swift Transportation decision would allow the exercise
of tribal jurisdiction if the tort occurred on tribal land, a geographic factor. Even if
that argument were successful, the personal nature of tribal jurisdiction expressed in
Duro may nullify any ground gained. There is nothing in Duro to indicate that a
nonmember's status changes when she or he goes onto tribal or trust property. The
nonmember's activity in Swift Transportation (driving through the reservation) is qual-
itatively and quantitatively different from the hunting and fishing discussed in Montana.
If tribal ownership of the highway right-of-way supported tribal jurisdiction, the implied-
consent-by-presence theory would be revitalized.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
422 AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 17
uncertain case-by-case analysis. It is not yet possible to say that if the
"vital interests" test is an exception to a jurisdiction-by-consent rule,
or vice versa. In a 1992 decision involving the same tribe as in
Brendale,3 7 the Court characterized Brendale as involving a "proposed
extension of a tribe's inherent powers," suggesting that the vital
interests test is an exception to a consent rule.5 8
2. The "Political" Nature of Indian Tribes
Neither Duro opinion directly addresses the juridical nature or com-
position of Indian tribes.359 While both opinions discuss, at length, the
"inherent sovereignty" aspects of Oliphant and Wheeler, the political-
entity theory supporting decisions such as Morton v. Mancari,360 United
States v. Antelope,36' and Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes362 (not discussed in either opinion) is germane.
As stated in United States v. Mazurie,363 Indian tribes are "unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty both over their mem-
bers and their territory .... [They] are a good deal more than 'private,
voluntary organizations."' 364 To avoid equal protection problems, fed-
eral enactments deal with members of political entities rather than with
members of a racial group. 65 Federal criminal statutes relating specif-
ically to Indians apply not because of the defendant's racial identity
but because of his or her membership in a federally recognized Indian
tribe.16 As noted in these decisions, "Indian" must be considered a
357. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
358. Id. at 692.
359. The majority opinion is necessarily based on tribes' political nature. The
dissent's discussion treats "Indians" as a unitary group, which could be either political
or racial.
360. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
361. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
362. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
363. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
364. Id. at 557, quoted with approval in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
323 (1978).
365. See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-54 (1974).
366. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646, If a tribe is officially "terminated," its prior
members are no longer subject to federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act. Id.
at 64647 & n.7 (citing United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1974)). However,
in Antelope, the Court noted that two circuit courts have held that persons of Indian
ancestry who lived on a reservation and maintained a tribal relation with the reservation's
Indians were subject to the Major Crimes Act, even though they were not members of
any tribe. Id. (citing Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S.
643 (1939); United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 953 (9th Cir. 1974) (dicta), vacated on
other grounds, 421 U.S. 944 (1975)). In Antelope, the Court expressly declined any
opinion on that issue since the defendants were enrolled members of a recognized tribe.
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political classification to avoid wholesale invalidation of federal statutes
that treat "Indians" differently from all others. 67
The historic actions of Congress and the executive branch in dealing
with Indians send mixed messages. A great mass of legislation is
directed toward specific tribes as entities, e.g., appropriations and
allotment acts. However, other legislation treats all Indians as a class,
without regard to tribal affiliation. The statutes concerning criminal
jurisdiction most often belong to this latter group. The Trade and
Intercourse Acts and amendments, from 1790 forward, and other acts
specifically addressing federal criminal jurisdiction (such as the Major
Crimes Act) refer to "Indian" and "Indian country," not to "tribal
members." When establishing the statutory basis of the federal-Indian
relationship (as opposed to treaty-related matters), it does not appear
that the responsible persons questioned whether "Indian" was a po-
litical or a racial category. The verbal records identify Indians as a
racial group, an identification that appears to have needed no expla-
nation.3 6e
An 1843 Attorney General Opinion may point toward a political
identification of "Indian." The Secretary of War had inquired con-
cerning federal court jurisdiction over Mr. Lovely Rogers,369 who had
allegedly participated in the murder of the Cherokee Nation Treasurer,
David Vance.370 Rogers reportedly had "Cherokee blood in his veins"
but was a citizen of Georgia, under Georgia law. Rogers resided in
the Cherokee Nation as a trader. The Attorney General first referred
to the Indian-against-Indian exception in section 25 of the 1834 Trade
and Intercourse Act and stated that the section "would have furnished
367. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 552:
Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reser-
vations ... singlels] out for special treatment a constituency of tribal
Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical
relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed
invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code
(25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of
the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.
See also Moe, 425 U.S. at 480 (quoting the above passage with approval).
368. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846) (cited by both
Duro opinions, 495 U.S. at 694 (majority), and 495 U.S. at 703, 706 (dissent)); United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (cited by the Duro dissent, 495 U.S. at 703).
See supra part III.A. At the same time, it must be remembered that the equal protection
clause did not appear in the Constitution until the end of the Civil War, long after the
basic statutes had been enacted.
369. Rogers was apparently a popular surname in the Indian Territory during the
1840s. Lovely Rogers was tWe accused murderer in the Attorney General's Opinion, J.K.
Rogers was the accuser in the same opinion, and William S. Rogers was the accused
murderer in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 200 (1845).
370. Jurisdiction of United States Courts over the Case of Rogers, 4 Op. Att'y Gen.
258 (Oct. 9, 1843).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
the irule applicable to Mr. Rogers." ' 371 He then stated that the Treaty
of New Echota "essentially changed this rule. ' 372 Article 5 of the
treaty provided that Cherokee Nation laws could not apply to United
States citizens residing in the Nation with tribal permission. The At-
torney General concluded:
It is very clear, under this treaty, that citizens of the
United States residing in Indian country by permission,
cannot be made subject to the laws enacted by the Cherokee
councils - the jurisdiction over them [United States citizens]
belonging to the courts of the United States, under the act
of 1834.
371
At least the Attorney General was of the opinion that "citizen" and
"Indian" were mutually exclusive political categories; a Georgia citizen
could not be treated as an Indian, regardless of his Indian blood.
If "Indian" is a political classification, the next problem is identi-
fying the political group.374 In the earlier treaties, the United States
dealt with various self-identified Indian groups as separate political
entities. In some later treaties, such as the Stevens treaties of the 1850s,
smaller groups, perhaps ethnologically and socially related, were com-
bined to effectively create a "tribe" that did not previously exist. 37
The ]IRA also could have the effect of combining tribal groups into a
single political entity.376 Similarly, a single ethnological group has been
371. Id. at 259.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. See, e.g., United States v. Rickart, 188 U.S. 432 (1903); United States v.
Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866). But cf. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v.
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). The Court has engaged in defining "Indian" on occasion
and has used less than commendable logic. See United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614
(1877), rev'd by United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926); United States v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). These later opinions considered if Pueblo members were
"Indians" and based their conclusions on very derogatory, ethnocentric descriptions of
what constituted "Indianness."
375. See Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 664 n.5 (1979); Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 192 (1978); United States v. Washington,
520 F.d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); United States v.
Washington, 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982) (deter-
mining if the different Indian groups were Indian tribes for treaty fishing rights
purposes). These combinations were probably more for administrative convenience than
any other reason.
376. Where two or more tribes are assigned to a single reservation, the IRA allowed
both consolidated organization as a single "tribe" and organization as separate, ethnic
tribes. :Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 19, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 479 (1988)) ("any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians
residing on one reservation"); see also Wheeler-Howard Act - Interpretation, Op.
[Vol. 17
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divided into two or more "tribes" through congressional action or
treaty."17 Several tribes became divided into smaller "tribes" when
some members remained behind as when the majority was removed
westward. 378 However, for political existence, it is not absolutely nec-
essary that a group receive formal federal recognition so long as there
is an identifiable group with the racial and social characteristics gen-
erally attributed to an Indian tribe.3 79 The only unifying characteristic
of these variously created groups is their recognition, by federal offi-
cials, as a distinct group.
United States v. Kagama31° is the significant statement of the legal
status of Indians in the late nineteenth century. In Kagama, the Court
considered the 1885 Major Crimes Act in the context of a crime
committed by an Indian against another Indian of the same tribe on
their tribe's reservation. Defining the United States-Indian relationship,
the Court said:
They [Indian tribes] were, and always have been, regarded
as having a semi-independent position when they preserved
their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal
and social relations .... 391
Notably, Kagama speaks of "a separate people" (a political term),
not a "race."
If "Indian" is a political classification and the basic political unit
is the "tribe," the earliest federal Indian law decisions require the
conclusion reached in Duro. A person has the legal-political status of
"Indian" only in relation to a particular tribe. Therefore, insofar as
any tribe is concerned, the world is divided into two political, juridical
groups: members and nonmembers.
SOLIC. DEP'T INTE oR, supra note 140, at 484, 489 (opinion dated Dec. 13, 1934):
The right to organize is not restricted to the collective group of tribes,
where more than one tribe is located on a reservation. Thus, any one of
several such tribes or bands... may organize under section 16 [25 U.S.C.
§ 476], on its own behalf, without securing the consent of other Indians
residing on the same reservation.
377. See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888 (dividing the Great Sioux
Reservation into seven separate reservations).
378. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) (Choctaws); United States v.
Boyd, 83 F. 547 (4th Cir. 1897) (Cherokee).
379. See Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901); Mashapee Tribe v. New
Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Joint Tribal
Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).
380. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
381. Id. at 381-82.
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3. Personal Nature of Tribal Jurisdiction
)uro fixes an in personam-type boundary for tribal criminal juris-
diction. While such a boundary may be somewhat inconsistent with
modern advocacy, it is consistent with precedent and the political
nature of tribes. In the Supreme Court's first Indian law case, Fletcher
v. Peck,312 Justice Johnson, concurring, stated: "All the restrictions
upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount only to an exclusion of
all competitors from their markets; and the limitation upon their
sovereignty amounts to the right of governing every person within
their limits except themselves. ' 38 While the language is somewhat
awkward or archaic, its meaning is clear. The European powers pre-
vented Indian nations from imposing their authority on anyone but
their own people. 314 Considering tribal authority as personal is also
consistent with modem criminal and civil cases, although those cases
do not use those specific terms. In Antelope, the defendants' personal
affiliation with the reservation tribe was pivotal'38 '
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,3 6 Justice Johnson, again concurring,
stated:
[The Cherokee Tribe's] condition is something like that of
the Israelites when inhabiting the deserts. Though without
land that they can call theirs in the sense of property, their
right of personal.self-government has never been taken from
them; and such a form of government may exist, though
the land occupied be in fact that of another. The right to
expel them may exist in- that other, but the alternative of
departing and retaining the right of self-government may
exist in them. And such they certainly do possess; it has
382. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
383. Id. at 147 (Johnson, J., concurring). The statement was quoted in part and
used as authority in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981), the current
primary referent for determining tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, and Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978), the current primary referent
denying tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
384. The quoted language itself may not make it clear that Justice Johnson was
speaking to tribal units; his preceding discussion does. Justice Johnson expressly distin-
guished between different tribal groups, contrasting those that have "totally extinguished
their national fire" and those, such as the tribes "to the west of Georgia," that "retain
a limited sovereignty, and the absolute proprietorship of their soil." Fletcher, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) at 146. It would be a very strained construction to argue that Justice Johnson
was speaking of an Indian tribe's authority to govern all Indians, regardless of tribal
membe.rship.
385. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 & n.7 (1977).
386. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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never been questioned, nor any attempt made at subjugating
them as a people, or restraining their personal liberty, except
as to their land and trade.
3
7
Justice Johnson's concurring statements are not inconsistent with the
other Justices' statements concerning the nature of tribal sovereignty.
Oliphant quotes Justice Johnson's concurrence in Fletcher as a basis
for the lack of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian persons; 388 Wheeler
cites the same source as authority for the proposition that Indian
tribes' jurisdiction is limited,8 9 the inference being that jurisdiction is
limited to particular persons.
In 1845, Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court in
United States v. Rogers,3 ° distinguished between "Indian" as a racial
group and a person's membership in a particular tribe. Rogers, a white
man, was charged with murdering another white man within Cherokee
Nation territory. Rogers contended that because both he and his alleged
victim were adopted members of the Cherokee Nation, he was exempt
from federal prosecution under the Indian-against-Indian exception in
the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act. Ruling against that contention,
the Court stated that the 1834 Act's exemption "does not speak of
members of a tribe, but of the race generally - of the family of
Indians... ."391 Rogers did not, the Court held, become an Indian by
387. Id. at 27 (Johnson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Johnson's asser-
tions concerning the remaining power of Indian tribes, such as the power to depart and
retain their governments, seems somewhat divorced from contemporary reality. The
underlying cause of the case before the Court was Georgia's (and the federal adminis-
tration's) clear, express desire to force the Cherokee and other tribes to leave their
homeland to occupy land west of the Mississippi River, where they would be obligated
to remain. Perhaps Justice Johnson equated the Cherokees' moving west of the Missis-
sippi with "departing." Even though the United States claimed sovereignty to the new
area, the removal treaties generally "guaranteed" that those areas would never be made
part of a state, contrary to the situation at their eastern locations. Departing to any
other location would have required displacement of other indigenous peoples, as well
as the Spanish or British who there claimed sovereignty. Justice Johnson may have
overlooked the practical consequences of a decision to move. The Israelites, with whom
Justice Johnson compared Indians, reputedly experienced considerable difficulty when
they arrived at their chosen location. The Israelites established their new homes, again
reputedly, only with significant outside help.
388. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (quoting Fletcher,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147 (Johnson, J., concurring)).
389. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (citing Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) at 147 (Johnson, J., concurring)).
390. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1845).
391. Id. at 572. The result in Rogers, specifically on this issue was later changed by
a treaty between the Cherokee Nation and the United States. See Treaty with the
Cherokee Nation, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799. Article 13 of that treaty allocated to
tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases in which only tribal
members, including adopted members, were parties. Id. § 13, 14 Stat. at 803. That
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being adopted into the tribe.392 However, the Court also made it clear
that Rogers' consent to adoption into the tribe made him amenable
to tribal law and possibly entitled to tribal privileges. 393 Therefore,
even when "Indian" was treated as a racial classification for federal
jurisdiction, tribal authority applied to tribal members, without regard
to race.39
4
The personal nature of tribal jurisdiction has, at times, been rec-
ognized with respect to tribal criminal jurisdiction. Congress has con-
sistently held tribes responsible for members' extraterritorial acts. If
an Indian committed a crime subject to federal jurisdiction under the
Trade and Intercourse Acts, tribes were required to deliver the per-
petrator to federal officials or have the victim's losses deducted from
the tribe's treaty payments.3 95 Congress may have merely intended to
employ tribal social pressure to discourage raiding, but it is more
probable that Congress acted on the presumption that the tribes could
take official action against members who committed crimes outside
the tribe's territorial jurisdiction.
provi!;ion was quite likely the result of the treaty requirement that the Indians' slaves
be freed and given tribal membership, rather than any desire that the tribe have
jurisdiction over white men. (Another possibly significant factor was the belief that a
large portion of the white residents of tribal lands were Southern sympathizers.) Similar
provimion was made in the Act establishing a temporary government for the Territory
of Oklahoma. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 30, 26 Stat. 81, 94. Had Rogers committed
his murder a few years later, he may have been subject to tribal, not federal, jurisdiction.
See Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897); Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S.
499 (1896).
392. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572-73.
393. Id. at 573.
394. But see supra notes 370-73. The 1990-91 congressional advocacy conveniently
overlooks this rather obvious distinction in Rogers. See infra part IV.
395. Such a provision, derived from the 1834 Act, is part of today's code, 25 U.S.C.
§ 229 (1988). The provision states:
If any Indian, belonging to any tribe in amity with the United States ...
shall pass from Indian country into any State or Territory inhabited by
citizens of the United States, and there take, steal, or destroy.., property
belonging to any citizen or inhabitant of the United States, such citizen
or inhabitant ... may make application to the proper superintendent,
agent, or subagent, who, upon being furnished with the necessary docu-
ments and proofs, shall ... make application to the nation or tribe to
which such Indian shall belong, for satisfaction; and if such nation or
tribe shall neglect or refuse to make satisfaction, in a reasonable time not
exceeding twelve months, such superintendent, agent, or subagent shall
make return of his doings to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that
such further steps may be taken as shall be proper ... to obtain satisfaction
for the injury.
Id. The current explanatory notes to section 229 indicate that this section is based on
section 17 of the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act (Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 17,
4 Stat. 731).
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A 1939 memorandum by the Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior details the basis of tribal court jurisdiction.396 The memoran-
dum addressed various questions concerning the power of tribal courts
and police to enforce tribal law if the crime or the perpetrator were
not on restricted land within reservation boundaries. The Solicitor
emphasized repeatedly the personal nature of tribal government:
If, on the other hand, the Indian courts [i.e., CFR courts]
are viewed as tribal courts, deriving their power from the
unextinguished fragments of tribal sovereignty, it must be
recognized that this sovereignty is primarily a personal rather
than a territorial sovereignty. The tribal court has no juris-
diction over non-Indians unless they consent to such juris-
diction. Its jurisdiction is solely a jurisdiction over persons.
3 7
And:
That the original sovereignty of an Indian tribe extended
to the punishment of a member by the proper tribal officers
for depredations or other forms of misconduct committed
outside the territory of the tribe cannot be challenged.
Certainly we cannot read into the laws and customs of the
Indian tribes a principle of territoriality of jurisdiction with
which they are totally unfamiliar, and which no country
has adopted as an absolute rule. That Indian tribes friendly
to the United States acted to punish their members for
depredations committed against whites outside of the Indian
country is a matter of historical record.
398
Current Department of the Interior regulations, in a limited situation,
authorize tribal prosecution of members' off-reservation crimes. The
Court of Indian Offenses of the Hopi Reservation is authorized to
hear cases involving members who violate Hopi laws which expressly
apply to off-reservation activities.
399
396. Law and Order - Dual Sovereignty - Powers of Indian Tribes and U.S., Op.
SoLic. DEP'T INTEmOR, supra note 140, at 891 (opinion dated Apr. 27, 1939). The
discussion dealt with jurisdiction of both tribal courts and CFR courts but took the
position that there was no significant difference between those courts' jurisdiction,
particularly where the Court of Indian Offenses was understood as exercising the criminal
jurisdiction of the tribe. For some reason, this analysis is not among those mentioned
in Duro.
397. Id. at 894 (emphasis added).
398. Id. at 896 (emphasis added).
399. 25 C.F.R. § 11.2(a) (1990). The regulation states:
A Court of Indian Offenses shall have jurisdiction over all offenses
enumerated in §§ 11.38 through 11.87H, when committed by any Indian,
within the reservation or reservations for which the court is established,
429
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In Settler v. Lameer,4w two members of the Yakima Indian Nation
challenged the tribe's authority to prosecute them for off-reservation
fishing violations. The Ninth Circuit held that there was nothing in
the relevant treaty that surrendered the tribe's right to regulate mem-
bers' fishing activities, even if those activities took place off the
reservation. 401 The Ninth Circuit made a similar ruling in the civil
context. Littell v. NakaiO involved a dispute between two Navajo
officials. The court held that the dispute was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of tribal court, even though some of the alleged activities
took place outside the reservation. 403
In the civil jurisdiction context, Montana v. United States 404 citing
Wheeler (a criminal context), held that tribal self-government powers
involve only relations among the individual members of the tribe. 40s
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation
4
06
held that for state taxation purposes, nonmember Indians have the
same status as non-Indians.40 Justice Rehnquist's separate opinion in
Colville, concurring with the majority's conclusions concerning non-
member Indians, stated:
[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity traditionally recog-
nized by this Court derived from the sovereign relationship
provided that such court on the Hopi Reservation shall also have jurisdic-
tion to enforce against members of the tribe within the Hopi Reservation
the ordinances passed by the Hopi tribal council which prohibit offenses
against the peace and welfare of the tribe committed by such members off
the reservation.
Id. (emphasis added) In contrast to Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974),
this regulation appears to limit enforcement authority (arrest) to the geographic bound-
aries of the reservation.
40. 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974).
401. Id. at 237. The Ninth Circuit held, however, that the tribe's authority to
physi.mlly arrest a violator was limited to the "usual and accustomed" fishing places.
Id. at 238-39. The Ninth Circuit noted that modern conditions required the power of
off-reservation arrest. If arrest powers were limited to the reservation, member-violators
could avoid the tribe's regulatory power by merely staying off the reservation; the
defendants in Settler were not reservation residents. Cf. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 668 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Wis. 1987);
United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979), remanded on other
grounds 623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1980); Note, Indian Law - Tribal Off-Reservation
Jurisdiction, 1975 Wrs. L. REv. 1221.
402. 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966).
403. Id. at 490. The Ninth Circuit stated: "We do not read Williams [v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217 (1959)] as holding the locus of some particular act as conclusive." Id. at 490.
404. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
405. Id. at 564-66 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 n.18 (1978)).
406. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
407. Id. at 158.
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between a tribe and its members .... Immunities [from
state jurisdiction] which have formed the backdrop for this
Court's pre-emption analysis have been those derived from
these precepts. This form of immunity, and the principles
which underlie it, are simply inapplicable to the recognition
of a tax immunity for an individual who resides on a
reservation, but is not a member of the trilie .... The fact
that a nonmember resident happens to be an Indian by race
provides no basis for distinction. The traditional immunity
is not based on race, but accouterments of self-government
in which a nonmember does not share;48
Decisions that affirm tribal civil authority over nonmembers are not
inconsistent with this personal nature of tribal authority. The Montana
decision recognizes tribal jurisdiction beyond tribal membership but
limits that jurisdiction to persons having a consensual relationship with
the tribe or whose personal acts have or threatened a direct effect on
tribal interests.4 In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,410 the Court
held that a tribe's power to tax nonmembers comes into being only
when the nonmember engages in on-reservation trade or other activity
to which the tribe can attach a tax.41' Justice Stevens' dissent in Merrion
emphasized the limitations on tribal authority over nonmembers, citing
particularly the portions of Oliphant and Montana noted above.
41 2
Presaging a major component in the Duro decision, Justice Stevens
stated: "The tribe's authority to enact legislation affecting nonmembers
is therefore of a different character than their broad power to control
internal tribal affairs. This difference is consistent with the fundamen-
tal principle that '[i]n this Nation each sovereign governs only with
the consent of the governed."' 43
The personal nature of tribal authority also has an impact on federal
delegation of jurisdiction to states. In United States v. Burland,4 4 the
Ninth Circuit addressed the contention that Montana obtained juris-
diction over all individual members of the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai tribes when Montana assumed Public Law 280 jurisdiction
408. Id. at 186-87 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
409. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
410. 455 U.S. 130 (1981).
411. Id. at 140.
412. Id. at 171-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist joined in Justice Stevens' dissent.
413. Id. at 172-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,
426 (1978)).
414. 441 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 842 (1971).
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over the Flathead Reservation. 45 The Ninth Circuit concluded: "Con-
gress was aware of the difference between ceding jurisdiction to the
states in terms of subject matter and territory and ceding such juris-
diction in terms of persons. When Congress provided for the latter it
did so subject to a variety of specific conditions not present in Public
Law 280. 416 The Ninth Circuit's conclusions are consistent with the
primarily territorial nature of federal and state jurisdiction and the
contrasting, primarily personal, nature of tribal jurisdiction.
The personal nature of tribal authority is a conceptual problem for
persons trained or raised in the common law. The European concepts
of state political jurisdiction that were being developed before and
during the conquest of the Americas were inextricably tied to concepts
based upon or derived from the legal protection of land ownership,
i.e., territory. Native Americans did not, as a rule, have similar
concepts of land ownership. That was one of the primary reasons
Europeans considered Native Americans uncivilized and living in a
state of nature. Indian tribes apparently did consider specific areas as
tribal domain and conducted wars to prevent other tribes' incursions
or to conquer other tribes' domain. However, the European consensus
was that tribal interest in territory was not European-type ownership,
but control of resource utilization.417 Attributing European nation-state
concepts of territorial jurisdiction to pre-Columbian Indian tribes (and
many other indigenous people) was inappropriate because individual
ownership of land or its resources was incompatible with most tribal
philosophies and most pre-Columbian social patterns. However, only
a territorial concept of sovereignty/jurisdiction can support a govern-
ment's general jurisdiction over persons not consensually associated
with that nation. In this respect, the Duro decision may conform more
to historic theory than to contemporary reality.4*8
4. Drawing the Line Between Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction
Duro makes the distinction between "civil" and "criminal" very
significant for tribal jurisdiction purposes. In most situations not
415. State jurisdiction over the Flathead Reservation was obtained under Act of
Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (Pub. L. No. 83-280), when Montana, by statute,
obligated itself to assume federal jurisdiction over that reservation.
415. Burland, 441 F.2d at 1203.
417. A recognition of European-type land ownership by natives might have created
a roadblock for Europeans desiring sovereign "rights" in the Americas. The European
ideological connection between land title and the power to govern precluded recognition
of Indian fee title and contemporaneous claims of European sovereignty. By categorizing
Indian real property interests as temporary uses, European sovereignty without actual
possession was ideologically acceptable, just as the medieval duke retained authority
despite his serfs' temporary possession.
418. If tribal governments were limited to their pre-Columbian sphere, there would
be no tribal courts, no jails, no criminal statutes to be enforced. Modern tribal
governments would not, per se, exist.
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related to Indians, it is not necessary to determine if a regulation is
"civil" or "criminal." Many regulatory laws include penalties of
various types. For instance, a zoning code may allow an agency to
issue administrative orders or a court to assess civil monetary penalties
and, ultimately, criminal sanctions. There is no need to characterize
all or part of the zoning code as civil or criminal if the enacting
jurisdiction has the power to impose both types of penalty. When a
question does arise, usually the fundamental problem is procedural,
i.e., whether criminal law procedures have to be followed before
imposing a particular penalty. In contrast, after Duro, determining
whether a particular tribal ordinance is civil or criminal is a jurisdic-
tional issue. If criminal, the ordinance is not enforceable against
nonmembers; if civil, the ordinance might be enforceable against non-
members.
Because of the uniqueness of the question, there is not a great
number of relevant cases. However, in federal Indian law, there is a
line of potentially analogous cases - those dealing with a state's
jurisdiction under Public Law 280.419 Public Law 280 was enacted in
1953 as part of a congressional program to terminate the federal-
Indian relationship (which included the legal "termination" of some
tribes). Public Law 280 delegated federal criminal and civil jurisdiction
with respect to Indians to specified states and authorized all other
states to assume the same jurisdiction. 420 In Bryan v. Itasca County,421
the Supreme Court held that while Public Law 280 delegated broad
criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians, it did not delegate the
same degree of civil jurisdiction.422 The civil delegation, the Court
held, did not include general civil regulatory or taxing authority.4  As
a result, when a state attempts to exercise authority within a reservation
under the aegis of Public Law 280, the first question is whether the
state law to be applied is criminal or civil.
The decisions dealing with that issue frequently involve a state's
attempt to impose its gambling laws on reservation-based Indian gam-
bling operations (frequently bingo). Based upon the civil-criminal di-
chotomy in Bryan, the cases distinguish between "criminal/prohibitory"
laws and "civil/regulatory" laws. 424 If the state's intent is to prohibit
419. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (Pub. L. No. 83-280) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)).
420. Id.
421. 426 U.S. 373 (1976). In Bryan, a Minnesota county levied its personal property
taxes on a mobil home owned and occupied by a reservation Indian. The Court held
the tax impermissible, despite the fact that Minnesota was one of the mandatory Public
Law 280 states. Id. at 390.
422. Id. at 390.
423. Id.
424. See, e.g., Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy,
694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983); see also United States
v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981).
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a category of conduct entirely (e.g., murder), the statute is "criminal/
prohibitory" and is enforceable on reservations. If the law permits an
activity, subject to regulation (e.g., operating mobile home parks),
then it is "civil/regulatory" and not enforceable on reservations.4 5
The civil/regulatory, criminal/prohibitory dichotomy was approved,
with minor qualification, by the Supreme Court in California v. Ca-
bazon Band of Mission Indians.426 The Court specifically said that the
prohibitory/regulator; distinction is consistent with Bryan's construc-
tion of Public Law 280, but that it is not a "bright line" rule.427 The
Court also stated: "But that an otherwise regulatory law is enforceable
by criminal as well as civil means does not necessarily convert it into
a criminal law within the meaning of Pub. L. 280. "1428 To determine
if the law is "civil" or "criminal" requires an examination of more
than the particular statutory section involved. The section's place in
related state law and the general intent of that broader law is impor-
tant. In Cabazon, the Court noted a broad spectrum of California
law concerning gambling, including the state lottery, parimutuel horse-
race betting, card rooms, and bingo. "In light of the fact that Cali-
fornia permits a substantial amount of gambling activity, including
bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state lottery, we
must conclude that California regulates rather than prohibits gambling
in general and bingo in particular.' '429
The civil-criminal dichotomy has also been applied in the Federal
Assimilative Crimes Act 430 setting. In Pueblo of Santa Anna v.
Hodel,43' the District Court for the District of Columbia considered
the application of New Mexico anti-gambling laws to a proposed
racetrack within the Pueblo. The court found that New Mexico
statutes evidenced a strong state policy against gambling, but there
425. Id.; see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.
1981, cert. denied, 455 U.S: 1020 (1982); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan,
626 F. Supp. 245 (D. Conn. 1986); Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin,
518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981).
426. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
427. Id. at 210.
428. Id. The Court went on to discuss whether California could impose its gambling
laws on reservation Indians under the normal, non-Public Law 280 preemption rules.
Id. The Court held that California's bingo laws were preempted because of the significant
tribal and federal interests in tribal self-sufficiency and the minimal state interest in
preventing infiltration of organized crime (of which there was no real evidence). Id. at
221-22. To the same effect, see Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d
967 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988) (holding that both state gambling
regulations and state sales taxes were an impermissible imposition on tribal autonomy).
429. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211.
430. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988). The Act applies to federal enclaves and Indian reser-
vations and incorporates local state criminal law to fill any gaps in federal criminal
law.
431. 663 F. Supp. 1300 (D.D.C. 1987).
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was a detailed exception for parimutuel gambling on horse races. 432
Because of that exception, the court found that the New Mexico
horse racing statutes were civil/regulatory, and therefore not a state
"criminal" law for Assimilative Crimes Act purposes.433 However,
the court also found that the general anti-gambling laws were crim-
inal/prohibitory for all other types of gambling. 434 Therefore, the




These cases do not directly consider the line between permissible
tribal civil regulation of nonmembers and impermissible application
of tribal criminal laws to nonmembers. However, there is no partic-
ular reason why the same considerations should not apply, and any
ambiguity resolved in favor of tribal authority. 436 A tribe may not
be able to impose criminal sanctions on nonmembers, but that should
not prevent the tribe from the impositing of civil sanctions so long
as a sufficient tribal interest is identified and the statutory scheme is
regulatory, not prohibitory.
IV. The Congress's New Corridor
Duro spurred activity in Congress, and legislation was enacted
purporting to nullify the decision. The original 1990 enactment em-
ulated a venerable tradition, i.e., burying significant Indian-related
enactments in apparently irrelevant legislation. In fact, the 1990
legislation improved on prior levels of burial. 437 Ascribing any leg-
432. Id. at 1313.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 1314.
435. Id.; see also United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding
that Washington State fireworks laws were criminal/prohibitory for Assimilative Crimes
Act purposes, even though limited fireworks sales were permitted).
436. In Pueblo of Santa Anna v. Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300 (D.D.C. 1987), the
court noted that the civil-criminal dichotomy was applied to protect tribal autonomy
from undue state interference. In the Public Law 280 or Assimilative Crimes Act setting,
that purpose would counsel in favor of finding a state statute civil and, therefore, not
applicable to reservation matters. In the tribal jurisdiction setting, that purpose would
counsel finding the tribal regulation civil and, therefore, applicable to nonmembers.
437. The 1990 legislation was initially presented as subsections added to a minor
section of the massive (over $290 million) FY 1991 Defense Department Appropriations
Bill (S. 3189, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 8070(b), (c) (1990)), severely stretching any
relevance requirement. The Senate measure was an amendment, by way of substitution,
to the original House bill (H.R. 5803, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)). Sen. Daniel Inouye
(D-Haw.) later indicated that he personally added the amendment to the appropriations
bill because of the urgency of the matter and the approaching end of the session. See
137 CoNo. REc. S5223 (dally ed. Apr. 25, 1991). It apparently took five months for
the matter to become urgent. Senator Inouye was the Chairman of the Select Committee
on Indian Affairs and of the Defense Department Appropriations Subcommittee. Sub-
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islative intent to the enactment would require elevating form over
substance to a level where objective reality is ignored. Because of
the legislation to which the amendment was attached, the press to
rush that bill through Congress, and the fact that the tribal jurisdic-
tion amendment was only mentioned in a massive conference report
(filed essentially contemporaneously with passage), it is unlikely that
more than a handful of members were aware of the amendment's
existence. It is even more unlikely that anyone, in the face of the
Gulf War crisis and the desire to end the congressional session, would
have prevented the passage of Defense Department appropriations
just to consider or prevent inclusion of the amendment.
4
1
The only mention made of the Indian jurisdiction amendments was
in the conference report. The report alleged that the Supreme Court
had "reversed" 200 years of tribal misdemeanor jurisdiction over
nornembers, creating a "jurisdictional void"; that Congress had
never denied the power of tribes to prosecute nonmember Indians;
and that the measure was presented strictly as a stopgap until "Con-
gress is able to enact comprehensive legislation addressing the con-
section 8070(a), the provision to which the amendment was attached, did have something
to do with the Defense Department; it reserved $8 million for programs under section
504 of the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1544 (1988). Not only did the
appropriations bill have normally controversial items, such as money for the B-2 bomber,
the Seawolf submarine, and the "advanced tactical fighter" development program, it
also dealt with national and international aspects of the Gulf War.
If that did not present sufficient obscurity, the measure was presented on an expedited
basis and legislators urged not to present amendments. See H.R. Res. 529, 101st Cong.,
2d Se;s. (1990), 136 CoNG. REc. HII,733 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1990); 136 CoNe. REc.
S16,735 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Stevens). The Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee report introducing the bill did not address the Duro addition (§ 8070),
nor did anyone participating in the floor debate. The Senate bill was passed as a
substitute for the House version, and the matter was referred to a conference committee.
The o:nference committee report (H.R. REP. No. 938, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1990))
was filed in the House near midnight on Wednesday, October 24 (136 CoNe. REc.
H13,556 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990)), and symbolically in the Senate on Friday, October
26, (116 CoNG. REc. S17,034 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1990)). There was a substantial reaction
in the House, primarily because the ultimate committee meeting included only three
people, was late at night at an obscure location, and the ranking minority House member
was not invited. See 136 CoNe. REc. H13,406 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (remarks of
Rep. Dickinson). The conference report was over 1700 pages long and weighed 14.5
poundi. See 136 CONo. REC. H13,505 (Oct. 24, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Solomon).
Nevertheless, the House approved the conference report on Thursday afternoon (136
CoNG. REc. H11,736 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1990)), and the Senate approved it late Friday
(136 CoNG. REc. D1425, S16,768-69, S17,005-35 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990)).
438. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D.-Vt.), who expressed serious reservations about items
such as the increase in authority to mobilize reserves and the $200 million for full-scale
development of the Advanced Tactical Fighter, nevertheless stated: "On balance this
bill has so many important items that we needU at this time that I will vote 'yes' despite
these reservations." 136 CONe. Rc. S16,766 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990).
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ditions." 4 9 No citations were given to support the assertions concerning
the alleged congressional recognition of tribal authority. A number
of other assertions of "fact" in the report were, at best, glib advo-
cacy.
The 1990 legislation amended a portion of the ICRA to read as
follows (the added language is in italics):
Section 1301. Definitions
For purposes of this subchapter [25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03],
the term-
(1) "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, or other group
of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
and recognized as possessing powers of self-government;
(2) "powers of self-government" means and includes all
governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, exec-
utive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and
tribunals by and through which they are executed, includ-
ing courts of Indian offenses; and means the inherent
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed,
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians;
(3) "Indian court" means any Indian tribal court or court
of Indian offense; and
(4) "Indian" means any person who would be subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under
section 1153, title 18, United States Code, if that person
were to commit an offense listed in that section in Indian
country to which that section applies.A
The conference committee added a provision for automatic expi-
ration, on September 30, 1991, 441 "based upon" the intent of the
relevant congressional committees to "develop more comprehensive
legislation within the coming year to clarify the intent of the Congress
on the issue of tribal power to exercise criminal misdemeanor juris-
diction over Indians."442
On February 19, 1991, Rep. Bill Richardson (D.-N.M.) introduced
a bill that merely deleted the sunset provision, i.e., made the 1990
amendments permanent. 443 The text of the bill stated its purpose as
"[tlo make permanent the legislative reinstatement, following the
decision of Duro against Reina (58 U.S.L.W., May 29, 1990), of the
power of Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indi-
439. CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 5803, H.R. REP. No. 938, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
136 CoNa. REc. H13,556, H13,596 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
440. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988 & Supp. I 1990) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-
511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1990)).
441. Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(d), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1990).
442. H.R. REP. No. 938, supra note 439.
443. H.R. 972, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 137 CONG. REc. H1849 (daily ed. Feb. 19,
1991).
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ans. ' "4  Representative Richardson's reasons for introducing the bill,
presented in writing solely for the record, echo the conference report's
reasons for the 1990 amendments, albeit more advocatorily - and
also without citation to any authority.441
Following a committee hearing,4 the measure passed the House
on an expedited basis. 447 The measure's language, the on-floor ad-
vocacy, and the report reveal that the 1990 comprehensive study
commitment was avoided. 448 The bill's only action was to repeal the
sunset provision. Just as in 1990, to obtain passage, promoters of
the bill promised that concerns raised at the hearing (e.g., inadequacy
of tribal courts, lack of meaningful remedy for ICRA violations)
would be addressed in subsequent proceedings.
Both 1991 House Report 61 and the bill's advocates make some
valid policy arguments. 4"9 However, the "historical precedents" and
444. Id.
445. See 137 CoNG. REc. E511 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1991) (extended remarks of Rep.
Richardson).
446. Hearing [Apr. 11, 19911 on H.R. 972 Before Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of
How-e Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
447. See 137 CONG. REc. H2988 (daily ed. May 14, 1991). A brief report was
submitted as part of the expedited consideration. H.R. REP. No. 61, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess., 137 CONG. REc. H2990-92 (daily ed. May 14, 1991). Reports requested from the
Department of the Interior and the Department of Justice were not available at the
time the measure was presented for expedited House consideration. Id. at H2992.
448. In an argument designed to trigger a primal reaction in congresspersons,
advoates repeatedly said the proposal would save the federal government $10 million.
See, e.g., 137 CoNG. REc. H2988 (daily ed. May 14, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Miller);
id. (remarks of Rep. Rhodes); id. at H2990 (remarks of Rep. Richardson); H.R. REP.
No. 651, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 137 CoNG. REc. H2992 (daily ed. May 14, 1991) (cost
and budget compliance statement). The allegedly supporting document filed at the time
of the House discussion was a letter from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that
indicated that if the federal government had to establish part-time CFR courts at all
reservations, it would cost "about $10 million" annually. Letter from Robert D.
Reischauer, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to Hon. George Miller, House
Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs (May 1, 1991), in 136 CoNo. REc. H2990 (daily
ed. May 14, 1991). The letter also said that such a comprehensive effort was unlikely
and that more likely actions (such as joint tribal judge-CFR judge appointments, tribal-
federal contracts, or establishment of fewer CFR courts) would be less costly. While
the letter said the proposed enactment might preclude the need for additional appro-
priations, the advocates implied that current appropriations would be reduced by the
enactment. Causing a decrease and not requiring an increase are significantly different
actions. The proponents' financial argument is rather ironic in light of those same
persons' advocacy of tribal court enhancement bills that call for appropriations of over
$50 million annually. See infra note 459.
449. However, even some of the policy arguments are questionable. In his advocacy,
Representative Richardson stated: "The Third District of New Mexico [Representative
Richardson's district] alone there are Navajo, Apache, Ute, and Hopi Indians, as well
as 19 different Indian pueblos, all culturally and geographically very close to one
another." 137 CoNo. Rac. H2889 (daily ed. May 14, 1991). The long-standing tensions
betwem the Navajo and Hopi tribes has been before Congress frequently.
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the assertions of prior congressional recognition and approval are
pure advocacy, inconsistent with the historic record.450 The only
recognition of the Supreme Court's rationale in Duro is the propo-
nent's repeated assertions that the 1991 enactments do not create
tribal jurisdiction but merely "clarify" and/or "confirm" an inherent
tribal power to punish nonmember Indian misdemeanants. For ex-
ample, the 1990 Conference Report, reproduced in the 1991 House
Report, stated: "Throughout the history of this country, the Congress
has never questioned the power of tribal courts to exercise misde-
meanor jurisdiction over non-tribal member [sic] Indians in the same
manner that such courts exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction over tribal
members. ' ' 45' Even if one grants accuracy to that dubious character-
ization of congressional history, the statement is misleading; it is
equally true that Congress has never questioned the jurisdiction of
the United States Marines over Antarctic penguins. Proving that a
question was never asked does not prove a particular answer to that
question; lack of denial does not prove affirmation.
On April 25, 1991, Senator Inouye introduced two bills relating to
Duro. The first, Senate Bill 962, was the same as House Bill 972,
but more terse. The second, Senate Bill 963, ignored the 1990 amend-
ment but contained essentially identical language, without the sunset
provision. 4 2 Senate Bill 963 also contained "findings" and "policy"
statements similar to the earlier advocatory statements and expressing
a congressional policy to provide funding for tribal courts equivalent
to comparable state courts and to extend full faith and credit for
tribal court judgments. 453 Senator Inouye's "extended remarks" in-
troducing the bills were essentially the same as those made in the
House and Senate on previous occasions. 414 "Oversight" hearings
450. See supra parts III.B, III.C.
451. House SuBcoMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, COMM. ON INTEIUOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS,
REPORT ON H.R. 972, H.R. REP. 61, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1991), 137 CoNo. REC.
H2990-91 (daily ed. May 14, 1991) (quoting DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS CoNrF. COMM.
H.R. REP. 938, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1990)).
452. 137 CoNG. Rc. S5136 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991).
453. Id. The effect of these policy statements, if any, is questionable. If no funds
were directly appropriated, the measure had a better chance of passage, but it could
have been contested because it establishes a federal "policy" that would logically require
later appropriations. On the full faith and credit issue, the language proposed may be
rather toothless. It does not amend the current full faith and credit implementing statute
(28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) and, therefore, does not require states to honor the "policy."
That provision is also inherently biased because even if implemented, it would not
require tribal courts to grant the same status to state decisions. See generally William
V. Vetter, Of Tribal Courts and "Territories" - Is Full Faith and Credit Required?, 23
CAL. W. L. REv. 219 (1987).
454. 137 CONG. REc. S5223 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991) (extended remarks of Sen.
Inouye).
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weire held by the Senate committee on May 9, 1991 ,41 and June 6,
19SI1.456
On-the-record action did not resume until near the September 30th
deadline. Apparently accompanied by much behind-the-scene negotia-
tions, the deadline was extended for eighteen days4 7 and then elimi-
nated. 48 The language adopted in the FY 1991 Defense Department
Appropriation Bill became permanent. Again, passage was gained
through commitments to study and address civil rights concerns, ap-
parently including the perceived unfairness of an Indian not being able




455. Impact of Supreme Court's Ruling in Duro v. Reina: Hearing on S. 962, S.
963 .Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, Senate Hearing 158, pt. 1, 102d
Con:g., 1st Sess. (1991).
456. Impact of Supreme Court's Ruling in Duro v. Reina: Hearing on S. 962, S.
963 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, Senate Hearing 158, pt. 2, 102
Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
457. Pub. L. No. 102-124, 105 Stat. 616 (1991). A 31-day extension was introduced
in and passed by the Senate (S. 1773), but the period was reduced to 18 days by the
House, to which the Senate acceded. The Senate had previously proposed a two-year
extension. See SENATE SELECT Comm. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, CONFERENCE REPORT TO
ACCOMPANY'H.R. 972, S. RE'. No. 153, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 136 CONe. REc. S13,327
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1991). This was apparently a compromise with committee members
who wanted to tie "resolution" of the perceived Duro problem with perceived problems
affecting individual rights in tribal courts, including federal review in civil cases. Id.
The House refused to agree to that limitation.
458. Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991).
4.59. As expressed by Sen. Slade Gorton (R.-Wash.): "[W]e have an agreement to
fully examine the issue of tribal sovereignty, tribal courts, and Federal review of Indian
civil rights claims from the chairman of the select committee, Senator Inouye." 137
CONO. REC. S14,930-31 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991); see also CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R.
972, PowER oF INDIAN TRlEas TO EXERCISE CRIINAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIANS, H.R.
REP. No. 261, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), 137 CoNG. REc. H8131 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1991). Earlier, Senator Gorton had linked permanent extension to a resolution of civil
rights concerns. See 137 CoNG. REc. S13,470 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1991). Apparently, an
additional concern was the definition of "Indians" over whom the tribes were being
allowed to "continue" exercising jurisdiction. See S. REP. No. 153, 102d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1991).
Senator Inouye stated that his proposals would not grant tribal courts jurisdiction
over persons who are racially Indian but are not considered, or who do not consider
themselves, Indian (137 CoNe. REc. 55224 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991)). The enactment
limits tribal jurisdiction to persons who are "Indian" for federal jurisdictional purposes.
There is no express requirement that the defendant "Indian" have any tribal connection
whatever. However, Senate Report 153 indicates that as a matter of practice, tribal
membership is the touchstone for federal prosecutions and a non-enrolled person con-
tending he or she is an Indian would have the burden of proof.
In a process that overlapped debate on the anti-Duro legislation, a number of hearings
have been held on various proposals aimed at improving tribal courts. In part, the
proposals have taken the position that adequately funded tribal courts are the answer
to all problems concerning civil rights violations. Toward that end, appropriations
exceeding $50 million have been proposed. See S. 1752, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992),
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The anti-Duro legislation has at least two significant, interrelated
problems. The most fundamental is the misinterpretation of Duro.
Comments supporting the 1990 conference committee report and the
1991 bills assume the theory underlying Duro is that Indian tribes have
plenary sovereign power except where expressly and specifically denied
by Congress." ° That is not Duro's, or Oliphant's, premise. The 1990-
91 legislation is based upon a theory of inherent tribal sovereignty that
was rejected in Duro. Indirectly, that is tacitly acknowledged by Sen-
ator Inouye's remarks introducing his 1991 bills, where he included a
lengthy quotation from the Duro dissent's opinion.461
The Court's actual basis in Duro is that the tribes' "inherent,"
"dependent" sovereignty, without more, precludes exercising inde-
pendent "external relations," without express delegation from Con-
gress.462 That Congress may not have "denied" tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers is a non sequitur. Duro is founded on the fundamental
nature of Indian sovereignty, as refined during the sixteenth through
eighteenth centuries. Chief Justice John Marshall's seminal opinions
(and the other Justices' opinions in the early cases) are not based upon
specific congressional action or inaction. Neither is Duro. Congres-
sional advocates assume that federal law equated tribal authority with
European-state sovereignty of the 1700s. Those assertions are not
consistent with beliefs actually expressed in historic Congresses. The
Court has consistently held that inherent tribal authority is something
different, with particular emphasis on external relations.
Duro and other cases divide potential tribal authority into "internal"
and "external" categories. Congressional silence has opposite results
in those categories. On "internal" matters, congressional silence means
the tribe has retained powers. On "external" matters, congressional
silence means the tribe has received no delegated authority.
reprinted in SENATE SELECT CoMM. oN INDIAN ASFA Rs, PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOP-
MENT, ENHANCEMENT, AND RECOGNITION OF INDIAN TUAL CourTs, S. REP. 314, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
460. See 137 CONG. REc. S5223 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Inouye)
("Tribal Governments retain all powers of self-government except those which have
been explicitly divested by Congress. Congress has never acted to divest tribal government
of this authority."). Senator Inouye's words represented a major argument of the
respondents and all amici (including the United States) in Duro. The Court's decision
rejects that argument. See also House Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, Comm. on Interior
& Insular Affairs, H.R. REP. No. 61, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. H2990,
H2991 (daily ed. May 14, 1991).
461. See 137 CONG. REC. S5224 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991). Senator Inouye quotes
the dissent's history discussion, which is not an adequate survey of congressional
activities, as demonstrated in supra part II.
462. A cogent argument can be made that Oliphant has a similar basis. See supra
part III.A.
No. 21
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Despite its fragile underpinnings, the 1990-91 legislation had to be
based upon some theory of inherent tribal authority. That need relates
to the Court's Reid v. Covert463 discussion. If Congress delegates
federal prosecutorial power, full constitutional protections must ac-
company the delegation,464 thus the advocates' emphasis on the no-
explicit-withdrawal theory. After Duro and the 1990-91 legislation, the
question is whether Congress, as a matter of law, delegated nonmember
jurisdiction, which could be done.46  In court, the legislation will
present a rather uncomfortable choice. The Court will have to conclude
that Duro incorrectly interpreted the law (the Court's function, not
Congress'), or that Reid does not preclude unrestricted delegations to
tribal courts, or that the legislation is unconstitutional.
V. Avoiding the New Corridor
Maintaining day-to-day peace and tranquility is a basic necessity.
Traditional and informal controls can serve the need, particularly when
a group is stable and homogenous and remaining part of the group is
necessary or highly desired. Before European incursions, Native Amer-
ican groups had adequate internal controls. Only a few of the hundreds
of groups had to use highly coercive methods like those needed by
their contemporary Europeans. The advent of Europeans significantly
increased cultural diversity. That, together with the non-natives' desire
to "civilize" indigenous peoples by dismantling tribal authority, sub-
stantially reduced the efficacy of traditional group controls. If the
traditional Indian tribe had been able to maintain homogeneity, tra-
ditional social controls may have remained adequate. However, federal
policy prevented that, both directly through allotment and termination
policies and indirectly through policies aimed at strengthening tribal
resources.4
463. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
464. There is the possibility that the Court would find the ICRA provides adequate
prote(tion to overcome the Reid v. Covert problem. In Reid, the Court was addressing
the propriety of subjecting civilian dependents to the military justice system. That system
provides few of the procedural or substantive constitutional safeguards. In contrast, the
ICRA provides nearly all of the same constitutional protections provided in equivalent
state courts, with perhaps the single significant absence being the right to appointed
counsel.
465. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (approving delegation of
authority to adopt liquor regulations that include criminal penalties).
466. The allotment and termination legislation resulted in non-Indians having the
legal ight to own property and reside inside reservation boundaries. A Duro amicus
brief argued that federal employment preferences, not limited to the local tribe's
members, have resulted in many Indians being employed on reservations other than
their own. See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of
the Rosebud Sioux Tribe et al., in Support of Respondents, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.




Reservations, like all other areas in the United States, need some
means of controlling unruly persons. Partly through necessity, Native
American societies have adopted or adapted European-style coercive
social controls, i.e., criminal law and its punishments. At least in
theory, the most serious on-reservation crimes are subject to federal
sanction, enforced by federal officials. However, crimes involving only
non-Indians are subject to state authority. While violent crime clearly
affects quality of life, "minor" misdemeanors and antisocial activities
may have a more pervasive impact. Tribal authority is probably most
necessary in "routine" matters (e.g., disturbing the peace, traffic
control, littering) which individually are not very significant but can
become severe problems if there is no effective, prompt local police
authority. This is particularly true when persons from outside the
community are present in significant numbers, such as during festivals
or powwows or (as with the Pima-Maricopa Indian Community) pop-
ular recreation. This type of control has been hampered by Oliphant
and Duro. In many ways, this is a practical problem that is not well
served by legal theorizing." 7
Together, Duro and Oliphant preclude Indian tribes from fully
exercising local law enforcement authority against anyone other than
tribal members. Some reservations have predominantly non-Indian
residents; some have a significant number of nonmember Indian resi-
dents. In any situation, tribal police acting solely under tribal law are
confronted with uncertainty about whom they can control. Apparently
there is no present legal impediment to tribal police's stopping, with
reasonable cause, any person violating tribal laws. Duro implicitly
approved tribal control through "arresting" violators and turning them
over to other authorities or excluding them from the reservation."6
That power is, however, useless if the perpetrator is a reservation
resident.
Duro definitely exacerbated problems for tribal governments. How-
ever, the decision also hints at potential solutions. The majority opinion
expressly states that the basis for the Duro conclusion is the same as
that for Oliphant. Therefore, means for establishing criminal jurisdic-
tion over nonmembers may also work for non-Indians." 9 Means limited
467. By the same token, there are undoubtedly many situations that are solved in a
practical manner and never appear on any court's docket, despite inconsistency between
the solution and legal theory.
468. Duro, 495 U.S. at 697.
469. That benefit could produce unfavorable results. If the tribal solution affects
only Indians, non-Indians may not be particularly concerned about the solution's
technical niceties. However, if non-Indians are also affected, their concern would
obviously be greater. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. H2988 (daily ed. May 14, 1991)
(comments of Rep. Kyl during the 1991 House discussion of House Report 972, indicating
his support for the measure only after obtaining on-record assurance that it did not
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to ]Indians do not solve the entire problem but could be beneficial on
reservations without a significant non-Indian presence.
A. Intertribal "Treaties"
Duro mentions the possibility of "neighboring" tribal governments
entering into reciprocal agreements granting criminal jurisdiction over
the members of participating tribes but expressly declines rendering
any opinion on that possibility. 470 Reciprocal agreements might work
on some reservations, such as the Sioux reservations in the Dakotas.
There are also some where reciprocal agreements are highly unlikely,
such as the intertwined Hopi and Navajo reservations. Despite the
Court's aside, intertriba agreements raise substantial questions.
From the beginning of its Indian jurisprudence through Duro, the
Supreme Court has held that Indian tribes do not retain the power to
control external relations. 47' In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,'472 which
enunciated that rule, it is relatively apparent that the "external rela-
tiong" reference was to interaction with governments foreign to the
United States, such as Great Britain, France, and Spain.473 If not
before, in Oliphant the Supreme Court included relationships between
tribes and nontribal individuals in the "external relations" category.
Duro held that dealings with nonmember Indians were also in that
category; nonmembers are "external" to Indian tribes even if they are
not external to the United States.4' 4 If dealings between a tribal gov-
ermnent and a nonmember individual involve external relations, it is
very difficult to understand how dealings between politically separate
affect non-Indians and was not a bellwether for legislation to reverse the Oliphant
decision). Since non-Indians are the political majority, that type of reaction could
increase political restrictions on tribal governments. This statement assumes a degree of
interpolity antagonism that does not necessarily exist in all situations, and should exist
in none. Unfortunately, one of the most notable features of Indian and non-Indian
relations since 1492 has been the significant discrepancy between political and philo-
sophic3l statements from a distance and actual events in the neighborhood.
470. Duro, 495 U.S. at 697.
471. The fact that this lack of authority resulted from an understanding between
European powers made without consultation with the Indians did not, at least then,
seem of particular consequence to the non-Indians involved. See Johnson v. M'Intosh,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 503 (1823).
472. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
473. British-Indian relationships were a major factor in the War of 1812, within the
adult lifetime of the Justices on the Bench in 1831. In the initial negotiations for a
treaty ending the War of 1812, the British demanded that the Indian tribes be included
in the treaty provisions and that a permanent reservation be established in the Old
Northwest as a barrier between the British and the United States. After the U.S.
negotiators rejected that, the British essentially abandoned the Indian cause. See DONALD
R. Hic:zcy, THE WAR OF 1812: A FORGOTTEN CONFL T 289-96 (1989). When Cherokee
Nation was decided, federal officials were still concerned about British influence on
tribes in the Upper Missouri, Upper Mississippi, and Oregon regions.
474. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686.
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tribal governments would not. If anything, intertribal relations are
more like the international relations precluded by European fiat.
475
Any different conclusion would be inconsistent with the "political"
nature of Indian tribes. Thus, despite Duro's tantalizing hint, the very
basis of that decision seems to preclude the hinted action.
If external relations are involved, the intertribal-treaty solution would
require federal approval, either on an individual-agreement basis or
through general enabling legislation. There, however, other significant
problems exist. If the approval were administrative, i.e., by the De-
partment of the Interior without express congressional delegation, there
may be a question concerning the department's authority.4 6 If con-
gressional approval, direct or indirect, is necessary, Duro (perhaps in
dicta) raises a significant constitutional question. Based on Reid, Duro
questions Congress' ability to subject United States citizens to tribunals
that do not provide full constitutional guarantees and at least implies
that tribal courts are not now required to meet those standards. 4" To
avoid the Reid problem, Congress would have to provide full consti-
tutional protection for nonmembers. 47 That would require two sets of
tribal criminal procedures, an awkward arrangement at best, and
arguably a violation of the IRA's equal protection requirement. To
avoid resulting problems, Congress would probably adopt a blanket
requirement that tribes provide full constitutional protections in all
prosecutions - a further intrusion on tribal internal autonomy.
Another problem with the intertribal agreement notion relates to the
nature of a member's "consent" to tribal jurisdiction. Duro rejects
the idea that an Indian's "consent" to membership in one tribe is
475. The various tribes might organize into a single "federal" polity, making them
not "foreign" to each other. That would probably require enabling federal legislation.
In some instances, perhaps, all that might be needed is a clarification of which "tribes"
are external to which others. For example, the federal government has dealt with various
parts of the Sioux Nation both as groups and individually. Similarly, the various member-
tribes of the Iroquois Nation are recognized as having had a political relationship that
antedates the United States. In each instance, there is a credible argument that the
included tribes are not "external" to each other.
476. If the department's general supervisory power (25 U.S.C. § 2) is adequate to
support the creation of CFR courts, which it has been held to be, perhaps that power
could be further stretched to include authorization of government-to-government rela-
tions among the tribes.
477. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)). There is
concern in Congress about the status of individual rights on reservations. See supra
note 457.
478. In Reid, the Court affirmed Congress's power to approve less protective pro-
cedures for military personnel. That power is based upon the military's special character
and needs (not found in Indian affairs) and the express constitutional power to provide
for the nation's defense. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19-40 (1957).
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sufficient to subject her or him to the jurisdiction of any other tribe.419
Differing tribal customs, traditions, and social relations, combined
with the nature of a tribal member's personal consent, present a
conceptual problem. The individual's consent, assuming it is a know-
ing, voluntary act, is to the authority as established by her or his
tribe's customs, traditions, and social relations. An intertribal agree-
ment, if valid, would subject each member to a significantly different
set of traditions. The only way to be free of those undesired obligations
would be to retire from one's own tribe, a rather drastic step. In a
way, the sugge.stion of intertribal agreements assumes a high degree
of cultural homogeneity, contrary to the Court's express declaration.
40
Even if the legal obstacles might be overcome, practical obstacles
remain. Intertribal agreements would be effective only as to members
of consenting tribes. While there may be more resident nonmember
Indians who are members of nearby tribes than of more distant tribes,
not all nonmembef Indians would be covered by local area agreements
- Albert Duro's problem with the Pima-Maricopa Community prob-
ably would not have been covered by such an agreement. The result
would be similar to the Ninth Circuit's derided "contacts" test, par-
tially effective but not a solution.
B. Courts of Indian Offenses (CFR Courts)
Duro notes the respondents' contention that CFR courts, which
continue to operate on some reservations, possess jurisdiction over all
479. Duro, 495 U.S. at 695. The Court stated:
[T]he tribes are not mere fungible groups of homogenous persons among
whom any Indian would feel at home. On the contrary, wide variations
in customs, art, language, and physical characteristics separate the tribes,
and theii history has been marked by both intertribal alliances and ani-
mosities. Petitioner's [Duro's] general status as an Indian says little about
his consent to the exercise of authority over him by a particular tribe.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
480. Perhaps the suggestion was made having in mind international treaties that
consent to foreign jurisdiction over the contracting parties' nationals, not an unusual
occurrence in the modem world. That practice is, however, diametrically opposed to
the practice that engendered separate Indian and European legal systems in the Americas.
As discussed at length in In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), extensively quoted in Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence in Reid, the practice of European countries, beginning long
before the "discovery" of the New World, was to negotiate agreements with non-
Christian countries that guaranteed European nationals would not be subject to non-
Christian laws. See Reid, 345 U.S. at 54-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). There is no
question that Europeans, starting with Spain, considered Native American societies to
be non-Christian, barbarous, and uncivilized. Because of their military and technological
superiority, the Europeans felt little need for negotiating exemption from local law.
European ideology and military power did not allow European nationals to be subject
to the laws of even the most advanced Indian polities.
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Indians.4 1 Duro effectively characterizes the CFR courts as a federal
program, exercising federal powers.4 2 Based upon the Duro rationale,
it is necessary for those courts to exercise federal powers; otherwise,
CFR courts would be limited to jurisdiction over members of the local
tribe(s), the department's regulations to the contrary notwithstanding.
In addition to the anomalous nature of the courts' creation, the
question of which government's power these courts exercise has not
been conclusively determined. At least the Solicitor of the Department
of the Interior has taken the position that CFR courts exercise federal
administrative authority.483 Initially, CFR courts assumed duties that
had been performed by federal officials, i.e., the local agent. Whether
481. Duro, 495 U.S. at 690 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 11.2(a) (1989)). Section 11.2(a)
provides that "[a] Court of Indian Offenses shall have jurisdiction over all offenses
enumerated ... when committed by any Indian, within the reservation or reservations
for which the court is established .... 25 C.F.R. § 11. 2 (a) (1989). By way of
definition, section 11.2(c) provides:
[A]n Indian shall be deemed to be any person of Indian descent who is a
member of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction and
a "reservation" shall be taken to include all territory within reservation
boundaries, including fee patented lands, roads, waters, bridges, and lands
used for agency purposes.
Id. § 11.2(c). This definition is more limited than the one in the 1990-91 legislation.
482. There is considerable difficulty with conceiving of the jurisdiction actually
exercised by CFR courts as federal. The crimes over which those courts exercise
jurisdiction are the very crimes that are not covered by the Major Crimes Act (18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)), e.g., carrying concealed weapons, abduction, embezzlement,
forgery, receiving stolen property, disorderly conduct, malicious mischief, cruelty to
animals, illicit cohabitation, failure to send children to school (25 C.F.R. §§ 11.38-.73
(1990)), and expressly includes "violation of an approved tribal ordinance" (25 C.F.R.
§ 11.74 (1990)). A number of these regulatory "crimes" are specifically adopted for
only one tribe. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.76H-.87H (1990) (applicable only to Hopi
Indians).
483. Secretary's Power to Regulate Conduct of Indians, Op. Souc. DEP'T INTERIoR,
supra note 140, at 531 (opinion dated Feb. 28, 1935). Similarly, the jurisdiction of tribal
courts and CFR courts over tribal members has been characterized as commensurate.
See Law and Order - Dual Sovereignty . Powers of Indian Tribes and U.S., Op. Souc.
DEP'T INTERIOR, supra note 140, at 891 (opinion dated Apr. 27, 1939); see also Powers
of Indian Tribes, 15 Interior Dec. 14, 64 (1934), reprinted in Op. Souc. DEP'T INTERIOR,
supra note 140, at 445 (opinion dated Oct. 25 1934) (this seminal declaration of inherent
tribal authority is somewhat equivocal on the source of CFR courts' powers).
484. See 1884 REPORT, supra note 286, at 6-8. The Commissioner's report included
communications from agents at reservations where CFR courts had been established.
The agent at the Standing Rock Agency (Dakota) reported that the court "aid[s] me
materially in administering the affairs of the agency." Id. at 7. The agent at the Devils
Lake Agency (Dakota) reported:
The court of Indian Affairs is of great assistance to the agent in keeping
the Indians under proper restraint and enforcing the laws published by the
Department. The system also relieves the agent of much disagreeable work
and odium in connection with the duty of imposing fines or imprisonment
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the agent's actions were a usurpation of tribal authority or a filling
of a. void left by the decline of tribal authority is primarily a matter
of opinion. The only court decisions that directly address the character
of CFR courts have held that the decisions are federal administrative
tools4 1 or that the CFR courts are exercising sufficient federal authority
to be considered an arm of the federal government.4 6 Congressional
administrative officials appear to be of the opinion that any extension
of today's CFR courts would be a federal project.47
If CFR courts can effectively enforce tribal ordinances against all
Indians regardless of tribal membership, their establishment on all
reservations might solve the nonmember Indian problem. It is, how-
ever, highly unlikely that such a solution would be acceptable. CFR
courts are created by, and subject to, Department of the Interior
regulations.48 The presence of a CFR court, even as an adjunct to
tribal court, would increase departmental presence, which is contrary
to the thrust of current federal policy and may not be desired by tribal
governments or individual Indians.
upon offenders.-
Id. The Commissioner, to support his request that the judges be paid, argued that
"[t]he agents would be relieved of a large amount of unnecessary labor and annoyance,
and it would be a matter of economy to the Government in saving the expense heretofore
incurred of suppressing crimes which are now included in the jurisdiction of the court
of Indian offenses." Id. at 8.
The implication that these courts were exercising federal authority is also supported
by the "crimes" initially within their jurisdiction. As indicated by the Commissioner,
"this court has been instrumental in abolishing many of the most barbarous and
pernicious customs that have existed among the Indians from time immemorial .... "
Id. at 6. The Commissioner goes on to state that "I believe that in a few years polygamy
and the heathenish customs of the sun dance, scalp dance, and war dance will be
entirely abolished," implying that the courts will be instrumental in that result. Id. At
least some of the "crimes" being punished in these courts were integral parts of
traditional Indian culture, not transgressions previously proscribed by tribal custom. To
the same effect, see 1883 REPoRT, supra note 286, at 10-11, which states:
There is no good reason why an Indian should be permitted to indulge in
practices which are alike repugnant to common decency and morality; and
the preservation of good order on the reservations demand that some active
measures be should be taken to discourage and, if possible, put a stop to
the demoralizing influence of heathenish rites.
485. United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888). The proximity of Clapox to
the court's initiation indicates that the deciding court was very much "in touch with"
the court's purpose and function.
486. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
487. See Letter from Robert D. Reischauer to Hon. George Miller, supra note 448.
488. As federal courts, it can be inferred from Duro that CFR court procedures
must conform to the federal constitution. If not, those courts would be in the rather
unusual position of exercising federal authority but not subject to constitutional res-
traints. Again, the Court's reference to Reid implies that this situation would not be
acceptable.
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C. Individual Consent
The key factor in tribal authority over members, under Duro, is
consent. Because consent confers jurisdiction over members, it is logical
to conclude that consent could confer jurisdiction over nonmembers.
While the Court has rejected implied consent based upon signs posted
at reservation boundaries,419 there appears little reason why voluntary
and informed consent should not be effective. The problem, of course,
is obtaining the consent; most people will not simply appear at tribal
headquarters to sign a consent form. However, with respect to a
significant number of nonmembers, tribes have effective means of
requiring consent.
The Duro majority stated that tribal enforcement officers have the
power to restrain and eject persons who disturb public order on the
reservation, apparently even if the tribe has no criminal or civil juris-
diction over the offender, 49 0 and: "We have no occasion in this case
to address the effect of a formal acquiescence to tribal jurisdiction
that might be made, for example, in return for a tribe's agreement
not to exercise its power to exclude an offender from tribal
lands . . . ,,491 The essentially unsolicited nature of the Court's com-
ment implies that some type of actual consent by nonmembers would
be sufficient.
49
In the situation mentioned by the Court (regarding an apprehended
offender), the necessary consent would probably be similar to that
required for a waiver of rights in a criminal setting, perhaps similar
to the federal rules for accepting guilty pleas. The accused would
probably also have to be at least generally informed of the available
alternatives, such as state or tribal prosecution, exclusion, or permis-
sion to remain, and so on. Once a person has been apprehended and
faces potential criminal penalties, the burden on tribal enforcement
officers would probably be relatively high, but could be satisfied using
standardized forms and procedures.
There appears to be no logical reason why obtaining consent need
be delayed until an offense has been committed. Most Indian treaties
allow tribal authorities to exclude or expel undesired persons from the
reservation. 493 As a result of federal legislation such as the Allotment
489. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 695; Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978).
490. Duro, 495 U.S. at 697.
491. Id. at 689.
492. The Court's implication also appears to support an argument that a person's
acquiescence to tribal court criminal jurisdiction, such as by entering a guilty plea, is
sufficient to support jurisdiction. That would prevent convicted persons from later
challenging the tribal court's jurisdiction by way of habeas corpus. That argument is,
however, vulnerable to the Duro dissent's comment concerning the general legal require-
ments for an effective waiver. See id. at 708 n.4.
493. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989).
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Acts, that tribal power does not extend to all nonmembers who may
come onto the reservation. 49 The power does extend, however, to any
person on individual Indian or tribal lands, even if the person has
some contractual right to be there.49s In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe,496 the Court stated:
Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject
to the tribe's power to exclude them. This power necessarily
includes the lesser power to place conditions on entry, on
continued presence, or on reservation conduct .... When
a tribe grants a non-Indian the right to be on Indian land,
the tribe agrees not to exercise its ultimate power to oust
the non-Indian as long as the non-Indian complies with the
initial conditions of entry. However, it does not follow that
the lawful property right to be on Indian land also immu-
nizes the non-Indian from the tribe's exercise of its lesser-
included power to tax or to place other conditions on the
non-Indian's conduct or continued presence on the reser-
vation .4W
While most of the statement is in terms of "non-Indian," the first
sentence indicates that what is said applies to all nonmembers.
When combined, Merrion and Duro establish the tribes' ability to
condition both initial entry into, and continued presence on, the
reservation. Those conditions could include express consent to tribal
criminal jurisdiction. If formal consent to jurisdiction in exchange for
not exercising the right to evict is sufficient, a similar consent in
exchange for not exercising the right to exclude should also be suffi-
cient. The only difference is that the former would be obtained after
a tribal offense has been committed, rather than before, as with the
latter. On reservations with a high proportion of non-Indian-owned
land, that mechanism may not be very practical. However, on relatively
isolated reservations with few non-Indian landowners, the administra-
tive costs and problems may well be justified by increased tribal
authority.
If pre-admission consent is adequate, a tribal administrative mech-
anism could be established to obtain that consent. 498 The mechanism
494. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
495. See Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1985)
(10-year reservation resident non-Indian who lived on tribal land leased by his parents
held excludable).
496. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
497. Id. at 144-45 (citing Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958)).
498. The most inclusive method would be to require all nonmembers entering the
reservation to execute a written consent. The nonmember would probably have to be




for obtaining consent would obviously vary with the degree of cov-
erage. The greater the period and degree of contact, the more likely
consent would be regarded as sufficient. But it would still be necessary
to document express consent to tribal jurisdiction.
With respect to semi-transient persons, the law enforcement benefits
may extend well beyond the mere fact of jurisdiction. The documentary
requirement would publicize the fact that tribal authorities intend to
enforce tribal law. In addition, it is more likely that consent will be
obtained if requested before a crime is committed. A person asked to
consent to jurisdiction after committing a crime may see refusal as a
means of escaping punishment, especially if that person's reservation
connections are not particularly significant. In contrast, before a crime
has been committed only persons intent on committing a crime would
be reluctant to consent.
The most significant problems with a nonmember consent system
are highly transient persons who have no desire to stay on the reser-
vation, and persons with a legal right to come within the reservation
without the tribe's consent.
With respect to highly transient persons, such as tourists driving
through on major highways, the potential benefits may not justify the
cost of establishing and administering an adequate consent system. 499
In potentially more egregious situations, such as powwows or other
popular attractions, an adequate consent system might be feasible if
combined with such things as event admissions or motel and camp-
ground registrations. Another potential means for obtaining transients'
consent would be to adopt some type of penalty for members (and
consenting nonmembers) who have nonmember guests or tenants for
more than a specified period, unless the guests or tenants have con-
sented to tribal jurisdiction. A more coercive measure might penalize
the member for any damages or losses caused by nonconsenting guests
or tenants.
Obtaining pre-crime consent from persons with a right to enter
without tribal consent is a more difficult problem. As indicated in
Montana, while on nontrust land, those persons are beyond day-to-
day tribal regulation. For those persons, the only means of obtaining
acknowledge. A less pervasive system, aimed at nonmember residents (excepting non-
Indian landowners) could be established by requiring all affected persons to execute a
consent/registration if they stay on the reservation for more than a specified number
of days, either consecutively or annually. That type of system could also be enforced
by civil or criminal sanctions against tribal members who sheltered nonregistered persons.
499. Enforcing consent in that setting, even if possible, would probably create public
relations and political problems that might far outweigh any benefits.
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pre-crime consent would be when they somehow came within one of
the Montana exceptions, i.e., commercial dealings or some threat to
tribal interests. Decisions such as Brendale, Cardin, and Namen, how-
evejr, may provide some leverage. If zoning, health, or other tribal
interests can be sufficiently articulated to require tribal permission for
some activity those persons wish to undertake on nontrust lands (e.g.,
a zoning variance), a strong argument could be made for the power




Another potential means for establishing tribal control lies in civil
law. The Duro result is largely predicated on the criminal law's sig-
nificant intrusion on personal liberty. It is established that a tribe has
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers who enter into consensual relation-
ships with the tribe or who engage in activities that may have a negative
impact on tribal social or economic interests. 0' There is also an
established, relatively artificial, distinction between civil-regulatory laws
and criminal-punitive laws. It would, perhaps, not be judicious to
adopt tribal regulations that merely labelled as "civil penalties" the
sanctions for otherwise criminal transgressions sc2 However, it should
not be difficult to impose civil monetary penalties for violations of
civil regulations.503 Since most misdemeanors are penalized by fine,
eliminating possible incarceration should not significantly handicap
enforcement. Perhaps the tribal zoning code could declare that any
injury to property or persons is a nonconforming use and impose a
civil penalty on persons who engage in or permit nonconforming uses.
The amount of the penalty could, of course, be tailored to the degree
of nonconformity, i.e., the amount of damage occasioned. As civil
penaRties, these exactions would not be subject to the $5000 limitation
for criminal fines.504
500. In Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1985), the
non-Indian was excluded because of his federal conviction for theft of federal property
from a federal installation within the reservation, something entirely unconnected with
his res,-rvation residence. The Ninth Circuit held that Hardin's exclusion was an appro-
priate exercise of the tribe's power to persons who threaten the health or welfare of
the tribe. Id. at 479; cf. Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984).
501. See discussion supra part III.D.
502. Similarly none of the proscribed acts should be called "crimes," "misdemean-
ors," or "infractions." All of the terms regularly associated with criminal law should
be avoided.
503. Cf. FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribe, 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990) (tribal
court imposed an annual civil fee of $100,000 in connection with the tribal hiring
preference law).
504. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988).
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While Brendale may place some limit on "civil" regulation, decisions
such as Cardin and Namen indicate that the "tribal interest" language
of Montana can be liberally construed when an identifiable, concrete
tribal interest is affected. 05 Criminal laws, by definition, protect against
activities that are considered harmful to society; subjecting the identical
activities to civil penalties does not make them less harmful. A Ca-
bazon-type distinction between civil and criminal laws would, however,
require care in drafting civil regulations relating to traditionally crim-
inalized activities.5s 6 Perhaps to support an argument that these are,
indeed, civil regulations, existing tribal criminal codes could be re-
tained. It would probably also be appropriate to have civil regulations
enforced by some tribal officer other than the criminal prosecutor.
One example of legislation essentially employing this theory was ad-
dressed in Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe °7 The tribal
ordinance regulated self-help repossessions. Tribal members who trans-
gressed were subject to misdemeanor charges. Nonmember transgres-
sors were subject to exclusion and civil damages judgments. The Ninth
Circuit held that ordinance enforceable in tribal court against nonres-
ident members. 08
E. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Another potential solution to the Duro problem is the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. That would not solve the problem of non-
Indian offenders and would be effective only to the extent tribal
governments are willing to participate. It should not, however, require
federal participation, as the intertribal-treaty approach does.
The personal nature of tribal jurisdiction appears to allow the
imposition of tribal sanctions upon members even though the triggering
events occur outside the reservation.509 Member's crimes on other
reservations affect law and order on that other reservation, hence the
need for intertribal cooperation. If the tribal police can detain alleged
perpetrators, as Duro expressly approved, and turn them over to
officials with jurisdiction, there appears to be no particularly strong
505. See discussion supra notes 345-56.
506. A major factor in the distinction is whether the law absolutely prohibits a
particular activity or merely regulates it. If the object is to control the use of weapons,
a permit system could be established and the zoning code amended to allow the use of
weapons only in areas zoned for hunting or recreational shooting. Similarly, physical
fighting could be proscribed except in recreation centers. If fighting is defined to include
any action traditionally included in a criminal battery, child or spouse abuse would
violate the zoning code. Repeated violations could probably be subject to incarceration
for contempt of court, assuming the first violation resulted in a court order prohibiting
further violations.
507. 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984).
508. Id. at 600.
509. See supra part III.D.3.
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argument against turning the perpetrator over to his or her own tribe,
rather than state or federal officials.
The effectiveness of this solution is, at best, partial. It would not
enable reservation officials to directly exercise local control; it would
depend upon an essentially pan-Indian exercise of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction. and a high degree of intertribal cooperation. The local tribal
government would, in effect, be depending on the membership tribe
(often far distant, geographically, and in other ways) to enforce local
law and order - not a very desirable state of affairs. That solution
also does not address the Oliphant problem; non-Indians would remain
beyond tribal control.
F. Limited Tribal Membership
Duro, at least twice, mentioned the fact that nonmembers and non-
Indians are unable to participate in tribal government. Although the
relationship is not clearly drawn, the ability to participate in a tribe's
government appears equated with consent to that government's au-
thority. The opinion did not fully detail what is meant by "partici-
pation in tribal government," but three factors are mentioned: right
to vote, right to hold office, right to serve on juries.510
The degree to which a tribe would have to allow nonmember par-
ticipation to avoid the Duro result is uncertain. Allowing nonmembers
to serve on juries appears important, but the Duro majority did not
mention the fact that some tribes do allow nonmember jurors. That
fact was made known to the Court in amicus briefs presented in
Duro.5-1 If opening jury panels to nonmembers were, of itself, suffi-
cient to overcome the "lack of participation" factor, it is logical to
assume that Duro would have made some mention of that. Since there
is no mention, a greater degree of participation must be necessary.
Two other factors were mentioned by the Duro majority, the alleged
subservience of tribal courts to tribal politics and tribal court appli-
cation of tribal tradition and custom. Eliminating the influence of
tribal tradition, to the extent it exists, may not be desirable, at least
510. Duro, 495 U.S. at 688. The portion of'Oliphant cited in support of that
proposition mentions only the right to sit on tribal court juries and the fact that tribes
are not precluded from allowing nonmembers to sit on juries. Id. (citing Oliphant v.
Suquanish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 & n.4 (1978)).
511. The amicus brief states that the following persons may sit on juries in the
indicated tribe's court: (a) Colville - all adult residents; (b) Lummi - all registered
state voters; (c) Upper Skagit - "not limited to enrolled members"; (d) Winnebago -
any Indian. Motion and Brief, Duro, supra note 466, at 28 n.10 (No. 88-6546). The
Navajo Tribal Code has been amended to allow all reservation residents, not just
Navajos, to sit on juries. See NAvAJo Tam. CODE tit. 7, § 654 (Supp. 1987). The 1985
amendment that substituted "Any person" for "Any Navajo Indian" also reduced the
minimum age from 21 to 18. Id. § 654 note.
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on the civil side. There is nothing in the Duro briefs that indicates
the degree of influence of tribal tradition in the criminal process. 12
Given the requirements of the ICRA, it is unlikely that the influence
is overwhelming. The political control issue probably goes to the heart
of the majority's concern.
The separation of the judicial and political branches is a fundamental
feature of legal ideology in the United States. Obviously, some degree
of political influence on the Judicial branch does exist in the federal
and state governments. The appointment of federal judges is a political
process (as amply demonstrated by recent Supreme Court Justice
appointment debates), but after appointment those judges are effec-
tively free from political control. Similarly, state judges are usually
elected, also a political process, but the other branches of state gov-
ernment normally become involved only when a vacancy exists and
they cannot, for political reasons, remove a judge. Despite actual
independence of tribal judges and regardless of actual noninterference
by other tribal-government branches, so long as the potential for
political manipulation exists, tribal courts will be perceived as subser-
vient and, therefore, inadequate to protect individual rights. It takes
only a few bad examples"' to establish a perception of general inad-
equacy.
The perceived inadequacy of tribal courts514 to protect nonmembers,
reflected in the Duro decision, can be eliminated at least partially in
two ways, legally establishing the independence of tribal judges and
providing for nonmember participation in tribal government. Estab-
lishing judicial independence would do much for the non-Indian per-
ception of tribal justice.
Opening tribal government appears to be more likely to obviate the
Duro objection to jurisdiction over nonmembers. The theory appar-
ently is that if tribal courts are subject to political influence, persons
who have the right to participate in the political process should not
be able to object to that process's result. Therefore, if the scope of
participation is broadened, the scope of tribal court jurisdiction might
broaden commensurately. It is not that a different category of persons
will be subject to tribal court jurisdiction, but that a broader group
512. It is unlikely that any degree of education would convince non-Indians, including
non-Indian jurists, that traditional Indian punitive measures should be enforced on
nonmembers.
513. See Shortbull v. Looking Elk, 677 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1982); Little Horn State
Bank v. Crow Tribal Court, 690 F. Supp. 919 (D. Mont. 1988), vacated on stipulation,
704 F. Supp. 1561 (D. Mont. 1989).
514. This "inadequacy" is undoubtedly a continuation of the ethnocentric viewpoint
of non-Indians. In traditional societies, the persons who enforce group norms are not
generally isolated (or insulated) from the community, but are fully involved. In that
sense, segregation of the law enforcers is an alien concept.
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of persons will be included in the subject categories. Naturally, there
is an objection to extending tribal membership to additional persons.
Insofar as federal benefits are concerned, it is not desirable to increase
the number of beneficiaries, particularly to persons who do not share
in the Indian heritage. Also, tribal rules cannot amend federal rules
concerning participation in federal programs designed to benefit In-
dians. There may, however, be some method of allowing nonmembers
the degree of participation necessary to overcome the Duro objections
without running afoul of federal benefit programs.
Even though it might be inferred from the Duro opinion that some
limited tribal membership would allow tribal courts to exercise juris-
diction over persons who are now nonmembers, the difficulties at-
tending that solution are likely greater than the benefits. It appears
fairly obvious that merely allowing nonmembers to sit on juries will
not be enough.
Summation
The Duro decision undoubtedly represents a challenge to tribal
officials - and a threat to law and order on the reservation. It also
could be a catalyst for a significant increase in tribal control over
reservation activities.
Duro expressly equated nonmember Indians and non-Indians, at
least for tribal jurisdiction purposes. Tribal solutions that provide
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians may allow the same control over
non-Indians. Federal legislation will not provide tribal control over
non-Indians. Even if Congress's plenary control over Indian affairs is
sufficient to avoid the Reid problem, it is unlikely that power would
be construed to avoid Reid for non-Indians (assuming that a measure
granting tribal authority over non-Indians could pass, which is un-
likely). Tribal measures that satisfy the Duro and Montana limitations
are not subject to that handicap. Satisfying those limitations will, no
doubt, require a degree of ingenuity and innovation by tribal author-
ities. That effort would be substantially rewarded - no longer would
tribal officers be required to travel the sinuous, shifting maze.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/2
